Asia Insights Online Magazine

US Alliances survive, despite the president

In August 2017, President Trump, on a call with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, expressed his frustration regarding a deal made by the Obama Administration. The deal entailed that the USA would take up to 2000 refugees detained by Australia because of their policy against allowing refugees who show up on boats. While expressing his unhappiness, President Trump said, "What is the thing with boats? Why do you discriminate against boats? No, I know they come from certain regions. I get it." Essentially accusing the Australian PM of racism (Sorkin et al., 2017).
In June of 2019, President Trump withdrew from a defensive treaty with Japan, saying, "If Japan is attacked, we will fight World War III." Then he added: "But if we're attacked, Japan doesn't have to help us at all. They can watch it on a Sony television." (Bass, 2019).
While critiquing President Trump's response to the COVID 19 crisis, Republican Governor Larry Hogan of Maryland claimed Donald Trump disparaged the people of South Korea in front of his wife, who is South Korean. The jarring part: Trump said he didn't like dealing with President Moon from South Korea. The South Koreans were 'terrible people,' he said, and he didn't know why the United States had been protecting them all these years," Mr. Hogan wrote. "'They don't pay us, Trump complained." (Jackson, 2019).
Since his presidency's inauguration, Trump has been very vocal in expressing his sometimes less than pleasant sentiments regarding his Asian allies. However, the alliances between the USA and their Asian allies have shown to be more resilient than most anticipated. Erratic short-term decisions have characterized the past four years of diplomacy by the white house. The most prominent example of this is China, where the Trump administration has been alternating between praising and engaging in a trade war. This approach has become quite a norm as the president would denounce a nation, only to have to work with them a few days later.
A response to this can be seen in multiple US allies across the country. Bills in Japan proposing to remove restrictions placed on militaries were introduced in 2015 and since have gained traction as their primary ally, on whom they depend for their defense, failed to reassure them. Confidence in the US has also plummeted in the face of the Trump presidency. With South Korean confidence in Trump being at 17%, this opposed to 88% during the Obama Presidency. Along with this, many other US allies have started bolstering their military in anticipation of the US government's unreliability (Denmark & Goto, 2020).
However, some of Trump's policies have favored their Asian allies, especially those regarding China. The White House director of Trade and Manufacturing Policy has described trade with China as a zero-sum game (Calia, 2018). Laying down the groundwork for the US policy where the US can only profit if China loses. Trump's actions of putting tariffs on China have been motivated by this policy.
On the whole, Trump's presidency has taken its toll on the US's alliances over many years. However, despite this, these alliances have held firm and proven resilient to these pressures. Despite the dissolution of treaties like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (BBC, 2017), the countries have actively sought out new treaties with the US. An excellent example of this is QUAD, a treaty between the US, Japan, Australia, and India (Madan, 2017). Due to Allied countries' great effort, the US has retained its alliances, which help keep countries like China in check. Whether this continues to be, the case is yet to be seen.

