10/11/2025
This is a good short read for pilots on training as well as those of us who are certificated.
The Crash That Changed Flight Training Forever — and Why It Hasn’t Made Pilots Much Safer Today
Fifteen years ago, the stall warning system on a Bombardier Q400 sounded as the aircraft approached Buffalo, New York. The captain responded by increasing the angle of attack slightly and adding some power. The first officer then retracted the flaps. Moments later, the Q400 stalled, entered a spin, and crashed — killing all 50 people aboard. Four others on the ground were seriously injured.
In the aftermath to this Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 120-109, which fundamentally changed stall recovery procedures forever. The new guidance emphasized aerodynamic principles rather than altitude preservation. The required recovery steps are:
1. At the first indication of a stall or aerodynamic buffet, immediately reduce the angle of attack to break the stall.
2. Advance the throttles to climb power.
3. Retract flaps incrementally only after a positive rate of climb is established.
Yet despite these changes, stall/spin accidents remain the leading cause of fatal aircraft crashes today.
Why? Because old habits die hard. During checkrides, examiners still see pilot applicants add partial power first, then announce, “I’m lowering the nose to the horizon” — but often without actually reducing the angle of attack enough to unstall the wing. This can lead to a secondary stall, something the FAA specifically warns can occur if power is added before reducing AOA.
Takeaway: There is no FAA standard for altitude loss during stall recovery. The first and only priority at stall onset is to reduce the angle of attack enough to break the stall. Then — and only then — add power, and clean up the flaps once a positive rate of climb is established. Altitude loss is acceptable; failing to recover is not.
Please don’t be another stall/spin statistic — follow the correct procedure.
Fly safe, friends. ✈️
