Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center

On May 13 at 1330 hours, a crew of firefighters completed Wildland Fire Chainsaw RT 212 Operations. They were traveling back to staging when a loud pop was heard from the bed of their pickup truck.
A can of premixed fuel had "popped" off its plastic spout and leaked fuel. Because this can was in a fuel bag, the spray was contained. Even so, leaked fuel was now in the truck bed.
Ambient air temperature was approximately 87 degrees. The truck had been sitting in the sun for approximately four hours. V***r pressure in the can caused the spout to fail. Other nearby cans in the truck’s bed were slightly expanded—but not leaking.

Lessons:
-Use caution if using premix fuel cans—they do not have venting capabilities.
-If taking to the fireline, consider transferring fuel out of these containers into a venting container.
-Be mindful to where fuels are being stored. To reduce solar radiation impacts, move to shade if possible.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/texas-training-pre-mixed-fuel-can-failure-2026

Remember - fuel in the bed of a truck can be problematic on the fireline. Earlier this year three trucks were destroyed on the Cottonwood Fire in Nebraska: "It is suspected that an ember likely landed in the back of one of the pickup trucks starting a fire which rapidly grew due to the hot and dry conditions."

Last week, LLC staff had the great privilege of attending the South Canyon Staff Ride, hosted by the Rocky Mountain Geographic Area. Joining firefighters from federal and local agencies, as well as many others whose work touches fire management, we walked the line first constructed by firefighters back in July 1994. We were guided in discussion and reflection by survivors of July 6, 1994, who told their stories and asked poignant questions. It was a humbling and powerful experience. We aspire to carry the lessons forward to share with our entire wildland fire community.

On March 19, 2026, a snag struck a sawyer during attempted mitigation efforts as part of prescribed fire operations on the Blue Buck Unit on the Mark Twain National Forest.
Due to a gap in FAL1’s memory, this account of the tree strike incident reflects FAL3’s perspective who was the only witness to the incident.
I recall the tree beginning to fall towards me, with FAL1 moving in the same direction with saw, axe, and wedge in hand. I yelled, “Watch out,” but he did not turn or look back.
The top of the snag struck the ground within several feet of where I was standing, striking FAL1 on his left side, causing him to collapse to the ground. I heard the loud impact and watched the event unfold.
I remember thinking, “This can’t be happening right now,” as I moved quickly toward him. He was lying on the ground approximately 10 feet away. I immediately contacted Saw Team 1 via the radio and notified them of the incident. The FAL1 on Saw Team 1 was a trained Emergency Medical Technician.
I knelt next to FAL1, who was lying unconscious just to the side of the tree. I was touching his arm, but he wasn’t moving. I could hear a wheezing sound and observed that his eyes were open and bloodshot. I repeatedly said, “Stay with me. Can you hear me?” while awaiting assistance from the other two personnel from Saw Team 1 who were moving in our direction.

Lesson from the report:
Techniques commonly applied in softwood-dominated environments do not always translate effectively to hardwood systems, in which cutting strategies, hinge management, and tree response can differ significantly.

The report has a detailed stump analysis and cutting sequence description.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/blue-buck-prescribed-fire-tree-strike-incident-2026

Montana Radio Cloning Issues – Montana – April 20, 2026

The U.S. Forest Service’s national contract for mobile radios recently switched from Bendix King (BK) mobile radios to Kenwood mobile radios (handheld radios are not included in this contract change).

During an Initial Attack fire in Montana in April, federal employees attempted to clone a Kenwood mobile radio installed in their fire vehicle. This new mobile radio did not have a programming guide, user guide, or a cloning cable that goes between BK and Kenwood radios. Further, fire personnel were not familiar with the platform of this recently installed Kenwood mobile radio. Fortunately, during this incident, handheld radio communication worked fine, and mobile radio use was not required.