Combating Global Counterfeiting, Locally

“The World Health Organisation (WHO) reported in 2017 that the estimated number of children who may die of pneumonia each year after consuming counterfeit medicines is between 72,000 and 169,000.”
The counterfeiting of medication, especially in Asia, has taken a turn for the worse as the pandemic progresses. The EU has teamed up with many countries across Asia to raise awareness about the dangers of counterfeit medication.
The campaign is a part of the broader IP Key SEA (Intellectual Property Key South-East Asia) project. EU has called upon people to share their experiences with counterfeit medication on social media to broaden their reach.
The IP Key SEA project is a 7 million Euro program to protect intellectual properties in the South-East Asia region. The goal of the program is to create a better economic and trade environment that supports innovation and cracks down on counterfeiting and intellectual property theft.
“Fake medicines may contain both placebo and dangerous substances,”
Tiago Guerreiro, IP Key SEA Project Leader, told EURACTIV. He further added that these medications might cause a placebo or may have dangerous side effects on consuming these medicines.
“This presents great health and safety risks to consumers who unknowingly ingest dangerous and toxic substances.”
The EU explained that the popularity of these counterfeit medications is attributed mainly to similar logos and presentation, tricking many into thinking it is the authentic product, coupled with their low prices. They have stressed that consumers need to be diligent in verifying products, especially medicines when buying them—ensuring that the pharmacies are appropriately licensed and the products authentic.
In the past few years, these counterfeits have found their way into the European and other markets, as e-commerce has flourished. As markets have become more accessible due to global conglomerates like Amazon and Alibaba, counterfeit products have found their way into markets worldwide.
It was found that almost 7% of imports by the EU were counterfeit. Another study revealed that 3.3% of the global pharmaceutical trade is counterfeit. As these opportunities have opened up, counterfeiting operations have become more and more sophisticated.
IP key SEA Guerreiro while explaining the level of sophistication of these operations, elaborated,
“Counterfeiters are growing in sophistication, employing highly skilled workers and setting up their production lines,”
“A growing number of counterfeit pharmaceuticals have been detected in small parcels, facilitated by a continuous expansion of unauthorized and unregulated online pharmacies.”
Currently, the counterfeiting of medication poses a unique problem. Counterfeiting is an economic problem, one which is given a similar urgency. However, counterfeiting of medication has put this problem on a much higher urgency. Now, it is not only an economic but also a medical problem.
This raises the stakes substantially, and more governments have a stake in the issue as the threat of these counterfeit medications making their way to their country is suddenly very real. Here we can see the EU’s two clear vested interests. By intervening in this crisis, they are securing EU countries from receiving these shipments. Secondly, by reducing counterfeiting, medicines produced in and by EU member countries will have a greater demand.

Southeast Asia vs. COVID 19: The Good, Bad and Ugly

As the world is closing in on the millionth death due to COVID 19 and over 30 million people have been infected by the global pandemic, one can see the disease tighten its grip over the Southeast Asian region. Previously a region considered to have handled the pandemic with great success, now Southeast Asia seems to have failed at continuing the efforts.
Most visibly, the Indonesian capital of Jakarta has been put into the second round of lockdown as cases peaked with an additional almost 4000 cases were recorded on September 17. Indonesia’s death toll is now at 9,222, with the total number of cases reaching 232,628. This has made Indonesia among the worst impacted country in the region.
A large portion of the blame for this situation has been attributed to President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and his unscientific approach to tackling the pandemic. Over the past few months, the administration has promoted cures ranging from prayer to unproved substances like eucalyptus leaves. Further investigation by Reuters has also revealed that testing in the country has been minimalistic, causing a lack of credible information to take action against the pandemic. The situation in the capital of Jakarta is considered as dire, as over 1000 daily cases have been recorded for the past week.
A similar situation can be observed in The Philippines, where the authorities recorded over 3,300 cases in a single day. The country has long overtaken Indonesia in the total number of cases, as they have observed a total of 276,289 cases, of which 4,785 deaths have been observed. This includes over 70 cases among the parliament of the country.
Another country which has taken a turn for the worse is Myanmar. Until a month ago, the country had been successful in controlling transmissions. However, since the past one month, as campaigning for the upcoming elections began, cases have spiraled out of control, reporting over 400 new cases on September 18.
However, not all countries have failed to constrict the virus. Vietnam, a country with a population similar to the Philippines has been able to restrict the number of cases to just 1000. Similarly, countries like Cambodia and Laos have shown great success in handling the pandemic. Thailand recently went 100 days without a community infection.

按照鷹派的評論家Chellaney的觀點（文章連結在下方），莫迪在第一任後期，刻意拉開和西藏流亡政府的距離，還搞了兩次莫習會，搞到現在邊境對峙再現，落入了中國「表面交往實際圍堵」印度的策略。

要講說莫迪應該做什麼什麼，不然就會怎樣怎樣，聽起來很容易，這其實也是印度的問題。一大堆發表意見的人，但是實際上聲音能進入實際決策圈的，鳳毛麟角。不過如果是國大黨那個羸弱的公子哥兒來當總理，那其結果大概更是難以想像。

在洞朗危機後，莫迪的中國政策籌劃人是曾任駐中國大使、時任外交常次的顧凱杰。此公在擔任印度台北協會會長（也就是實際上的印度駐台大使館）時，一心著眼促進中印關係，對增進印度與台灣的關係不以為然，也不甚積極。

