Knowledge is Power

09/04/2026

The government's regulatory authority over highway transportation does not begin merely because a person uses an automobile, nor does every transportation of another person transform private travel into a licensed public-carrier enterprise.

In Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579 (1930), the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia recognized that the right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways, to transport property thereon, and to use the ordinary conveyances of the day—including an automobile—is a common right associated with liberty rather than a mere privilege that government may grant or withhold arbitrarily. At the same time, Thompson recognized that government may impose legitimate safety regulation under its police power. The critical distinction, therefore, is not whether regulation may ever exist, but what activity is actually being regulated and whether the regulatory burden bears a legitimate relationship to that activity.

Modern federal transportation law preserves an important version of that same distinction.

Federal regulations expressly recognize a category known as a “private motor carrier of passengers (business).” Under 49 C.F.R. § 390.5, that category includes interstate passenger transportation undertaken in furtherance of a commercial enterprise where the transportation is not made available to the public at large. In other words, a business does not automatically become a public or for-hire transportation carrier merely because it carries persons in connection with its underlying business.

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's own regulatory examples make the point even clearer. A private university transporting students and employees in furtherance of its institutional operations is classified as a private motor carrier of passengers rather than a for-hire passenger carrier when the university is not receiving compensation for the transportation itself. FMCSA specifically explains that such an operation is not for-hire merely because transportation furthers the institution's commercial purpose.

The same principle appears in the regulatory treatment of a musical group transporting its members while being compensated for performances. The group may be engaged in a commercial enterprise, yet the transportation remains private because the compensation is for the performance rather than for transportation. The passengers are not purchasing transportation, seats are not being offered to the public, and the transportation remains incidental to the underlying enterprise.

This distinction is legally important.

“Commercial activity” and “for-hire transportation” are not synonymous.

A person or business may engage in commerce while transporting passengers without thereby becoming a transportation business. Compensation for an underlying service does not automatically become compensation for carriage. The regulatory inquiry must therefore examine the actual character of the transaction: What is being sold? Is transportation itself being offered to the public? Is a passenger paying for carriage as a separate service? Or is transportation merely incidental to another private undertaking?

Congress has likewise expressly withdrawn federal motor-carrier jurisdiction from numerous categories of transportation under 49 U.S.C. § 13506, including certain local, occasional, incidental, commuting, taxicab, hotel, recreational, and other passenger operations. That statute reinforces the broader proposition that use of a motor vehicle and even the transportation of passengers do not automatically place every movement within the same regulatory classification.

The constitutional and regulatory principles therefore converge on a basic proposition:

Government may regulate genuinely regulated activities, particularly public carriage for hire and commercial motor-vehicle operations falling within established safety classifications. But it may not simply presume that every use of an automobile is identical to operating a public transportation business, nor may it erase legally recognized distinctions between ordinary travel, private carriage, transportation incidental to another enterprise, and transportation sold to the public for compensation.

That distinction becomes especially important where no transportation service is being advertised or sold, no fare is being charged for carriage, the transportation is not available to the public at large, and the movement is merely incidental to private affairs or an underlying business relationship.

Under those circumstances, the government should be required to identify the specific regulated activity before imposing a regulatory classification. It is not enough to reason backward from the existence of an automobile, a passenger, or a business relationship and simply declare the activity “for hire.”

The sequence must be the opposite:

First determine the nature of the activity.

Then determine the lawful regulatory classification.

Then determine whether the particular licensing requirement actually applies to that classification.

That is especially important because federal law itself recognizes private passenger carriage as distinct from for-hire carriage.

Nothing in this argument contends that every private passenger operation is exempt from every safety requirement. Vehicle weight, seating capacity, hazardous-material carriage, interstate operation, and other independently applicable factors may trigger separate federal or state requirements. For example, federal CDL rules may apply to sufficiently large passenger vehicles even though the underlying passenger transportation is private rather than for hire.

