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Strategic confusion

IT was late spring (موسم بہار کا اختتام), yet Islamabad (اسلام آباد) was gripped (جکڑا ہوا/گرفت میں) by a heated debate (شدید بحث) over whether Pakistan should send its troops (فوجی دستے) to Saudi Arabia (سعودی عرب) to participate (حصہ لینا) in the Saudi-Yemen war (سعودی-یمن جنگ). The joint session (مشترکہ اجلاس) of parliament (پارلیمنٹ) deliberated (غور و فکر کیا) for five days, reflecting (ظاہر کرتا ہوا) an unusual (غیر معمولی) level of engagement (شمولیت/دلچسپی), as it is rare (نایاب) in Pakistan’s history (تاریخ) for parliament to decide matters (معاملات کا فیصلہ کرنا) concerning (سے متعلق) security (سلامتی) and foreign policy (خارجہ پالیسی).

A similar moment (ایسا ہی لمحہ) had emerged (سامنے آیا) in May 2009, when the military leadership (فوجی قیادت) sought (طلب کی) parliamentary support (پارلیمانی حمایت) to launch (شروع کرنا) Operation Rah-i-Raast (آپریشن راہِ راست) in Swat (سوات) against what was at that time described (بیان کیا گیا) and debated (بحث کی گئی) as action against its ‘own people’ (اپنے ہی لوگ).

After a few days, parliament concluded (نتیجہ اخذ کیا) on April 10, 2015, that Pakistan should remain neutral (غیر جانبدار) in the Yemen conflict (یمن تنازع) to play a proactive (فعال/پیش قدم) diplomatic role (سفارتی کردار) in ending the crisis (بحران). Indeed (یقیناً), it was a crucial (اہم ترین) decision (فیصلہ) that parliament made, one which the establishment (طاقتور ادارے) could not have afforded (برداشت کر سکتے) to take unilaterally (یکطرفہ طور پر); parliament had provided (فراہم کی) it full support (مکمل حمایت).

Has such a moment arisen (پیدا ہوا) again? Pakistan’s leadership (قیادت) is once again hesitant (ہچکچاہٹ کا شکار) to play a role (کردار ادا کرنا) in the Middle East (مشرق وسطیٰ), ie (یعنی), to announce (اعلان کرنا) its participation (شمولیت) in the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) (بین الاقوامی استحکام فورس), which will be tasked (ذمہ داری سونپی جائے گی) with securing (تحفظ فراہم کرنا) reconstruction zones (تعمیر نو کے علاقے) and supporting (سہارا دینا) a post-conflict (جنگ کے بعد) governance arrangement (نظامِ حکومت کا انتظام) in Gaza (غزہ).

Prime Minister (وزیراعظم) Mian Shehbaz Sharif (میاں شہباز شریف) and Deputy Prime Minister (نائب وزیراعظم) Ishaq Dar (اسحاق ڈار), along with a delegation (وفد), went to Washington (واشنگٹن) where they attended (شرکت کی) a Donald Trump-led (ڈونلڈ ٹرمپ کی سربراہی میں) Board of Peace meeting (بورڈ آف پیس اجلاس), during which the American president (امریکی صدر) and Mr Sharif exchanged (تبادلہ کیا) “traditional greetings” (روایتی مبارکباد), with a reminder (یاد دہانی) that Trump had prevented (روکا تھا) a nuclear war (جوہری جنگ) between India (بھارت) and Pakistan. However (تاہم), Pakistan was not among the five nations (پانچ ممالک) that announced their formal participation (باضابطہ شمولیت) in the ISF.

Pakistan’s leadership is once again hesitant (ہچکچاہٹ کا شکار) to play a role in the Middle East.

With Mr Sharif and Mr Dar continuing (جاری رکھتے ہوئے) their meetings (ملاقاتیں) in Washington, including (بشمول) with US Secretary of State (امریکی وزیر خارجہ) Marco Rubio (مارکو روبیو), the leadership may reach (پہنچنا) a decision (فیصلہ) in the next few days about Pakistan’s contribution (حصہ/کردار) to the ISF, as hinted (اشارہ کیا) by the Foreign Office (دفتر خارجہ) spokesperson (ترجمان) during a media briefing (میڈیا بریفنگ).

It is spring again, and the establishment (ادارے) has quickened (تیز کر دی) its pace (رفتار) towards becoming a hard state (سخت ریاست). And yet (پھر بھی), this is a peculiar (عجیب/غیر معمولی) move (قدم) for it and it might be considering (غور کر رہا ہو) taking parliament into confidence (اعتماد میں لینا) to seek (طلب کرنا) its endorsement (توثیق) and present it as a consensus (متفقہ) decision. Such doubts (شکوک) arise because Pakistan is maintaining (برقرار رکھے ہوئے ہے) a similar position (مؤقف) on the ISF, ie, that it would be part of a peacekeeping mandate (امن قائم رکھنے کا مینڈیٹ) but would not participate (حصہ نہیں لے گا) in any disarmament (ہتھیار ڈالنے کا عمل) of Hamas (حماس) or demilitarisation mandates (غیر فوجی بنانے کے احکامات).

