UF Philosophy

Structural Injustice and Individual Responsibility — Philosopher's Zone

Who is responsible for structural injustice? The answer is “practically everybody”. But that can be just another way of saying “effectively nobody”. Individuals can always claim – reasonably enough, in most cases – that they've never personally stolen anyone's land, or made anyone homeless, or held racist views. So what responsibility do individuals bear for structural injustice? And how can this responsibility be acted upon, without falling into practices of blaming and shaming? [audio] @ Philosopher's Zone

https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/philosopherszone/structural-injustice-and-individual-responsibility/13486680

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Nietzsche's Mock Interview — 3:16am (blog)

Richard Marshall, well known for his long series of interviews with contemporary philosophers, has posted a (mock) interview with none other than renown philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. Why let the fact that he is long dead get in the way? If anyone could do it, Nietzsche could. @ 3:16am (blog)

https://www.3-16am.co.uk/blog/exclusive-3-16-interview-with-friedrich-nietzsche

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Trust, Legitimacy, and Algorithms in Criminal Justice — Public Affair Quarterly

A common criticism of the use of algorithms in criminal justice is that algorithms and their determinations are in some sense ‘opaque'—that is, difficult or impossible to understand, whether because of their complexity or because of intellectual property protections. Scholars have noted some key problems with opacity, including that opacity can mask unfair treatment and threaten public accountability. In this paper, we explore a different but related concern with algorithmic opacity, which centers on the role of public trust in grounding the legitimacy of criminal justice institutions. We argue that algorithmic opacity threatens the trustworthiness of criminal justice institutions, which in turn threatens their legitimacy. We first offer an account of institutional trustworthiness before showing how opacity threatens to undermine an institution's trustworthiness. We then explore how threats to trustworthiness affect institutional legitimacy. Finally, we offer some policy recommendations to mitigate the threat to trustworthiness posed by the opacity problem.

"Public Trust, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Use of Algorithms in Criminal Justice", Duncan Purves (UF) & Jeremy Davis. /Public Affairs Quarterly/ (forthcoming) @ Public Affair Quarterly

https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVPTI-3

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Being Seen to Be Good — Institute for Art and Ideas

Most of us want to be good and be seen to be good. But aren't these goals contradictory? Isn't the desire to be seen to good a means of placing ourselves higher than others and wishing to gain status and position as a result? Should we conclude that the attempt to be seen to be good is immoral and call it out as hypocritical, including philanthropist donation, explicit piety on the part of the religious, and virtue signalling be it on campus or on social media? Or is being seen to be good vital to cement socially positive behaviour? And explicit public demonstration of morality the only morality worth having? Philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah and joins other experts to discuss. [video] @ Institute for Art and Ideas

https://iai.tv/video/being-seen-to-be-good?_auid=2020

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Free Speech: Are the Kids Alright? — The Conversation

A useful breakdown of various aspects of the complex of concepts associated with "free speech". @ The Conversation

https://theconversation.com/free-speech-doesnt-mean-you-can-say-whatever-you-want-wherever-heres-how-to-explain-this-to-kids-166334

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Why AI Ethics Is Needed All the Way Down the Line — Harvard Business Review

When most organizations think about AI ethics, they often overlook some of the sources of greatest risk. @ Harvard Business Review

https://hbr.org/2021/07/everyone-in-your-organization-needs-to-understand-ai-ethics

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Five Challenges for Data-driven Policing — AI and Ethics

"Five Ethical Challenges for Data-Driven Policing", Jeremy Davis, Duncan Purves (UF), Juan Gilbert & Schuyler Sturm (UF). /AI and Ethics /(forthcoming). @ AI and Ethics

https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVFEC

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The Centrality of Ethics in Hobbes — Philosophy Bites

Thomas Hobbes is best known for his account of why we should accept political authority. But, argues Arash Abizadeh, that was Hobbes' solution to the problem of how we should live together in society that arises directly from his views about what human beings are and what obligations we have to one another. [audio] @ Philosophy Bites

https://philosophybites.com/2021/08/arash-abizadeh-on-thomas-hobbes-ethics.html

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In the Philosophy Reality Lab — Daily Nous

What can extended reality (XR) technologies, such as virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) bring to the study of philosophy? A discussion with philosopher Andrew Kissel at the Virginia Philosophy Reality Lab. @ Daily Nous

https://dailynous.com/2021/09/15/philosophy-and-extended-reality-technologies/

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How Fast Is Your Moral Compass? — Philosopher's Zone

Morality is something that develops over time. Even the briefest glance through human history reveals that cultural notions of good and evil change from one set of cultural and temporal circumstances to the next. But what if social changes happened so fast and so radically that our moral "evolution" couldn't keep pace? [audio] @ Philosopher's Zone

https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/philosopherszone/the-trouble-with-our-moral-evolution/13563102

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The Mind of Make-believe — PhilPapers

Mental fictionalism is not the benign view that we may better understand the mind if we think of mental states as something like useful fictions, but the more radical view that mental states just are useful fictions. This paper argues that, if one were to treat mental states as a kind of fiction, the genre of fiction best suited to this purpose would be fantasy make-believe, in which magic is a central feature. After defending a promising fictionalist account of mental discourse as a kind of prop-oriented make believe against recent criticism, the paper ultimately concludes that mental fictionalism faces further, potentially insurmountable, challenges. Most significantly, there is a problematic disanalogy between folk psychology and fiction: our mental state attributions aim to track truth, and this crucial aspect of our mental discourse cannot be captured if we interpret it as a kind of fictional discourse. For this and other reasons, the cost of adopting mental fictionalism likely outweighs its benefits. Whether or not these problems can be resolved, there is still much to be gained from taking mental fictionalism seriously: in doing so we may illuminate several important features of our own folk psychology that often go unnoticed.

"Mental Fictionalism: A Costly Combination of Magic and Mind", Amber Ross (UF). In /Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations/. Forthcoming. @ PhilPapers

https://philpapers.org/rec/ROSMFT

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Forensic Ethics — Nature

Widely available global DNA databases are regualrly used now in forensic work to help solve crimes. What if large portions of this data was obtained coercively or without consent? @ Nature

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01584-w

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