But those separate requirements prove rather than defeat the central point: the law uses defined classifications and objective triggering conditions. Regulatory authority is not established merely by applying the word “driving” to every movement on a highway.

Where the government seeks to impose a licensing requirement, it therefore carries the burden of identifying the actual regulated conduct and demonstrating that the person, vehicle, and activity fall within the classification to which that requirement applies. Private carriage cannot constitutionally or logically be converted into public carriage for hire merely by presumption.

The right recognized in Thompson v. Smith should therefore be read together with the federal regulatory distinctions that followed it: ordinary highway use remains fundamentally different from the special use of the highways as a transportation business, and transportation connected with private business does not automatically become transportation for hire merely because commerce exists somewhere in the surrounding transaction.

The relevant question is not simply:

“Was a person operating an automobile?”

The legally meaningful questions are:

What was the automobile being used for?

Was transportation itself being sold?

Was carriage offered to the public?

Was compensation actually received for transportation?

What statutory or regulatory classification applies to that particular activity?

And what specific fact triggers the licensing requirement being asserted?

Without answers to those questions, the conclusion that a private traveler or private carrier is automatically subject to the same regulatory regime as a public carrier for hire is not legal analysis. It is an unsupported classification.

08/13/2026

07/23/2026

PROJECT SUNSHINE

Factual Historical Review

What Project Sunshine Was

Project Sunshine was a secret United States government research program established in 1953 under the Atomic Energy Commission’s broader investigation of radioactive fallout from nuclear-weapons testing.

The project followed Project Gabriel, which the Atomic Energy Commission began in 1949 to determine how many atomic weapons could be detonated before radioactive contamination of air, water, and soil caused long-term harm to crops, animals, and human beings.

A 1953 review conducted under contract with the Atomic Energy Commission and the United States Air Force identified strontium-90 as a major long-term danger from atmospheric nuclear testing. Project Sunshine was then organized as a worldwide investigation into the distribution of strontium-90 in the environment and the human body.

Why Human Bones Were Collected

Strontium-90 behaves chemically like calcium. After entering the body through contaminated food, milk, water, or air, it can accumulate in bones and teeth.

Government researchers therefore wanted human bones and teeth to determine how much strontium-90 had entered people living in different parts of the world.

The project concentrated heavily on bones from stillborn infants and young children because developing bones could provide evidence of recent environmental contamination.

The program’s stated objectives were to determine:

1. Whether nuclear fallout had already created a human health hazard;

2. How many additional nuclear weapons could be detonated before creating a serious hazard; and

3. How radioactive materials moved through the environment and became concentrated in living organisms.

# # # How the Material Was Obtained

The Atomic Energy Commission used physicians, hospitals, pathologists, laboratories, private organizations, overseas contacts, and medical institutions to obtain human bones and tissue.

Government correspondence discussed collecting infant skeletons from the United States, Japan, India, and other locations.

A July 1954 government report listed material already analyzed, including:

* Fifty-five stillborn infants from Chicago;
* One stillborn infant from Utah;
* Three stillborn infants from southern India; and
* Three human legs obtained in Massachusetts.

During 1955 and 1956, hundreds of additional human bone samples were collected through stations overseas and through researchers in Boston, Denver, Houston, and New York.

The Secrecy and Cover Story

Project Sunshine was classified secret when it began.

Atomic Energy Commission officials wanted the agency kept “out of the picture where possible.” Researchers and intermediaries were told that the bones were being collected to study naturally occurring radium rather than radioactive fallout from nuclear-weapons testing.

One official described the explanation as incomplete rather than false because some radium analysis might also be performed. The actual purpose—measuring worldwide strontium-90 contamination—was deliberately withheld from some of the doctors and organizations assisting in the collection.

Government correspondence stated that the program was being classified because of concerns involving public and international relations. Another military collection effort instructed personnel to describe samples as being collected for nutritional studies while the actual fallout data remained secret.

Knowledge of the Legal Problem

At a classified government conference in January 1955, participants repeatedly referred to the collection of human remains as “body snatching.”

