05/06/2025
The Withering Constitution: ( ) By Shahab Usto
The country has recently emerged (نکلا ہے) from a war. The Modi government failed to achieve its three intended objects — cowing (ڈرانا/جھکانا) a nuclear-armed country of 225 million, establishing India as a regional hegemon (علاقائی بالا دستی والا ملک), and extracting political mileage (سیاسی فائدہ حاصل کرنا) for its Hindu nationalist constituency.
The post-war triumphalism (جنگ کے بعد کی فتح کا غرور), however, is also exacting a heavy cost (بھاری قیمت وصول کر رہا ہے) on Pakistan’s politico-constitutional order (سیاسی و آئینی نظام), besides shifting the balance away (توازن کو ہٹا رہا ہے) from a democratic civilian dispensation (جمہوری سویلین نظام حکومت).
Military courts (فوجی عدالتیں): On the fateful day (تاریخی دن) — May 7 — when India attacked Pakistan and the country was distracted by the rising din of war (جنگ کے شور میں الجھا ہوا تھا), a Constitutional Bench (آئینی بینچ) of the Supreme Court, with a 5-2 majority, allowed the trials of civilians in military courts (شہریوں کا فوجی عدالتوں میں ٹرائل).
It overturned (منسوخ کیا) the verdict (فیصلہ) of an earlier five-member bench that had unanimously declared (اتفاق رائے سے قرار دیا) such trials unconstitutional (آئین کے خلاف). Whether military courts can help eradicate terrorism (دہشتگردی کا خاتمہ) is yet to be seen (ابھی دیکھنا باقی ہے), though there is little empirical evidence (تجرباتی ثبوت) that ‘military justice’ is an effective tool (موثر ذریعہ) against politically and policy-rooted terrorism.
But the military courts will further erode (کمزور کرنا) the constitutional trichotomy of power (تین اختیارات کا آئینی توازن). In the Liaquat Hussain case (1999), the Supreme Court already held that military courts, being part of the armed forces — a branch of the executive (انتظامیہ کی شاخ) — could not assume judicial power (عدالتی اختیارات استعمال نہیں کر سکتے).
Moreover, the validation of civilian trials in military courts betrays the failure (ناکامی ظاہر کرتی ہے) of judicial leadership (عدالتی قیادت) which oversees a large network of antiterrorist courts (دہشتگردی کے خلاف عدالتیں) already equipped with special laws (خصوصی قوانین) to prosecute terrorists.
(مختص نشستیں): The apex court (اعلیٰ عدالت) is also dealing with a critical matter (اہم معاملہ) which could alter the entire political spectrum (پوری سیاسی صورتِ حال کو بدل دینا), especially the inter-organs balance of power (ریاستی اداروں کے درمیان طاقت کا توازن).
An 11-member bench is reviewing a decision which, in the name of 'complete justice' (مکمل انصاف), had given reserved seats to the PTI. If it now takes a procedural route (ضابطہ جاتی راستہ) and allows coalition partners (اتحادی جماعتوں کو دے دے), they could achieve the two-thirds majority (دو تہائی اکثریت) to amend the Constitution (آئین میں ترمیم کرنا).
Rumours are rife (افواہیں گردش کر رہی ہیں) that a new, more ‘amendable’ federal constitutional court (ترمیم کے قابل آئینی عدالت) could be created, stacked with preferred judges (من پسند ججوں پر مشتمل). The country, once again, stands on the brink (خطرے کے دہانے پر). The fate of democracy (جمہوریت کا مستقبل), judicial autonomy (خودمختاری), and citizens’ rights and liberties (حقوق و آزادی) all hinge on (انحصار کرتے ہیں) this verdict.
This raises urgent questions: for how long will the constitutional framework (آئینی ڈھانچہ) remain vulnerable (کمزور) to alternative interpretations (مختلف تشریحات) by different benches? And for how long will legal niceties and procedural lapses (قانونی باریکیاں اور عملدرآمد کی کوتاہیاں) be used to trump (پست کرنا) the will of the people (عوام کی خواہشات)?
Leveraging Post-War Triumphalism
Post-war euphoria (جنگ کے بعد کا جوش) has often benefited autocratic rulers (آمریت پسند حکمران), unless checked by democratic guardrails (جمہوری اصولوں کے تحت روکا جائے). Churchill lost elections despite being a WWII hero, as voters preferred a socio-political agenda (سماجی سیاسی پروگرام). But history is replete with (تاریخ بھری پڑی ہے) examples of populists and dictators (عوامی مقبول لیڈر اور آمروں) who used war to extend their rule (حکومت کو طول دینا).
In Pakistan, hybrid regimes (ملے جلے نظام حکومت) have gained international recognition (بین الاقوامی منظوری) during wars. Ruling elites have used hyper religio-nationalist narratives (شدید مذہبی و قومی بیانیہ) to camouflage security failures (سیکیورٹی ناکامیوں کو چھپانا), gag opposition (اپوزیشن کی آواز دبانا), and prolong rule (حکومت کو طول دینا). But wars, internal strife (اندرونی جھگڑے), and emergencies undermine (تباہ کرتے ہیں) democracy and the economy.
Authoritarian Drift and the ‘Chinese Model’
The current ruling elite (موجودہ حکمران طبقہ) presents itself as the nation’s saviour (منجی). This newfound triumphalism (نئی حاصل شدہ فتح کا غرور) is being used to:
Establish leadership credentials (قیادت کا دعویٰ)
Legitimise hybrid regime (ملے جلے نظام کو جائز قرار دینا)
Appease military leadership (فوجی قیادت کو راضی کرنا)
Rewrite the Constitution (آئین میں بنیادی تبدیلیاں کرنا)
Though Pakistan depends on IMF support (آئی ایم ایف پر انحصار), elites have begun praising the Chinese model (چینی ماڈل) — focusing on economic development (معاشی ترقی), not democracy.
Why the Comparison Fails
But drawing parallels (موازنہ کرنا) with China is ridiculous (مضحکہ خیز). China last fought a war in 1979 and since then has focused on:
Human capital (افرادی قوت)
Infrastructure (انفراسٹرکچر)
Technology & trade (ٹیکنالوجی اور تجارت)
In contrast, half of Pakistan’s population is illiterate (ناخواندہ), and there is endemic corruption (وسیع سطح پر کرپشن), bad governance (خراب طرز حکومت), and political instability (سیاسی عدم استحکام).
Still, the state prepares for conflict (لڑائی کی تیاری میں لگا ہوا ہے), rather than investing in peace.
It is expected that patriotism (محب وطنی) will compensate for (کمی پوری کرے گا) what is missing — education, stability, and vision. But this illusionary idea (خوش فہمی پر مبنی خیال) is hard to digest (ہضم کرنا مشکل ہے).
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