沿著印度對華政策圈/外交圈傳統的那種多邊、不結盟滑溜外交的思路，在顧公的主導下，會搞兩次莫習非正式領袖會晤，還共同發表了一堆框架式宣言，也不令人意外。

如今顧公已卸任，未來莫習會這種非正式高層通道，在目前的氛圍下是否還是會成為外交重點，很難說。

中印的邊界緊張態勢，其實已經以扔石頭、肉搏的方式持續了很久，在外媒不斷報導的視角中，雙方不斷在邊界蓄積兵力，看似很嚇人，實則比較像是動員測試；在兩國軍事實力不平衡、中國在大國關係戰略上拉攏印度的大趨勢下，升級為雙方交火的機率甚低。

印度要能真正抵禦中國的戰略壓力，唯一的道路只有整軍經武一條，必須建立可信的嚇阻訊號。但是按照其實力、工業能力、辦事文化以及左傾遠美「戰略自主」慣性的牽制下，未來大概還是會維持其一貫猶疑的態度以及緩慢的速度，慢慢往對美親近的方向震盪性擺動。

Chellaney的評論，請見：

India’s Appeasement Policy Toward China Unravels | by Brahma Chellaney - Project Syndicate Last month’s swift and well-coordinated incursions by People’s Liberation Army troops into the icy borderlands of India’s Ladakh region were likely the product of months of preparation. The aggression – and the fact that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi didn't see it coming – shows just...

本刊合作夥伴印度富萊明大學「南亞及東南亞研究中心」主任劉奇峰（Roger C. Liu）在《外交家》雜誌網站刊出的分析文章。以下是重點摘要：

「印度今年在WHO輪值執委會主席（Chairman of EB）一職，加上在去年WHA接任的外部稽核（external auditor，由印度總主計長擔任）以及2019年才創設的首席科學家（由前副幹事長Soumya Swaminathan醫師轉任），印度在WHO的管理階層就佔了三個重要職位。

時值美國、歐盟、澳大利亞對WHO提出調查新冠病毒源頭，以及印度總理莫迪倡議改革包括世衛組織在內的國際組織，印度此時掌握WHO重要職位，在明年世衛召開執委會會議（2021年一月）以及大會（五月）之前，將對美中在世衛的角力產生何種影響？

如果美國希望印度能在世衛發揮有效的功能，最好還是遵從多邊主義的邏輯，以包括印太架構在內的諸邊主義（plurilateralism）和印度展開合作。焦點應集中在世衛本身的改革上，而非過度強調中美之間的政治鬥爭。

印度近年來在莫迪的領導下，雖然已經逐步走出1970年代抗美的「戰略自主（strategic autonomy）」思維，但是在國際組織裡，印度還是傾向「77國集團（G77）」和「不結盟運動（NAM）」等第三世界國家的立場。幾個基於實證資料的研究顯示，印度自戰後在聯合國大會的投票行為，都展示了和美國截然不同的立場。印度和美國之間在政策上的距離，甚至比美國與俄國這兩個曾為冷戰老對手之間的立場還要遠。

另一方面，印度擅長在國際發展議題上發揮團結和組織並影響投票，但在涉及國際安全等議題上（例如對抗恐怖主義或是自身聯合國安理會的「入常」案），印度發揮的功能則受到限制。

寄望印度在世衛（或在任何外交戰場）和中國獨自對抗的想法是不切實際的；同時，強迫印度在中美之間選邊站也非明智之舉，最好還是透過多邊機制的合作，將焦點放在在WHO的機構改革本身。」

India’s Leadership in the WHO: What To (and What Not To) Expect How much India is willing to join hands with the West and further pressure China on COVID-19 can determine the course of events.