The conference record shows that lawyers had been consulted concerning the legality of obtaining human remains. Officials acknowledged that collecting the material legally would be difficult, but the collection program continued through hospitals, pathologists, personal contacts, and locations where remains were considered easier to obtain.

The conference transcript remained restricted until it was declassified in 1995.

Consent and Family Notification

The later federal review found that Project Sunshine involved secrecy and deception.

The surviving records do not show that the Atomic Energy Commission established an independent ethical requirement to disclose the true purpose of the tissue collection to the deceased persons’ families. The available documents focus primarily on obtaining usable samples, maintaining secrecy, and avoiding public opposition.

The absence of records does not prove that no family was ever asked for permission. It does establish that informed family consent and truthful disclosure were not shown to be consistent, documented requirements of the government program.

Why the Government Concealed It

The later federal Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments determined that government information was sometimes withheld because officials feared:

* Public embarrassment;
* Damage to government programs;
* Adverse public and international reaction;
* Potential legal liability;
* Labor or insurance claims; and
* Public opposition to nuclear-weapons activities.

The Committee specifically found that Project Sunshine was kept secret from its beginning in 1953 until 1956 and that deception was used when soliciting the bones of deceased babies from persons who had access to human remains. It concluded that public-relations concerns played a major role in concealing both the human-data collection and the existence of the program.

Historical Significance

Project Sunshine does not establish that every government agency operates unlawfully or that it is directly connected to present-day child-welfare agencies.

It does establish a documented historical fact: a government agency pursued an asserted public-interest purpose involving children and families while withholding the true purpose of its actions, using institutional intermediaries, limiting informed participation, and protecting the program from outside scrutiny.

The central lesson is that a government program cannot be considered trustworthy merely because it is described as scientific, medical, protective, or necessary. Its conduct must be tested through truthful disclosure, documented authorization, independent review, preserved records, and accountability to the people directly affected.

07/23/2026

NOT FOR THE WEAK MINDED IT IS DISTURBING

GOVERNMENTAL REVIEW OF CHILD-WELFARE CUSTODY, CONSENT, AND INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY

I. Purpose and Scope of Review

This review examines whether governmental child-welfare authority has been exercised with adequate consent, transparency, documentation, independent supervision, and protection of the children and families affected.

The historical reference to Project Sunshine is not presented as proof that Child Protective Services participated in that particular program. It is presented as a documented governmental case study demonstrating the danger created when vulnerable children become the subjects of state-directed activity while material information is withheld from their families and responsibility is divided among numerous governmental and private actors.

II. Historical Governmental Warning

Project Sunshine was a secret Atomic Energy Commission program involving the collection and analysis of human bones and tissue, including material taken from infants, stillborn children, and young children, for research concerning radioactive fallout.

The federal government’s later review found that secrecy and deception were used in obtaining some of the human material and that surviving records did not demonstrate meaningful consideration of an independent obligation to inform affected families. Government officials also considered potential public reaction, institutional prestige, legal claims, and liability when determining what information should remain concealed.

This history establishes a fundamental governmental-review principle:

> A declaration that governmental activity serves science, safety, health, or the public interest does not eliminate the requirement for informed participation, accurate records, independent review, and accountability to the persons whose bodies, children, families, or rights are affected.

III. Relevance to Child Protective Services

Child Protective Services operates under a stated protective purpose. That purpose, standing alone, cannot establish that every investigation, removal, placement, medical decision, restriction, or record entry was accurate, necessary, properly authorized, or beneficial to the child.

