02/04/2026
Bumpy off-ramp?
AS the Gulf war rumbles (گھن گرج کے ساتھ جاری رہنا) on, even President Donald Trump’s allies (اتحادی), at home and abroad (بیرون ملک), worry (فکر مند ہونا) about its erratic (غیر یقینی/غیر مستقل) aims (مقاصد) and timeline (جدولِ وقت/مدت). Signals (اشارے) by American officials (حکام) that it may end soon were nixed (مسترد کر دیے گئے) by news of new air attacks (فضائی حملے) and troop (فوجی دستوں) arrivals (آمد). Mixed signals often aim to hassle (پریشان کرنا/تنگ کرنا) the enemy in wars. So, war gurus (ماہرین) instead look at the military, political and economic constraints (پابندیاں/رکاوٹیں) of foes (دشمنوں) to gauge (اندازہ لگانا/پیمائش کرنا) their plans.
The war started out aiming (مقصد رکھنا) for regime (حکومت/نظام) change. But while president Nicolás Maduro’s gangster-like kidnapping (اغوا) resulted (نتیجہ نکلنا) in a more pliant (لچکدار/بات ماننے والا) regime in Venezuela, the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran brought to the fore (نمایاں کرنا/سامنے لانا) far more hard-line (سخت گیر) elements (عناصر). The US and Israel (USrael) now think that a land war will take care of their key constraints (رکاوٹیں/مجبوریاں). War-mongering (جنگ پسند/جنگ کے شائق) American presidents start short wars covered (احاطہ کرنا) by their current budgets (بجٹ/میزانتی تخمینہ) but inevitably (لازمی طور پر/ناگزیر طور پر) end up in longer ones that need new money that a saner (سمجھدار/ذی شعور) Congress may not approve (منظور کرنا). The war’s hits on US market indices (اشاریے) and Trump’s ratings (درجہ بندی/مقبولیت) are a lonely (تنہا) Iran’s best pals (دوست/ساتھی).
The new, humbler (عاجزانہ/کم تر) aims are to harm (نقصان پہنچانا) Iran’s military and economy to eliminate (ختم کرنا/خاتمہ کرنا) the threat (خطرہ) to American interests (مفادات) forever and open the Strait (آبنائے) of Hormuz. These aims may explain (وضاحت کرنا) the mixed signals. Just a few days more of war and new troops may seek (کوشش کرنا/تلاش کرنا) to achieve (حاصل کرنا) both aims. But how aligned (ہم آہنگ/ایک سیدھ میں) are they with US constraints? The aim to hurt Iran has already shrunk (سکڑ گیا/کم ہو گیا) as plans to hit its energy assets (اثاثے) were eliminated (خارج کر دیے گئے) after sane heads warned (خبردار کیا) of huge Iranian hits on America’s ‘Abrahamic’ allies (اتحادیوں).
Now the aim is to mainly (بنیادی طور پر) damage (نقصان پہنچانا) its military. They may even have a list of key targets (اہداف) to hit in a few days. But experts (ماہرین) see few gains (فوائد/حاصل) here. War has hurt Iran’s missile stocks (ذخائر) and factories but it can still fight hard and rebuild (دوبارہ تعمیر کرنا) key arsenal (اسلحہ خانہ) soon — within months perhaps and at the most two to three years. This may tempt (ترغیب دینا/لچانا) USrael to deliver (پہنچانا/فراہم کرنا) annual (سالانہ) ‘haircuts’ (نقصان پہنچانا/کٹائی/کمی) via short wars.
But this may harm (نقصان پہنچانا) the Gulf economies forever. The aim to open the strait via land troops is dicey (خطرناک/غیر یقینی). The problem is not opening it but keeping it open. Iran’s intact (صحیح سلامت/مکمل) arsenal (اسلحہ خانہ) and a fast rebound (واپسی/پلٹ کر آنا) may result in a long war. So, the first aim has worsened (بدتر کر دیا/بگاڑ دیا) matters (معاملات) for USrael, and the second has achieved (حاصل کیا) few gains.