在2019年阿富汗總統大選挑戰失敗的前外長阿卜杜拉（A Abdullah），宣布將與連任的總統甘尼（Ghani）組成權力共享的政府。在美軍撤軍、塔利班班師回朝、IS勢力滲透的情況之下，縱使阿富汗政府內部在大國的力促之下，願意攜手合作，但未來變數仍多。雙方合作的基礎並不穩固，在塔利班已經席捲阿富汗全境的情況下，阿富汗政府在美軍撤軍後，是否還能維持有效統治，並不樂觀。對向來支持阿富汗「合法」政權的印度政府來說，如何同時與現政府和包括塔利班在內的各方勢力維持接觸、並發揮影響，將是未來周邊外交政策中一個重要的議程。

"Afghanistan President, feuding rival reach 'tentative' agreement"

Saumya Sampath (research associate, CSSAS FLAME)

Through his official Twitter account, ex chief-executive of Afghanistan Abdullah Abdullah announced that progress had been made between him and President Ghani with respect to an agreement. Abdullah and Ghani previously had a power-sharing deal, which saw its end when Ghani won the presidential elections last year. Since then, Afghanistan has been drenched in political instability, which has been cited as a reason for an unimpressive response to the current pandemic in the country.

This tentative agreement has similar colours to the Israeli 'Unity Government' that was formed last month. Incidentally, thousands of Israeli protesters took to the streets against this power-sharing deal between PM Netanyahu and his election rival Gantz. Some issues that the demonstrators highlighted were those related to the infringement of democracy, control over courts, and corruption.

The devil is always in the details. We would have to study certain important details of the Afghan agreement- Who would control the police and the appointment of judges? It is safe to assume that any leader controlling domains related to law and order would wield considerable physical and judicial power. Another interesting thing to note is that according to reports, Abdullah would be leading the Taliban peace talks as part of the agreement. Is Ghani being set up as a convenient scapegoat? Any failure to reach a point of agreement with the Taliban and a subsequent failure to prevent terror attacks will target Abdullah's abilities as a capable leader, which could be a huge plus for the Ghani camp.

What does this Afghan political agreement mean for India? A Ghani-Abdullah partnership is good news for India, since it has been cultivating relationships with both leaders for decades now. But it must be cognizant of two main issues - 1) Any partnership of this kind will only be temporary, especially given Afghanistan's highly fragile state system and the presence of Taliban as a legitimate political opposition. India must act swiftly to engage the two leaders in a dialogue on a longer-term plan for the democratic system to function, minimizing the scope for civil conflict. 2) Perhaps the most important consideration for India is security. India needs to continue its partnerships and training programs with the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army since these bodies act as the first line of defense against the Taliban, but also IS and LeT. India will have to closely coordinate with any leader who controls the domestic security apparatus and its rules of engagement will have to be determined by that factor.

Most people are approaching the Afghan agreement with positivity given the fact that the country doesn't have the time for a political tug-of-war when there is a pandemic to control and overcome. We can only wait for the details of the official agreement to get flavorful of its long-term, post-pandemic implications.

Afghanistan president, feuding rival reach 'tentative' agreement Dispute was huge distraction for Afghanistan when coronavirus crisis was worsening and Taliban was stepping up attacks.

前印度駐華大使班浩然（Gautam Bambawale）在接受印度媒體Mint專訪時指出，美中兩大強權在應對本次武漢肺炎爆發時的進退失據，以及聯合國下屬各機構處理事態不力，提供了諸如印度、日本、德國、法國等中等強權展現領導能力的最佳機會。班浩然認為，中國的外交形象和信任度，在本次新冠肺炎中受損嚴重。在專訪中，他認為儘管中方不喜，但「武漢病毒」的稱呼很難被擺脫。

China’s diplomatic credibility has been grievously damaged: Gautam Bambawale Gautam Bambawale, former Indian ambassador to China, said the pandemic has also brought to the fore vulnerabilities and shortcomings in global institutions such as the UN, and the new world order that emerges post covid-19 could create space for a group of middle powers to provide global leadership,...

根據「無國界記者」組織的資料，東南亞各國2020年的新聞自由排名指數。其中新聞自由度最高，進步最多的是馬來西亞，而越南則排名末位。東南亞各國的新聞自由程度，反映出其壓迫性政體的現實。這點是不管是民主程度或自由度發展都靠前的台灣，在和東南亞諸國交流時，不能忽略的事實。

Zachary Abuza on Twitter “It's a very unhappy world press freedom day in , where it's the proverbial race to the bottom. No press is free in the region. Even which saw such gains in the past 2 years is quickly going back to its old ways under the Muhyiddin government.”