When the State takes control of a child or materially interferes with the parent-child relationship, the review must determine:

1. Who made each material decision;

2. What verified evidence existed when the decision was made;

3. Whether contrary evidence was recorded and considered;

4. Whether the parents and child were accurately informed;

5. Who authorized medical, psychiatric, pharmaceutical, educational, or placement decisions;

6. Whether any required consent, judicial authorization, or treatment record is missing;

7. Whether governmental employees or contractors had financial or institutional incentives affecting the decision;

8. Whether complaints against CPS or its contractors were investigated independently;

9. Whether records were altered, omitted, backdated, summarized inaccurately, or withheld;

10. Whether the child and parents were interviewed separately and without institutional pressure;

11. Whether adverse consequences were disclosed, documented, and corrected; and

12. Whether the reviewing body relied primarily upon records created by the same persons whose conduct was under review.

IV. Structural Risk of Self-Review

A governmental review is not independent merely because it is conducted by a different employee, supervisor, department, contractor, or court participant within the same child-welfare structure.

Where CPS creates the allegations, selects the service providers, controls or influences the records, communicates privately with institutional participants, and later supplies the evidence used to evaluate its own performance, the review risks becoming a validation process rather than an investigation.

The review must therefore distinguish among:

* CPS-created statements;
* independently verified facts;
* direct statements from the child;
* direct statements from each parent;
* medical and educational source records;
* contractor opinions;
* judicial findings;
* allegations that were never adjudicated;
* facts contradicted by other evidence; and
* missing records that should exist if the reported event actually occurred.

V. Medical and Pharmaceutical Accountability

Federal oversight reports have documented significant recordkeeping and monitoring deficiencies involving medications prescribed to children in foster care. These findings demonstrate that the existence of agency supervision does not itself establish that authorization, documentation, treatment planning, or medication monitoring occurred properly.

The governmental review should obtain and compare:

* every prescription and medication-administration record;
* the identity and qualifications of each prescriber;
* diagnoses supporting each medication;
* informed-consent documents;
* judicial authorizations;
* dosage changes and stated reasons;
* laboratory and monitoring records;
* reported side effects;
* treatment plans;
* pharmacy billing records; and
* the child’s statements concerning the medication and its effects.

Any inconsistency should be identified by date, actor, source document, and resulting consequence.

VI. Required Independent Findings

The final governmental review should not merely summarize the CPS file. It should make separate findings concerning:

1. Accuracy of the initiating allegations;

2. Reliability of the persons supplying the allegations;

3. Completeness and authenticity of agency records;

4. Necessity and proportionality of governmental intervention;

5. Validity of medical and placement authorizations;

6. Treatment of contrary evidence;

7. Financial relationships involving service providers and placements;

8. Compliance with internal safeguards;

9. Harm caused or increased by governmental intervention;

10. Retaliation following parental complaints or challenges;

11. Preservation or destruction of evidence; and

12. Corrective relief necessary to protect the child and restore the integrity of the record.

VII. Conclusion

Project Sunshine demonstrates that governmental purpose cannot be accepted as proof of governmental propriety. The government’s later acknowledgment of secrecy, deception, and inadequate attention to family notification establishes why child-welfare conduct must be tested against contemporaneous records, informed participation, independent evidence, and review by persons who did not participate in the challenged conduct.

The proper question is not whether CPS described its actions as protective.

The proper questions are:

What occurred, who authorized it, what verified evidence supported it, what information was withheld, what harm resulted, and who independently examined the conduct?

A review that cannot answer those questions from preserved and independently verifiable evidence is incomplete.

