Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center

NEW! - Our Numbers and Lessons Infographic is out.

This training aid provides a few numbers and associated lessons gathered from the previous year. Please take a moment to review and consider what lessons you can put into practice in the 2025 fire year.

You can print the infographic and hang it up where others can see and study it.
Share the lessons!

Get the full infographic here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/annual-incident-review-summaries

On December 12, Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center staff took part in a pile burn at Bidwell Park immediately adjacent to a highly developed part of Chico, California. With the support of and , FFT2 (or greater) qualified participants from , , , and continuously fed burn piles in an oak woodland part of the city’s heavily-used open space area. The burn achieved multiple objectives, including hazardous fuel reduction, habitat improvement, and training. Most piles were lit only with pitchwood rather than with driptorches or other ignition devices using petroleum products.

NEW Two More Chains!

In this edition of Two More Chains, we explore the international landscape of wildland fire. You’ll hear from those who’ve crossed borders, whether it’s U.S. firefighters heading overseas or international experts bringing their knowledge to our shores. Despite the varied languages, protocols, and strategies, one thing remains constant: The human factors that drive decision-making, teamwork, and resilience under pressure.

Get the issue here:https://lessonslearned-prod-media-bucket.s3.us-gov-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/issue/Two%20More%20Chains%20Fall%202024.pdf

Sheep Fire, Boise National Forest, Idaho - September 2024

An Assistant Fire Engine Operator (AFEO) was mopping-up on the middle to upper third of the slope, moving hose around and spraying water, when a huge log rolled onto her foot, spun her around, knocked her over, and rolled right over the back of her head. Those on scene packaged her in a position of comfort in a “MegaMover” and lined out down the slope. The T2IA, IHC, and Engine Crew personnel utilized the “conveyor” patient transport method to carry her down the slope, across the river, and up to a pickup truck on the road. They carefully drove a bumpy forest road to an awaiting agency helicopter. The AFEO’s injuries included a skull fracture and concussion, soft tissue injuries to ribs and her left hand, and a sprained knee.

Lesson from the report:
Soft stretchers, like the MegaMover, have been utilized in other accidents and been identified as an excellent option for transporting injured people. The Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center has produced a “Data Points” product that highlights previous accidents in which soft stretchers were successfully utilized.

Get the full report here:
https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/sheep-fire-hit-by-log-2024

A skid steer masticator was conducting hazardous fuels reduction treatment alongside a paved road to prepare the unit for a prescribed fire. During normal masticator operations, the masticator head struck a rock beneath the vegetation resulting in the Rush Fire. While conditions that day were hot, dry and windy, it was not a Red Flag Day. After about 30 minutes of work, the operator turned the machine and saw flames out of the corner of his eye. By the time an engine responded the fire was several acres, growing to over 12,000 acres over the following days.

Lessons from report:
When designing and implementing mechanical treatments:
*Establish triggers when environmental conditions warrant pausing mechanical treatments.
*Develop an SOP to determine the need for on-site contingency resources (engine/dozer/UTV with sprayer).
*Consider adding onboard suppression mechanisms (water fire extinguisher, fabricated suppression tank with external hose for rapid response, etc.). These are common on larger machines and may not be realistic on skid steer machines.
*Have a spotter or another resource working in the same area to watch for ignitions.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/rush-fire-masticator-ignition-rls-2024

Borel Fire, Sequoia National Forest, California

On July 30, 2024, line overhead on Div H of the Borel Fire formulated a strategy of using heavy equipment to create a staging area, then to push indirect line from the ridgetop down. The strike team leader (STEN) directing this operation asked the dozer operator about his level of experience: “He said he had 40 years of operating equipment, and 5 or 6 years working on fires.” As the dozer finished the ridgetop dozer push, he moved onto the slope and felt the machine begin to slide. As he attempted to maneuver back where he came from, the dozer began to roll down the hill 6 or 7 times until it stopped. The STEN immediately announced the accident over the radio and had his engine strike team bring medical gear to the scene. Six firefighters and medics arrived at the dozer, where the operator was out the dozer walking around. He was treated and packaged on a backboard for helicopter hoist medevac.

