09/04/2020
Hot off the presses.......
Nevada Supreme Court issues Two Decisions in Family Law cases!
CASE: NELSON v. NELSON, Supreme Court Adv. Opn. No. 36
FACTS
During their marriage, Lynita and Eric both signed separate property agreements that transmuted their community property into two separate property trusts. They then created two other self-settled spendthrift trusts, which were funded by their separate property trusts. Klabacka later became distribution trustee of Eric's spendthrift trust (the ELN Trust). After Eric filed for divorce, the clerk of the court issued a joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.85, prohibiting the parties and the trusts from disposing of any property that may be subject to a community interest claim. In the divorce decree, the district court equalized the trust assets and ordered some assets from the ELN trust to be transferred to Lynita's spendthrift trust (the LSN Trust). On appeal, the court determined that both trusts were funded with separate property and remanded for the district court to conduct proper tracing to determine community interests. See Klabacka v. Nelson, 133 Nev. 164, 182, 394 P.3d 940, 954 (2017). On remand, the district court issued a preliminary injunction only for two assets subject to community property claims and declined to extend the injunction. Eric and Klabacka argued that the district court's order was not appealable.
JURISDICTION
The court has interpreted NRAP 3A(b)(3), holding that injunctions are governed by NRCP 65, which sets forth the procedure for seeking an injunction and the form that an order granting an injunction must take. However, joint preliminary injunctions pursuant to EDCR 5.517 are not governed by NRCP 65. NRCP 65(e) explicitly provides that the rule is not applicable to actions for divorce, alimony, separate maintenance, or custody of children. As such, orders granting or denying injunctions pursuant to EDCR 5.517 are not appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(3). This is so because injunctions in family law matters differ procedurally from those governed by NRCP 65. However, given the mandatory language in EDCR 5.517, a writ petition would be the appropriate vehicle to seek review of the district court's order for an arbitrary or capricious exercise of its discretion.
CASE: LOPEZ v. SERBELLON PORTILLO, Supreme Court Adv. Opn. No. 54
FACTS
Lopez gave birth to K.M.L. in El Salvador in 2007. Despite being informed of the pregnancy and birth of K.M.L., Serbellon Portillo has had no communication with and provided no support for K.M.L. K.M.L. resided in El Salvador with Lopez's mother until 2017 until Lopez's mother was no longer able to care for him. Lopez also feared for K.M.L.'s safety due to gang activity in his neighborhood. At that point, K.L.M. relocated to the United States to live with Lopez. Lopez filed a custody action seeking primary physical and legal custody and Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status. Although Serbellon Portillo was personally served, he never responded. Lopez was awarded primary physical and legal custody and the district court found that it was in K.M.L.'s best interest to remain with Lopez but that the court was unable to find that reunification is not viable due to abandonment because the court was unable to predict whether the father will seek to reunify with the child some time in the future.
SIJ ANALYSIS
Before an applicant may file a petition with the federal government for SIJ status, the applicant must obtain a state juvenile court order with three findings: (1) the juvenile is dependent on a juvenile court, or the juvenile has been placed under the custody of an individual appointed by the court; (2) due to abandonment, abuse, neglect, or some comparable basis under state law, the juvenile's reunification with one or both parents is not viable; and (3) it is not in the juvenile's best interest to be returned to the country of the juvenile's origin.
Here, the first SIJ finding was established by the order awarding Lopez custody of K.M.L. Turning to the second prong, abandonment of a child is established when the parent's conduct "evinces a settled purpose on the part of one or both parents to forego all parental custody and relinquish all claims to the child." NRS 128.012(1). There is also a presumption that the parent has abandoned the child when the parent has not supported the child or communicated with the child for six months. NRS 128.012(2). Here, the district court was only required to find that reunification is not viable, instead of not possible. The court relied on J.U. v. J.C.P.C., 176 A.3d 136, in observing that the definition of viable calls for a court to consider whether reunification is practicable or workable. The court in Romero v. Perez, 205 A.3d 903, further expanded on the concept by providing a nonexhaustive list of factors a court should consider in determining whether abuse, neglect, or abandonment indicate that reunification is not viable: (1) the lifelong history of the child's relationship with the parent; (2) the effects that forced reunification might have on the child; and (3) the realistic facts on the ground in the child's home country. The court here adopted both approaches from J.U. and Romero.
The court stated that because SIJ findings do not result in the termination of parental rights, the consideration of whether a parent has abandoned a child such that reunification is not viable is broader than the consideration of whether a parent's abandonment of a child warrants termination of the parent's parental rights. Here, because the district court looked to whether reunification might be possible in the future rather than looking at the viability of reunification, the district court erred in declining to make the predicate finding that reunification is not viable under NRS 3.2203(3)(b). The custody determination was affirmed, the denial of SIJ status was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
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