Lessons:

-Kenwood mobile radios will need to be hand programmed by the operator, unless a radio tech from the local incident area is available.
-Whenever new hardware is issued that affects LCES, stop and prioritize the time to ensure that all people who may be using the new hardware know how to use it.
-Prompt all radio techs with a crash course or programming or user guide when issuing new equipment when literature is not widely available.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/montana-radio-cloning-issues-2026

Texas Dozer Transport Rollover – Texas – February 21, 2026

During a period of heightened wildfire danger in the Texas Panhandle in February of 2026, multiple Texas A&M Forest Service resources from other areas of the state were moved to preposition. After several days, the fire danger decreased, and many resources were sent back to their home units. One of these resources was a Caterpillar D5K2 dozer or tractor-plow, transported using a Freightliner M112. The first driver drove over half of the 560 mile journey, and then swapped with the second driver for the remainder of the trip. While exiting the interstate to use a rest area about two hours after this driver swap, the transport encountered a sudden sharpening of the exit ramp curve, causing it to leave the roadway and roll over several times. While it rolled, the binders holding the dozer to the back of the truck broke, and the dozer rolled onto its side. The transport ended up back onto its wheels not far from the dozer. Both occupants suffered minor injuries for which they were treated and released.

Lessons:
-Familiarize yourself with the route you will be taking, including turns, potential rest stops, bridges, etc. especially when driving large trucks.
-Both occupants’ cell phones detected the force of the accident and automatically notified 911 of the accident. Consider turning on this setting in your phone.
-What is you unit’s hospital liaison program? Who will assume this role, and who is their backup? How familiar are these people with this critical role?

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/texas-dozer-transport-rollover-2026

On April 14, 2026, at 9:02 PM, a fire was reported in the Printer, KY area. The incident commander type 5 (IC) and the county fire crew were dispatched. IC found the fire's location but, because of the location, decided to return in daylight to construct containment lines. No structure was threatened by the fire.
The next day, the IC and crew returned to the scene and conducted an extended attack on an estimated 4-5 acres of burning timber. Around 3:30 PM on April 15, 2026, the dozer rollover occurred. The dozer was working off an old strip-mine
road, constructing a containment line. The dozer became high centered on a rock, which caused it to skid downhill. Once it was off the rock, the tracks on the dozer took hold, tipping it onto its side. The operator was able to exit the dozer with only minor injuries. Fuel began to leak from the dozer. The fire moved toward the dozer, and the dozer ended up engulfed in flames. The crew tried to put in a line around the dozer but was unsuccessful. The dozer is a total loss.
The dozer rollover occurred due to the unknown depth of the rock under the leaf/debris and soil during the construction of the containment lines.

Get the full report here: https://www.lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/gunstock-fire-heavy-equipment-incident-2026

Enroute to a Fire the engine’s occupants felt a slight vibration. The vibration became worse. Within the next ten seconds, multiple loud bangs occurred. The two crew members felt the engine jump like something hit the bottom of the truck, and black smoke started to fill its cab.
As the driver pulled the engine to the side of the highway the brakes weren’t working correctly. He had to use the emergency brake to stop the engine. It came to a complete stop as soon as safely possible—the highway’s shoulder was very narrow with a guard rail and there was heavy vehicle traffic.
The chase truck behind the engine first noticed debris coming from underneath the engine, then smoke, and then flames from underneath the engine compartment. They grabbed the fire extinguisher out of the chase truck. The engine was up against the guard rail and the compartment containing the fire extinguisher couldn’t be opened. The fire extinguisher from the chase truck was used to extinguish the fire underneath the engine. They also started the pump on the engine to use its water if needed.
While all this was happening, the debris that had been ejected from under the truck went into the ditch and ignited a wildfire.
It is believed that the front drive shaft rear yoke broke off the transfer case, pulling the slip yoke out of the front differential drive shaft—causing catastrophic failure. The drive shaft became tangled in the wire harness. It is believed that the hot transmission fluid and fuel from the lines was ignited by the wires shorting out.
The employee’s actions during this mechanical failure prevented this incident from escalating into an accident.