Lesson: “Experience” is difficult to fully communicate and understand, especially in the middle of high-tempo operations. Sometimes a thorough discussion is worth the time it takes.

Read the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/borel-fire-dozer-rollover-rls-2024

Wapiti Fire Camp Evacuation - August 2024
Fire spread modeling by one of two incident management teams (IMT) managing nearby large fires on the Boise National Forest predicted that the Wapiti Fire would impact the Warm Springs forward operating base (FOB). In the midst of team transitions, the decision was made to relocate the FOB outside the probable fire growth area, to Valley Creek. This move began on August 22. Nearly all equipment and infrastructure was successfully relocated to the new Valley Creek FOB, with the exception of some supplies, a portable Cell-on-Wheels, six yurts, and two generators. Some fire personnel remained at the Warm Springs site on August 23 to implement some defensive firing to protect the equipment left on site, after which they evacuated the site as well. After the flaming front had passed, IMT members returned to the site to find that one yurt had burned, with no other significant damage to incident supplies or equipment.

Lesson from the report:
The successful evacuation of Valley Creek camp demonstrates the importance of flexibility and adaptability in the face of adversity. Quick thinking and decisive action can save lives and minimize losses.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/wapiti-fire-camp-evacuation-2024

Colorado, March 2024 - Chainsaw training course field day operation.
An instructor was felling a hazard tree with a diameter at breast height (DBH) of 20-25-inches that was hung up in another adjacent tree, leaning into it at about 45 degrees. The initial cut plan of pie cut on the top side and a release cut on the under side resulted in a closed kerf and stuck saw. The plan was adjusted to cutting the underside with a different saw. A student was in the cutting area to help pull the stuck saw out as cuts were made. The binds released all at once and the tree came down suddenly. The student followed their planned escape route but was struck on the head and shoulders by a 20-foot-long limb that was around 5 inches in diameter at the point of impact. The student suffered a significant compression fracture in his spine and multiple skull fractures.

Lessons from the report:
Judging and anticipating the influence of binds when cutting trees is complex and the tree doesn’t always respond as predicted.

When the intial plan doesn't work and we move to an alternate plan, we need to step back and ensure that our priorities are still in alignment with the first plan.

The training host stopped allowing metal helmets.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/colorado-fire-camp-training-hit-by-tree-2024

On October 1, 2024, two Type 6 engines were engaged in suppression actions on a fast-moving wind-driven fire. The crews were tasked with holding a road to prevent the fire from crossing over to the road’s south side. Initially, the fire was burning with 4-5- foot flame lengths in old-growth sage and bitterbrush. Around 3:00 p.m., a sudden wind shift caused the fire’s behavior to change rapidly—with flame lengths increasing to 8-10 feet. The initial attack plan was to suppress the fire as it approached the road. But with this sudden wind shift, the radiant heat from the fire intensified—causing flame lengths to surge to 15-20 feet. As the fire’s intensity grew, both engines were engulfed by flames, and the crews sought cover behind their engines for protection. The firefighters were not injured, and the engines were able to continue fire operations, though they sustained heat damage to plastic parts such as mirrors and lightbars.

Lessons from the report:
The crews were forced to react quickly when the fire’s behavior changed unexpectedly. Crews need to identify potential safety zones and escape routes before engaging in suppression activities.

The crews’ prompt decision to utilize the engines as a temporary refuge was critical to their safety. When facing extreme fire behavior, quickly identifying and utilizing barriers such as fire engines—as a last resort—can prevent injuries. Maintaining your situational awareness is essential.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/jack-wells-fire-engine-burnover-2024

On November 10 and 11, training cadre from around Northern California presented Firing Operations (S-219) to upcoming prescribed fire practitioners from a multitude of organizations. After a full day of lecture and scenarios, firing teams developed plans to burn small grass units on lands of the Mechoopda Indian Tribe of Chico Rancheria. Students learned about burn plans, firing techniques, firing boss duties, and absorbed lessons from the cadre’s collective decades of prescribed fire experience. Lessons Learned Center was present to assist the training and to learn from this diverse group.