07/13/2026

Baird Municipal Court
CITY OF BAIRD, TEXAS
THE STATE OF TEXAS
v.
Josh Goble
§
§
§
§
Cause Nos. 26-005 and 26-006
NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTION AND DEMAND FOR EXPRESS
FINDINGS
Josh Goble, appearing sui juris, places this constitutional
objection upon the record and demands an express determination
of the governmental authority, factual predicate, and
constitutional basis relied upon before any further enforcement,
pretrial proceeding, trial setting, adverse process, or
restraint occurs in these causes.
The existence of an enactment establishes that governmental
authority has been asserted. It does not, standing alone,
establish that the authority was constitutionally delegated,
constitutionally exercised, or factually applicable to the
conduct alleged.
SUMMARY OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
The officer stated that Josh Goble was required to signal
approximately 1,000 feet before turning but observed him
signaling approximately 150 to 200 feet before turning.
Texas Transportation Code § 545.104(b) requires an operator
intending to turn right or left to signal continuously for not
less than the last 100 feet of movement before the turn.
This Notice requests express findings identifying the
constitutional authority, factual basis, and legal reasoning
supporting continued prosecution where the officer's own stated
observations describe compliance with the enactment relied upon.
Without those findings, meaningful appellate or extraordinary
review is impaired.
1
GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CBI. PURPOSE AND LIMITED SCOPE
This Notice does not contend that every legislative enactment
is invalid merely because it is denominated a statute,
ordinance, regulation, rule, or code provision.
The objection is narrower:
An enactment may be enforced only within constitutionally
delegated authority, upon facts satisfying its actual terms, and
in a manner consistent with controlling constitutional
protections.
A statute cannot prove its own constitutional validity merely
by being cited. Nor may an officer create reasonable suspicion
by substituting a materially different requirement for the
requirement appearing in the enactment allegedly enforced.
This filing therefore requests an express determination of:
1. the precise enactment relied upon;
2. the conduct the officer allegedly observed;
3. the actual legal requirement contained in the enactment;
4. whether the observed conduct violated that requirement;
5. whether an objectively reasonable basis for seizure
existed before the seizure began; and
6. whether further proceedings may constitutionally continue
if the officer's own stated facts negate the alleged
violation.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF AUTHORITY
The Constitution is the controlling source from which
governmental authority must be derived.
Legislative enactments, municipal ordinances, administrative
practices, and judicial procedures operate beneath-not above-the
Constitution.
The lawful order is:
Constitutional authority first;
2
GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CBvalid enactment within that authority second;
facts satisfying the enactment third;
constitutionally reasonable enforcement fourth.
The order cannot lawfully be reversed so that seizure occurs
first and authority is constructed afterward.
The constitutional objection presented here concerns both:
A. the absence of an objectively articulable violation at the
inception of the seizure; and
B. enforcement based upon an asserted legal requirement
materially different from the requirement appearing in the
enactment relied upon.
III. THE GOVERNMENTAL ACTION CHALLENGED
The challenged governmental action is the seizure initiated by
the Baird officer and the continued prosecution arising from
that seizure. Both Cause Nos. 26-005 and 26-006 arise from the
same stop, the same asserted signaling violation, and the same
seizure challenged in this Notice.
The officer stated, in substance, that:
1. Josh Goble was required to signal approximately 1,000 feet
before turning;
2. Josh Goble signaled approximately 150 to 200 feet before
turning; and
3. the claimed insufficiency of that signal supplied the
basis for the stop.
These statements are based upon Josh Goble's personal
knowledge and are preserved by the Declaration at the conclusion
of this filing. Any body-camera recording, dash-camera
recording, dispatch record, citation narrative, written report,
audio recording, or other record in the State's possession
concerning the officer's stated reason for the stop and the
distances asserted is specifically demanded to be preserved and
produced.
3
GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CBTexas Transportation Code § 545.104(b), the enactment
governing the distance for signaling before a turn, requires an
operator intending to turn right or left to signal continuously
for not less than the last 100 feet of movement before the turn.
Accordingly, the officer's own stated observation-that