There is now talk of talks soon. The talk of us hosting (میزبانی کرنا) talks is seen by many as an enhanced (بہتر/بڑھی ہوئی/اضافہ شدہ) global status (عالمی حیثیت) that gives an advantage (برتری/فائدہ) over India. But real status (حیثیت) comes slowly by ensuring (یقینی بنانا) economic heft (وزن/قوت/اثر), democracy (جمہوریت) and security (سکیورٹی/تحفظ) via good strategy (حکمت عملی) and hard work. The war’s end will help all but a mediating (ثالثی/بیچ بچاؤ کرنا) role carries risks (خطرات) and few additional (اضافی) gains, as with our key role in the 1971 US-China talks — and the lack (کمی/فقدان) of US help just months later in December. A vicious (ظالم/بدکار/شدید) Israel may harm talks via all dirty means (ذرائع/طریقے). A haughty (مغرور/متکبر) US prefers (ترجیح دیتا ہے) mediators who just pass messages, and don’t ask it to compromise (سمجھوتہ کرنا) nor object (اعتراض کرنا) if it attacks during talks or breaks an agreement (معاہدہ) later. Pakistan, Egypt and Turkiye must think hard about the impact (اثر/نتائج). Our stretched (دباؤ کا شکار/کھنچے ہوئے) rulers (حکمران) already face economic issues, internal (اندرونی) and external (بیرونی) trouble (مصیبت/پریشانی) and volatile (غیر مستحکم/تیزی سے بدلنے والے) masses (عوام/رعایا). So, we must choose our precise (درست/عین مطابق) role wisely (دانشمندی سے). Our rulers (حکمران) must also take clear action to ensure (یقینی بنانا) a break (انقطاع/علیحدگی) from a past where autocrats (آمر/خود مختار حکمران) used the global/ American ties (تعلقات) for domestic (ملکی/گھریلو) legitimacy (قانونی حیثیت/جواز) and to crack down (سخت کارروائی کرنا) on democracy (جمہوریت).
How talks go — if they are held — depends (انحصار کرنا) again on the constraints (رکاوٹیں/پابندیاں) that the foes (دشمن) face given (دیے گئے/مدنظر رکھتے ہوئے) the war’s results (نتائج). Foes often prolong (طویل کرنا/کھینچنا) wars to gain an edge (برتری/فوقیت) in talks. If talks start with the strait shut (بند), Iran will gain an edge. The trust gap (اعتماد کا فقدان) is huge (بہت بڑا) on both sides. In a realpolitik (حقیقت پسندانہ سیاست) world, where an evil (شرپسند) hegemon (بالادست قوت) is the aggressور (جارحیت کرنے والا/پہل کرنے والا), clout (اثر و رسوخ/قوت/سیاسی طاقت) helps mediators more than just good ties (تعلقات). So, ideally (مثالی طور پر), global titans (بڑی طاقتیں/دیو قامت ہستیاں) like the European Union, China and Japan, all hurt (متاثرہ/تکلیف یافتہ) by the war but with greater influence (اثر/اقتدار) over the US, should lead discussions (مباحثہ/گفت و شنید) on key issues like Iran’s nuclear abilities (صلاحیتیں), missiles (میزائل), proxy (نمائندہ/ایجنٹ/بالواسطہ) aid (امدادی/مدد) and frozen (منجمد) assets (اثاثے) and US bullying (دھونس دھاندلی/ڈرانا دھمکانا) and sanctions (پابندیاں).
The hard issues may be left for later. The focus (توجہ/مرکز) should be on burning (انتہائی اہم/سلگتے ہوئے) issues — a durable (پائیدار/مستحکم) ceasefire (اعلانِ جنگ بندی) and opening the strait. Iran rightly (حق بجانب) wants damages (ہرجانہ/تاوان/تلافی). But it may be hard for anyone to convince (قائل کرنا/ماننے پر مجبور کرنا) a haughty (مغرور/متکبر) US to pay up, more so as it knows that if it just cuts (کم کرنا/بند کرنا) its attacks, friendly states may get Iran to end the war and open the strait. But Iran, too, has some cover (تحفظ/آڑ/پناہ) against future wars as it can close the strait again and can ask other rich states to aid (مدد کرنا) its recovery (بحالی/صحت یابی) in opening it or charge (وصول کرنا/فیس لینا) passing ships. In the end, talks may not result in big formal (رسمی) gains (فوائد) and realpolitik may shape (تشکیل دینا/صورت دینا) the future.
Dr Niaz Murtaza
March 31, 2026
Dawn
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