On June 13 2024 on a Prescribed Fire, a Wildland Fire Module (WFM) Assistant and a Fire Engine Module Assistant (AFEO) both from the local area, were sent to scout the line for an incoming Interagency Hotshot Crew (IHC).
As the prescribed fire was becoming more active, these two were trying to find the best location to utilize this IHC. They both had an idea of where to position the IHC crew on the top of a ridge.
They posted a lookout on a nearby road to be their eyes as they hiked up this ridge. The AFEO had scouted this line multiple times while hunting on his own time and knew there was a nearby rock scree that was approximately 100 yards by 100 yards and could serve as a safety zone.
As they got farther up the hill during their scouting mission, a large flame front developed and was coming up the canyon toward them. The lookout notified these two of this increased fire behavior then moved out of the area and tied-in with the rest of the crews at the bottom of the hill.
There was a saddle on either side of the two scouting firefighters. They both made the decision to stay in the rock scree and let the fire pass through. Due to heavy smoke, this took approximately four hours.
Radio contact was maintained throughout this intense burning period. To be prepared, the two scouters pulled their fire shelters from their line gear. While they didn’t open their shelters, they had their gloves, water and shelters out “just to be ready”.

Lessons from the report:
Know the limitations of your safety zones. While this “safe area” was appropriate for two firefighters, it may have been too small for a handcrew.

Human nature drives you to run from a big fire. Staying in the safety of the rock scree was the best area to wait out the fire’s passage.

Scouting can be dangerous. Both firefighters took heavy smoke and some warm air, but through training and experience they recognized that the rock scree would be the safest location for them.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/south-beaver-prescribed-fire-scouting-close-call-2024

On the evening of September 28, 2024, at approximately 2005 hours, a handcrew experienced a vehicle rollover incident while returning from fire operations on Upper Danville Road, near the Goosmus Fire in Danville, Washington. The vehicle was a Ford F-350 crew cab, with an enclosed utility bed, and four occupants.
Due to the nighttime driving conditions combined with heavy dust kicked up by the convoy vehicles up ahead, visibility was significantly impaired. The driver misjudged a curve on the road, causing the front left tire to slip off the soft shoulder. After attempting to correct the vehicle’s course, both left tires went off the road, resulting in a rollover down a 25-foot embankment. The vehicle came to a stop after one full rotation, landing partially on its passenger side against trees that prevented the vehicle from rolling farther. All crew members exited the vehicle safely through the rear driver’s side window. Minor abrasions from their seat belts were reported by two individuals.

Lessons:
Proper seat belt usage by all crew members played a critical role in minimizing injuries.

The initial radio transmission following the incident went out over the wrong radio channel. This was due to the channel selection k**b being bumped during the rollover. Effective communication was restored quickly, but the confusion could have led to a delay in the response if it had not been corrected quickly.

Get the full report here:
https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/goosmus-fire-vehicle-accident-2024

October 17, Huron-Manistee NF, Michigan

The Huron Zone fire personnel were performing hazardous fuels reduction work with a skid-steer masticator. After several hours of operation, the trainee operator noticed white smoke coming from the rear of the track loader. They discovered a fire within the engine compartment located at the rear of CAT 299D3XE. After opening the engine compartment, they discovered the flames were being propelled by diesel fuel coming from the fuel tank, mounted to the left of the engine. The trainee operator and trainer got the fire extinguisher from the inside of the cab and quickly extinguished the flames. It seems the fuel tank itself had been damaged by heat and a hole had melted, causing fuel to leak and the feed the fire. The exact cause of the fire isn’t known yet.

Lessons from the report:
Checklists help ensure that proper cleanout of debris is performed, in addition to daily, weekly, and monthly maintenance checks. These are crucial to safe operations.