signaling occurred for approximately 150 to 200 feet-describes
conduct exceeding the stated 100-foot minimum.
The constitutional issue is therefore direct:
How can an objectively articulable violation exist where the
officer's own stated facts describe compliance with the actual
distance requirement?
IV. LOCATION AND INCEPTION OF THE SEIZURE
Josh Goble further states that he had completed the turn,
entered his private driveway, exited the vehicle, and was
outside the vehicle before the officer arrived with emergency
lights and siren.
The Court is therefore requested to identify expressly:
1. the exact point at which the officer claims a seizure
occurred;
2. the specific articulable facts existing before that point;
3. the specific offense allegedly observed before that point;
4. whether the asserted 1,000-foot signaling requirement
appears in Texas Transportation Code § 545.104(b);
5. whether signaling for 150 to 200 feet satisfies the actual
100-foot requirement; and
6. what lawful basis remained for seizure once the observed
conduct was measured against the actual enactment.
V. NO POST-HOC RECONSTRUCTION OF THE STOP
The constitutional validity of a seizure must be determined
from the objective facts and lawful authority existing at the
moment the seizure began.
4
GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CBA seizure that lacks an objectively reasonable basis at
inception cannot be validated by later-discovered facts,
subsequent investigation, later-filed complaints, additional
charges, administrative presumptions, or reconstructed legal
theories developed after the seizure occurred.
Accordingly, the Court is requested to determine the validity
of the stop solely from:
1. the enactment allegedly violated;
2. every specific and articulable fact actually known to the
officer before the seizure began, whether or not
contemporaneously stated, while excluding facts learned
after the seizure and theories dependent upon
later-acquired information; and
3. whether those pre-seizure facts, viewed objectively and
measured against the enactment actually relied upon,
established a lawful basis for the seizure before it
occurred.
VI. ASSERTED MISTAKE OF LAW
Josh Goble anticipates that the State may attempt to
characterize the asserted 1,000-foot requirement as a mistake of
law.
The constitutional inquiry is not satisfied merely by
attaching the word "mistake" to the officer's assertion.
The Court must determine whether any asserted mistake was
objectively reasonable.
Texas Transportation Code § 545.104(b) states a fixed and
readily identifiable distance of 100 feet. The officer allegedly
substituted a requirement ten times greater-1,000 feet-while
simultaneously observing conduct of approximately 150 to 200
feet.
The Court is requested to enter express findings concerning:
1. whether the signaling-distance language is ambiguous;
5
GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CB2. what text, authority, training material, or objectively
reasonable interpretation could produce a 1,000-foot
requirement;
3. whether substituting 1,000 feet for the stated 100-foot
requirement was objectively reasonable; and
4. whether the officer's observation of 150 to 200 feet
negated the stated basis for the stop, requires
suppression of evidence obtained through or as a result of
that seizure, and requires dismissal of any cause that
cannot be established through competent evidence
independent of the seizure.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS AFFECTED
The challenged seizure and prosecution implicate, at minimum:
1. the right to be secure against unreasonable seizure;
2. the right not to be deprived of liberty or property
without due process of law;
3. the right to a neutral determination of the authority
asserted;
4. the right to have the State establish the factual
predicates for enforcement;
5. the right not to have compelled participation treated as
voluntary consent;
6. the right to meaningful review upon a complete record; and
7. the right not to be prosecuted upon a factual premise
contradicted by the government actor's own stated
observations.
VIII. RESERVATION AGAINST IMPLIED WAIVER OR CONSENT
Any filing, response, attendance, compelled participation,
receipt of process, protection of property, defense of liberty,
or effort to preserve the record shall not be construed as:
1. conceding the constitutionality of the challenged seizure
or prosecution;
2. conceding that the officer observed a violation;
6
GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CB3. waiving any objection to jurisdiction, authority,
neutrality, or constitutional compliance;
4. consenting to an otherwise unauthorized exercise of power;
5. accepting the officer's asserted 1,000-foot requirement;
6. surrendering any challenge to the factual or legal basis
of the stop; or
7. converting compelled participation into voluntary joinder
or consent.
This reservation preserves constitutional objections
independently existing in the record. It does not depend upon