Lessons:
-Ensure fire extinguishers are kept easily accessible—not in a compartment that could be blocked from opening.
-Perform monthly Preventive Maintenance Checks and have a certified mechanic perform an annual inspection on the entire truck.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/missouri-ia-response-engine-vehicle-fire-2026

March 31, 2026 - Kawishiwi Ranger District.

After conditioning wooden-handled tools, an oil-soaked linseed rag was disposed of in a 21-gallon oily waste can. Forty-eight hours later, a burning smell was noticed coming from the shop. Upon inspection, smoke was seen coming from the rag can. The can was immediately moved outside through the shop’s side doors. Opening the can revealed one to three rags smoldering amongst another dozen dry rags.

Personnel were present to recognize an issue and quickly removed the threat.
This rag can was replaced two years ago. During the annual safety inspection,
the plastic can was identified as non‑compliant and was replaced with a metal safety can.

How to Safely Dispose of Oil-Soaked Rags
When you are ready to dispose of a used rag, hang it on a dedicated clothesline or lay it flat on a nonflammable surface, like gravel or concrete. Once the rags are dry and hard, submerge them in a water bucket. Wring out the excess water.
Place these rags in a metal can. Once you are ready to remove the rags from the site, take them to a hazardous waste disposal facility, such as a household hazardous waste drop-off site that some counties provide free of charge. Do not throw the rags away in regular trash containers, even after they have gone through the drying and submerging process.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/superior-national-forest-linseed-oil-rags-close-call-2026

On March 10th, 2026, the Savannah River Forest conducted a prescribed fire in Timber Compartment 75.

At approximately 1705 hours Engine 603’s driver contacted the Holding Boss via radio to request his assistance with the hazard tree assessment. The Holding Boss arrived about 1715. He and Engine 603’s driver went down to the base of the hazard tree for a proper size up.
At approximately 1720 hours, the Engine 603 driver placed his hand on the tree, felt movement, and realized that it was falling unexpectedly. He yelled: “Tree’s coming down!” to the Holding Boss who was standing directly beside him. Both the Holding Boss and the driver quickly ran up the embankment—just in time to look over and see the tree strike Engine 603.

Lessons from the report:
Ensure apparatus are positioned outside the potential fall zones when assessing hazard trees. Once the snag was identified as a hazard that needed to be mitigated and after the tree had been cooled, the apparatus could have been repositioned outside potential fall zones while further assessment was ongoing.

Reinforce situational awareness around hazard trees through training. The firefighter’s use of a loud, clear verbal warning “tree’s falling!” and their previously identified escape route demonstrates strong situational awareness. Their successful movement to safety supports the lesson to reinforce situational awareness around hazard trees—including lean, fire-weakened bases, and slope influences—and to consider wider exclusion zones and training scenarios involving escape route planning.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/compartment-75-prescribed-fire-vehicle-tree-strike-2026

A6 Fire - North Carolina
Two North Carolina Forest Service firefighters were measuring the 193-acre A6 Fire’s perimeter when they discovered a tree near the fireline that was burning. This was a 70-foot-tall loblolly pine, approximately 14 inches in diameter. Because this tree was dropping fire brands across the line, suppression action was required. The firefighters decided that the best course of action was to cut the tree, dropping it inside the fire's perimeter. While cutting the tree, a burning branch fell from it, striking the faller on the helmet. When the branch hit the full brimmed helmet, it broke into multiple burning pieces—burning the faller’s head, neck, and ears. The firefighter received 1st and 2nd degree burns from which he has since made a good recovery and returned to normal duties.

Lesson:
When sizing up a burning tree, consider other ways it can be mitigated, such as requesting a piece of equipment—such as a bulldozer—to come in and push the tree down.

Get the full report here: https://lessons.wildfire.gov/incident/a6-fire-tree-felling-burn-injury-2025