The operator and trainee were able to extinguish the flames within the engine compartment within a matter of minutes. Ensure the proper fire extinguisher is available.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/huron-manistee-nf-skid-steer-masticator-fire-2024

Schenk Prescribed Fire Preperation, South Dakota - August 2024
Skid steer operator grabbed a down tree with the gapple and began pushing. The tree somehow slipped off the grapple and impacted the skid steer door, breaking through the polycarbonate glass and struck the operator in the right thigh. A three foot piece of the tree broke off and remainded in the operators lap.
Not entirely sure what happened, the operator moved the skid steer in reverse toward the road and called for assistance from a nearby crewmember. The operator remembered feeling woozy, light-headed, and nauseous for a time immediately following this incident.
Within minutes, the engine captain arrived and was able to open the door of the skid steer and remove the log from the cab. The captain noticed blood seeping through the operator’s flame-resistant pants. The engine captain assisted the operator out of the machine and sat him under a nearby tree. He then called the Fuels AFMO for additional assistance and indicated they needed an ambulance for transport.
Quick action by the engine captain and AFMO allowed for imediate medical treatment, transfer to an ambulance, and eventually transport by air ambulance. The skid steer operator underwent surgery to repair the laceration and a torn tendon in his upper right leg. He remained in the hospital for two nights to monitor for infection. It was also discovered that he had a stable pelvic fracture in his right hip.

Lesson: Responders commented that it was invaluable to have additional personnel in the project area to assist with the response and transport. Are you staffing your projects to account for emergent situations?

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/schenk-prescribed-fire-hit-by-tree-2024

Willamette Complex, Willamette National Forest, Oregon

An Incident Management Team member experienced a dizzy spell, but attributed it to dehydration or inadequate diet on a hot day. They quickly recovered. At 0239 the next morning, the team member awoke feeling dizzy and with a pressure in their chest. Walking through the main area of the Incident Command Post (ICP), the team member saw no one out and about at this hour. They became concerned they were experiencing a heart attack or a stroke, and if they didn’t get help soon, they may lose consciousness.

The team member called the Incident-Within-an-Incident (IWI) phone number printed on the cover of the Incident Action Plan (IAP). Within minutes, an EMT monitoring that number responded to provide initial patient assessment and care. Soon the team member was transported to the hospital, where a barrage of tests all came back negative. The team member was well enough to return to work later that day.

Lesson: The IMT’s 24-hour IWI phone number was critical in initiating quick care and transport in what could have been a serious medical emergency. Make sure you know the plan for night time emergencies.

Get the full repport from our homepage, link in profile.

Yellow Lake Fire Burned Vehicle - October 9, 2024
With the crew engaged in direct handline operations, the Crew Superintendent drove up a road that was the primary control line for the Division.
At 1045, he decided to try to make access to the fire’s edge, to park in the black, and scout above the crew. The road instantly got tight and the Crew Superintendent decided to back out. At 1050, while backing out, the front tire slid off the road and the truck got stuck. Trying to get the vehicle unstuck was only making it worse. The Superintendent called the crew for help but fire activity was increasing and they were just trying to hold what they had.
At 1200 winds increased and the fire started to push uphill. At roughly 1300, the winds changed direction and started pushing the fire toward the Superintendent’s location. While walking out the road to a safer location, the Superintendent is cut off from the vehicle due to increasing fire activity. By 1830, the fire behavior moderates and the vehicle is reached and assessed. The truck has burned and is considered a total loss.

Lesson from the report: Walk out remote untraveled roads or scout with UTV before committing to them with vehicles.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/yellow-lake-fire-vehicle-burnover-2024

New Podcast Episode!

Episode 37 - Unplanned Leadership Moments

Travis Dotson, Erik Apland, and Rebecca Sorensen discuss “unplanned leadership moments;” decisions that need to be made when the boss isn’t there.

Get to it here:
https://lessons.wildfire.gov/wildland-fire-lessons-learned-center-podcast

Over the weekends of 10/11-13 and 10/19-20, LLC attended the Butte County Cal-TREX event to teach and learn from a diverse group of participants and instructors. The events bring together professionals and ordinary citizens to share prescribed fire skills through hands-on field scenarios and training. Since 2021, Butte County Cal-TREX has aimed to restore beneficial fire by using an “All Hands, All Lands” approach to focus on building local prescribed fire crews through hands-on field scenarios and education on fireline leadership skills, local fire ecology, cultural burning, and fire management. The weekend training events took place on forested property in Cohasset where Park Fire impacts were mitigated by prescribed fire, and at Wajim Kumbali, tribal land of the indigenous people of the northern Sacramento Valley.