UCC § 1-308 as an independent source of jurisdictional immunity
or exemption.
IX. QUESTIONS REQUIRING EXPRESS DETERMINATION
Before any further proceeding occurs, the Court is requested
to answer expressly:
1. What precise enactment is alleged to have been violated?
2. What distance does that enactment require?
3. Does the enactment require 100 feet or 1,000 feet?
4. What distance did the officer claim Josh Goble signaled?
5. Does signaling for approximately 150 to 200 feet satisfy a
100-foot requirement?
6. What specific offense did the officer reasonably suspect
before initiating the seizure?
7. What facts existing before the seizure supported that
suspicion?
8. At what precise location and moment did the seizure begin?
9. Was Josh Goble already within his private driveway and
outside the vehicle when the officer activated lights and
siren or otherwise asserted authority?
10. Is the signaling-distance language ambiguous?
11. What objectively reasonable interpretation could convert
100 feet into 1,000 feet?
7
GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CB12. What evidence establishes that the officer relied upon
such an interpretation before initiating the seizure?
13. Is the State relying upon a reason different from the
reason stated by the officer?
14. If so, what is that reason, and what evidence proves it
existed before the seizure began?
15. What process has been provided for neutral determination
of the constitutional challenge?
16. Has any participation by Josh Goble been treated as waiver
or consent?
17. If so, what precise conduct and authority support that
determination?
18. What findings support continued prosecution
notwithstanding the officer's stated observation of
signaling beyond the actual minimum distance?
19. Was the seizure constitutionally valid at its inception?
20. Is dismissal required where no objective violation existed
at the inception of the seizure and the State lacks
competent independent evidence?
X. DEMAND FOR A RECORD CAPABLE OF REVIEW
Josh Goble requests that the Court:
1. identify the precise enactment being enforced;
2. identify the constitutional source of the authority
asserted;
3. state the actual legal signaling requirement;
4. identify the officer's stated factual observations;
5. determine whether those observations established a
violation;
6. determine whether any mistake of law was objectively
reasonable;
7. address each material constitutional objection;
8
GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CB8. enter findings sufficient for meaningful appellate or
extraordinary review;
9. refrain from treating compelled participation as waiver or
consent;
10. preserve every pleading, recording, exhibit, citation,
complaint, video, audio recording, dispatch record,
officer report, transcript, order, and ruling concerning
this objection;
11. identify whether the objection is granted or denied; and
12. state the factual and constitutional grounds for that
disposition.
A response merely stating that an enactment exists, that
traffic laws are routinely enforced, that the Court possesses
jurisdiction, or that the objection is denied-without addressing
the stated factual contradiction-does not resolve the
constitutional question presented.
XI. PRESERVATION OF NOTICE AND SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT
This Notice is submitted to ensure that the municipal record
accurately reflects:
1. the specific constitutional objection presented;
2. the factual basis supporting the objection;
3. Texas Transportation Code § 545.104(b), the exact
enactment implicated;
4. the conflict between the officer's stated observation and
the actual distance requirement;
5. the request for a neutral and express determination;
6. the relief requested before further proceedings;
7. the Court's response or non-response; and
8. every action taken after receipt of this Notice.
The purpose is not to speculate concerning motive.
9
GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CBThe purpose is to establish notice, opportunity to address the
defect, the response made, and the sequence of subsequent
conduct.
XII. RELIEF REQUESTED
Josh Goble respectfully requests an order:
A. identifying the precise constitutional and enactment-based
authority asserted;
B. finding that Texas Transportation Code § 545.104(b)
required continuous signaling for not less than the last 100
feet of movement before the turn;
C. finding whether the officer stated that Josh Goble signaled
approximately 150 to 200 feet before turning;
D. determining whether those stated facts established any
violation;
E. determining whether the asserted 1,000-foot requirement was
supported by any objectively reasonable interpretation of the
enactment;
F. determining whether the stop was constitutionally valid at
inception;
G. suppressing every statement, observation, identification,
admission, recording, item of evidence, and derivative product
obtained through or as a result of a seizure unsupported by an
objectively articulable violation;
