The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

"Less than a month into his mandate, the jury is still out on Ali al-Zaidi," writes Institute expert David Schenker. "The deep state exists in Iraq and is largely controlled by Iran, so a political novice like Zaidi will have a hard time trying to steer the ship in a new direction even if he is so inclined."

Tempering U.S. Expectations About Iraq’s New Government Tehran seems just as enthusiastic about the new prime minister as Washington—a telling sign that the militia-dominated status quo in Baghdad will be difficult and slow to change, if it changes at all.

Syrian officials want foreign capital to flow quickly given the country’s needs, but they have to understand that such a pace is impossible as long as the world sees their government as “an opaque regime with unclear authority, factional infighting, uncertain legal protections, and unresolved military tensions with powerful neighbors,” writes Institute expert Andrew Tabler.

The Politics Blocking Syria’s Energy Recovery Washington’s message to Syrian officials should be simple: foreign energy capital is unlikely to flow quickly as long as the outside world sees their government as an opaque regime with unclear authority, factional infighting, uncertain legal protections, and unresolved military tensions with powe...

Washington should treat the current protest wave in Syria not as a sign that the country's transition is failing, "but as an opportunity to help ensure that Damascus does not repeat the mistakes of previous Syrian governments," writes Institute expert Aaron Zelin.

Syria’s Protest Wave: A Governance Stress Test Washington should treat the recent public discontent not as a sign that Syria’s transition is failing, but as an opportunity to help ensure that Damascus does not repeat the mistakes of previous governments.

Iran is hoping that its new control system, the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, will “lock in facts on the ground” and give Tehran leverage during negotiations, writes Institute expert Farzin Nadimi. The U.S. should counter Iran’s strategy by:

🔹Announcing and launching a “Hormuz Security Force”;
🔹Continuing to publicly and privately denounce Iran’s attempts to rewrite international maritime norms;
🔹Imposing secondary sanctions on companies, banks, insurers, or governments that comply with new Iranian restrictions or facilitate the new authority;
🔹Interdict Iranian “shadow fleet” vehicles; and
🔹Pushing Oman away from going along with Iran here—but cautiously.

Countering Iran’s Latest “Smart Control” Gambit in the Strait of Hormuz Tehran is hoping that its Persian Gulf Strait Authority will establish “facts on the ground” and give it leverage at the negotiating table, so Washington and its partners need to respond right away with a suite of military, economic, and diplomatic countermeasures.

The military cooperation between the U.S. and Israel hit new heights during the Iran war. In the latest episode of “Decision Points,” host David Makovsky speaks with Amir Eshel, former head of the Israeli Air Force, and Eliot A. Cohen, former counselor at the State Department, about the early military lessons of the conflict.

Listen to the full episode:

What the U.S. and Israeli Militaries Have Learned So Far From the Iran War with Eliot Cohen and Amir Eshel | Decision Points Listen to What the U.S. and Israeli Militaries Have Learned So Far From the Iran War with Eliot Cohen and Amir Eshel from Decision Points. Conflicting statements from President Trump leave open the question about whether the Iran war is any closer to being over or whether the significant impasse ove...

Even if Turkey will not take part in U.S. military action against Iran, Ankara still has a strong interest in preventing the Islamic Republic from going nuclear or falling into chaos, writes Soner Cagaptay.

Turkey’s Limited Role in the Iran War Power parity informs the view from Ankara, which has a strong interest in preventing Iran from going nuclear or alternatively falling into chaos—even as the war’s outcome will be largely outside Turkish control.

Disarming Hezbollah is still crucial, but Washington will have to address the group’s broader ability to restore itself so long as it retains Iranian support and key allies and government posts in Beirut, writes Institute expert Hanin Ghaddar. That will mean:

🔹Delinking Iran and Lebanon
🔹 Offering carrots to Beirut, not just sticks
🔹Targeting Hezbollah’s allies and engaging its Shia base

Beyond Disarmament: How the IRGC Keeps Hezbollah in Power Despite Its Military Losses Although disarming the group is still crucial, negotiators need to realize that they will never really break Hezbollah’s hold on Lebanon so long as it retains Iranian support and key political allies and government posts in Beirut.

Iran’s drone ecosystem cannot be destroyed though airstrikes alone, writes Institute expert Farzin Nadimi. In the medium-term postwar period, that means the U.S. should pursue a counter-drone strategy around these principles:

🔹Put unrelenting pressure on Iran’s domestic regeneration network;
🔹Counter Iran’s use of cryptocurrency to procure drone components;
🔹Pressure foreign supply chains leading into the Iranian drone program;
🔹Directly confront Russian and Chinese assistance for Iran’s drone ecosystem;
🔹Prepare for the future; and
🔹Work with Gulf and European partners to launch a classified defection program for Iranian personnel working on drones

Iran’s Drone Strategy (Part 2): Preventing Postwar Rebuilding and Advancements Tehran’s drone ecosystem has been hit hard, but not at its roots—with help from Russia and China, the regime could restore many of the program’s capabilities within months while steadily working toward more dangerous next-generation models.

The Iran war has shown the U.S. “that relying too heavily on expensive missile defenses against relatively low-cost OWADs [one-way attack drones] is financially and operationally unsustainable,” writes Institute expert Farzin Nadimi.

Iran’s Drone Strategy (Part 1): Wartime Performance and Adaptations The war has shown that Iran’s one-way attack drones are highly adaptable tools of coercion and military effect, able to continue imposing costs across the Gulf region and beyond even after heavy losses.

As long as Hezbollah retains control over key Lebanese security and financial channels and access to Iranian funding, “it will find a way to rebuild,” writes Institute expert Hanin Ghaddar.

Beyond Disarmament: How the IRGC Keeps Hezbollah in Power Despite Its Military Losses Although disarming the group is still crucial, negotiators need to realize that they will never really break Hezbollah’s hold on Lebanon so long as it retains Iranian support and key political allies and government posts in Beirut.