撤軍之後的阿富汗：塔利班回歸、IS滲透 安全局勢不容樂觀

今年三月，美方和塔利班簽署和平協定，美國將逐步撤回在阿富汗的軍隊，終結長達18年的阿富汗戰事。在美國和北約離開後，阿富汗的局勢將回到多個武裝團體群雄競逐的狀態，事態的發展也將牽動印巴關係和南亞的區域安全局勢。

除了阿富汗政府軍以及塔利班之外，伊斯蘭國（IS）的分支組織「伊斯蘭國呼羅珊省分部（IS-K或ISKP）」也在巴基斯坦三軍情報局（ISI）的支援下，進入阿富汗建立據點，並展開攻擊。

月前在首都喀布爾針對錫克教徒的爆炸攻擊，就是由ISKP的新領袖Farooqi策劃。Farooqi的後面據信是巴基斯坦三軍情報局（ISI）。ISI同時也在幕後支持恐怖組織「虔誠軍（LeT；涉及2008年11月的孟買恐攻事件）」以及Haqqani網絡等組織。

儘管美方多次要求，印度對阿富汗局勢仍堅持和平發展的基調，反對過度以軍事方式介入阿富汗事務。在強權撤退、權力真空的情況下，未來阿富汗陷入混亂的機率非常高。而在ISI的支援之下，阿富汗未來恐將成為激進份子對包含印度在內的周邊國家，展開攻擊的基地。

本刊助理研究員石秀美認為，印度應採取更為主動的阿富汗策略，而非一昧重複支持符合「阿富汗人領導、阿富汗人所有」政權的立場。印度除了維持固有的、和「北方聯盟」建立的關係之外，也應該盡全力建立和塔利班溝通的管道，以便更好的應對阿富汗將來可能惡化的安全情勢。

"The Islamic State Remains Alive in Afghanistan"

Saumya Sampath (research associate, CSSAS FLAME)

Experts have been keeping a very close eye on the Middle East and South Asia region, waiting to see which state collapses under the weight of a pandemic coupled with domestic political instability, regional insecurity and crashing oil prices. Afghanistan, a country that acts as a frontier between West and South Asia, is one state that is being watched with particular attention.

With the arrest of ISKP's (Islamic State in Khorasan Province) leader Aslam Farooqi in Afghanistan earlier this month, attention was refocused to the very real threat of continuing operations of terror outfits in Afghanistan. Any successful peace deal between the US, Taliban and Afghan government does not address groups such as the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, with thousands of their fighters spread across the country.

When Islamic State's leader (ISKP) Aslam Farooqi was interrogated, strong links were revealed between the terror outfit and Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). Farooqi, a Pakistani national himself, also shared ISKP's connection to Pak-based terror outfits Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

There is an urgent need for states like India to draw up a post-US plan that moves past its “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” narrative. Yes, the ultimate goal should be the realization of a stable and democratic Afghanistan, but that possible outcome is many many years into the future. Presently, we are dealing with a situation where Pakistan is going to exploit its links with the Taliban and other regional groups to fulfill its goal of establishing 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan and turning it into a client state. Pakistan's quest of being a regional revisionist power and destabilizing the Indian status-quo is going to determine the extent to which Afghanistan will enjoy some domestic peace and cooperation.

India must bear in mind that once the US leaves Afghanistan, many attacks and incidents in the Af-Pak region are going to be looked at as 'regional issues' by the West. India has to take a more proactive stance and protect its interests, which are intrinsically linked with the interests of the Afghan people. While this could be done by re-energizing the Northern Alliance, it can also be done by establishing its terms for communicating and dealing with the Taliban, instead of pretending they don't exist in the Afghan government machinery. It is time for some brave and creative problem-solving.

The Islamic State Remains Alive in Afghanistan In early April, Afghan forces captured the latest head of ISKP — but will it matter?