H. prohibiting any inference of waiver or consent from
compelled participation undertaken under express objection;
I. staying further proceedings until the constitutional
objection is expressly determined;
J. entering findings sufficient for meaningful review;
10
GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CBK. dismissing any cause for which the State cannot establish
every required element through competent evidence independent of
the unconstitutional seizure, including Cause Nos. 26-005 and
26-006 to the extent each depends upon evidence obtained through
or as a result of that seizure;
L. granting all further relief necessary to preserve
constitutional supremacy and the integrity of the record; and
M. requiring that each constitutional question presented
herein be expressly granted or denied individually, with
findings of fact and conclusions sufficient to permit meaningful
appellate or extraordinary review.
11
GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CBAPPENDIX A
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND FACTUAL-PREDICATE MATRIX
CHALLENGED ACTION:
Traffic seizure initiated after Josh Goble completed the turn
into his private driveway, followed by continued municipal
prosecution arising from that seizure.
ENACTMENT RELIED UPON:
Texas Transportation Code § 545.104(b), together with the
exact charging language alleged by the State.
ACTUAL REQUIREMENT:
Continuous signaling for not less than the last 100 feet of
movement before the turn.
OFFICER'S STATED REQUIREMENT:
Approximately 1,000 feet before the turn.
OFFICER'S STATED OBSERVATION:
Josh Goble signaled approximately 150 to 200 feet before
turning.
FACTUAL CONFLICT:
The officer's stated observation describes signaling beyond
the actual 100-foot minimum but was treated as a violation based
upon an asserted 1,000-foot requirement.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION:
A seizure requires an objectively articulable factual and
lawful basis existing at inception. A later explanation cannot
retroactively supply a missing basis.
12
GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CBLOCATION AT ASSERTION OF AUTHORITY:
Private driveway; Josh Goble had exited the vehicle before the
officer arrived with emergency lights and siren.
OBJECTION FIRST RAISED:
June 2, 2026, by the filing of the jurisdictional challenge,
constitutional objections, and related motions placed before the
Baird Municipal Court.
PRIOR DEMAND FOR RULING:
June 2, 2026. A written demand for disposition of the pending
jurisdictional and constitutional matters accompanied the
original filing package.
FINAL NOTICE OF OPPORTUNITY TO CURE:
Served on or about June 17, 2026, as a final 72-hour cure
notice and pre-litigation notice.
PROCEDURAL NOTICE CHRONOLOGY:
1. June 2, 2026 — Original jurisdictional challenge, demand
for ruling, constitutional objections, and related motions
filed.
2. June 17, 2026 — Final 72-hour cure notice and
pre-litigation notice served.
3. Trial setting issued without an identified written ruling
on the pending jurisdictional or constitutional
objections.
4. Notice of Dishonor and Demand for Dismissal issued.
5. Demand for Secretary of State records, oath, bond, and
authority issued.
6. Notice of Constitutional Objection and Demand for Express
Findings filed to preserve the unresolved questions and
obtain a reviewable ruling.
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GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CBCOURT'S RESPONSE:
Trial setting issued. No written ruling has been identified on
the pending jurisdictional or constitutional objections as of
the date of this Appendix.
EXPRESS FINDINGS MADE:
None identified.
RELIEF REQUESTED:
Express findings; a stay of further proceedings; determination
of the seizure's constitutional validity at inception;
suppression of evidence obtained through or as a result of an
unconstitutional seizure; and dismissal of any cause the State
cannot establish through competent evidence independent of that
seizure.
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GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CBDECLARATION OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
I, Josh Goble, declare under penalty of perjury that the
factual statements in this filing, including Appendix A,
concerning the officer's stated reason for the stop, the
distance the officer claimed I signaled, my location when the
officer asserted authority, and my position outside the vehicle
are based upon my personal knowledge and are true and correct.
This Declaration is offered to preserve those facts in the
record pending production of the officer's body-camera
recording, dash-camera recording, dispatch records, citation
narrative, written report, audio recording, and any other record
concerning the stop.
July 13th
Executed on ____________________, 2026.
Respectfully submitted,
________________________
Josh Goble
sui juris
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GEN 2026-07-13 08:42 AM CDT / 01:42 PM UTC | MUNICIPAL | MUNI-20260713-13E4CB