最近新冠疫情肆虐，印度也趁此機會對周邊國家開展支援外交。但在最近印度因國內反穆斯林浪潮和周邊伊斯蘭教國家產生外交摩擦之際，印度的醫療外交是否能發揮其最大效用？本刊助理研究員石秀美（Saumya Sampath）的分析。

"India’s Indian Ocean Diplomacy in the COVID-19 Crisis"

With the analysis by Saumya Sampath
Associate Research Fellow
CSSAS, FLAME University

Earlier in March, India organized a virtual SAARC meeting to strategize a regional response to combating COVID-19. The meeting was highly publicized, with India wanting to emerge as some 'example for the world'. It also proposed, and contributed a substantial sum of $10 million to the COVID-19 emergency fund for SAARC countries.

However, disturbing events in the past month have perhaps taken the Indian diplomatic machinery a few steps back. With the emergence of reports and news regarding the domestic maligning of Indian Muslims over the spread of coronovirus and the denial of essential medical and related services to the community on the basis of their faith, India has been slammed by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). It is vital to note that the OIC has members who are also part of SAARC - Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

India had temporarily banned the export of anti-malaria hydroxychloroquine and was forced to lift restrictions only after warnings of retaliation from Trump. An important question to ask then is - What goal did the supply of medicines to regional states achieve? It didn't stop a huge coalition of states (some of those were recipients of Indian medical support) from publicly publishing a strongly worded condemnation against India. So do we really care about our IOR neighbors, or are our actions undertaken to capture the eyeballs of the West, to display our position as some regional responsible 'older brother'? More importantly, do our neighbors really care about us? We seem to have risked being regionally isolated, in our quest to pivot towards the United States and western allies.

While this is definitely a big loss for Indian Diplomacy, it is an even bigger warning sign for the future of the country. India risks damaging relations with strategic partners like Afghanistan and Iran where it as invested billions of dollars, and has a long-term interest with significant geo-political consequences. It also faces increasing faith-based radicalization domestically. A deterioration of law and order can surely be expected in a country where the public institutions are overtly partisan and discriminatory.

Indian diplomacy is going to fail tremendously if we don't see the value of a bottom-up approach of regional relationship building. Over 8 million Indians work in the Gulf States and thousands of students from OIC members states study in India. What are we doing to include them in the larger machinery of peace-building? In our tendency to get enamored by the optics of the conferences of powerful men, we forget those who truly define the story and determine its future.

To follow this story in depth, refer to -

1. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-slams-oic-s-remarks-over-reports-of-maltreatment-of-muslims-11587656010581.html
2. https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/indian-embassies-in-gulf-states-warn-against-hateful-messaging-1.71117584
3. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=4651&lid=3503
4.https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-india-drugs/india-lifts-restrictions-on-24-drug-exports-amid-coronavirus-idUSKBN21O34B

https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/indias-indian-ocean-diplomacy-in-the-covid-19-crisis/

India’s Indian Ocean Diplomacy in the COVID-19 Crisis India’s assistance in the coronavirus crisis could help cement its leadership in the Indian Ocean Region.

武漢肺炎肆虐的當頭，在封城之後，印度的大學是否能順利和其他歐美及東亞的同行一樣，順利轉軌成線上教學？本刊合作夥伴FLAME（富萊明）大學的經驗。

「......在學校裡，負責授課的教授地位比非授課職員高出一等，上課時間一通電話，負責教室電腦的IT人員就得出場，解決播放投影片、調音量等鷄毛蒜皮的問題。平日有需求，IT也會專人服務，幫忙換筆記電腦上的桌布圖。當然也有少數人自力自助，但就像印度中上階層的人普遍外包家務，請幫傭打掃、煮飯、開車，所以換桌布圖大概也是類似的概念。在這樣的情況下，真的能成功要求大家開始線上課程嗎？」

作者徐靜琦目前任教於印度浦那FLAME大學，負責校內數位教育訓練和教學工作；移居印度前，在美國工作十餘年，資歷橫跨英語教學、專案助理、財務會計和產品管理等，善於整合跨領域、專業和文化團隊； 美國麻州註冊會計師。

http://southasiawatch.tw/2020/04/23/封城後的印度大學線上教學實況報導/

封城後的印度大學線上教學實況報導 – 南亞觀察