Let us recall (یاد کریں) the April 2015 session (اجلاس), when parliament went a step further (ایک قدم آگے بڑھا): while endorsing (تائید کرتے ہوئے) the establishment’s plan (منصوبہ), it also advised (مشورہ دیا) that Pakistan should not send its troops to Saudi Arabia even for training (تربیت) and advisory (مشاورتی) purposes. In its resolution (قرارداد), it stressed (زور دیا) that the leadership should play a proactive diplomatic role rather than deploy (تعینات کرنا) troops. Will Pakistan repeat (دہرانا) this stance (مؤقف)?

The situation (صورتحال) is altogether (بالکل) different now. Pakistan has renewed (تجدید کی) its defence pact (دفاعی معاہدہ) with Saudi Arabia, there are new geostrategic alignments (جغرافیائی سیاسی صف بندیاں) in West and Central Asia (مغربی اور وسطی ایشیا) as well as in Africa (افریقہ), and Pakistan is enjoying the support (حمایت) and favour (عنایت) of President Trump. This time, multiple (متعدد) Muslim nations (مسلم ممالک) are participating in the ISF, and it would be difficult (مشکل) for the leadership to make a decision.

However, there is a perception (تاثر) that, more than a backlash (شدید ردعمل) from the masses (عوام) over unpopular (غیر مقبول) decisions, the establishment is apprehensive (فکرمند/خوفزدہ) of the historical factor (تاریخی عنصر) — history (تاریخ) can make us either heroes (ہیرو) or villains (بدنام کردار). Such an impression (تاثر) has a cost (قیمت) not only for individuals (افراد) but also for institutions (ادارے). Such assumptions (قیاس آرائیاں) may haunt (پریشان کرنا) the decision-makers (فیصلہ ساز), but perhaps the strategic advantages (حکمت عملی کے فوائد) they see in any geostrategic adventure (جغرافیائی سیاسی مہم جوئی) they contemplate (سوچتے ہیں) is not viewed (دیکھا جا رہا) from a longer-term perspective (طویل مدتی نقطہ نظر).

Seemingly (بظاہر), Pakistan faces a dilemma (دوراہا): an India-centric (بھارت مرکز) security doctrine (سلامتی نظریہ), seeking help (مدد) from the West (مغرب) and Gulf countries (خلیجی ممالک), while providing (فراہم کرتے ہوئے) a strategic backyard (اسٹریٹجک پچھلا محاذ) to the US and offering specialised (خصوصی) security services (سلامتی خدمات) to Gulf countries. Though the dream (خواب) is to eventually (آخرکار) become a net security provider (سلامتی فراہم کرنے والا ملک) to the Gulf and North Africa (شمالی افریقہ), defence production capabilities (دفاعی پیداوار کی صلاحیت) and a weak economic profile (کمزور معاشی حیثیت) are major hindrances (بڑی رکاوٹیں) to this, but the decision-making skills (فیصلہ سازی کی صلاحیتیں) of the establishment have always been tested (آزمائی گئی) on both fronts (دونوں محاذوں پر).

US regional priorities (علاقائی ترجیحات) are changing and may require (ضرورت پڑنا) Pakistan’s backyard as part of its strategy (حکمت عملی) against China (چین) and Iran (ایران), something Pakistan obviously (ظاہر ہے) cannot consider (غور نہیں کر سکتا), unlike the role (کردار) it played against the Soviet Union (سوویت یونین) in the 1980s and 1990s. Afghanistan (افغانستان) is a different story now. It still carries (رکھتا ہے) some strategic value (اہمیت) for the US for the same purpose, but the country has lost (کھو دیا ہے) much of its strategic capital (اسٹریٹجک اہمیت) and will take a long time to regain (دوبارہ حاصل کرنا) even limited (محدود) strength (طاقت). Meanwhile (اس دوران), Pakistan will continue to exert pressure (دباؤ ڈالنا) on it, and this appears (نظر آتا ہے) to be sufficient (کافی) for the US for now.

In the Middle East, where Pakistan has somewhat greater geostrategic space (زیادہ گنجائش), it often becomes confused (الجھن کا شکار) about which direction (سمت) to take. It tries to balance (توازن قائم کرنا) its relations (تعلقات) with neighbouring countries (پڑوسی ممالک), mainly Iran, manage (سنبھالنا) the domestic front (اندرونی محاذ) marked by sectarian (فرقہ وارانہ) and political divisions (سیاسی تقسیم), and, more importantly (زیادہ اہم بات), confront (مقابلہ کرنا) India’s growing influence (اثر و رسوخ) in the Gulf countries over the last two decades (دو دہائیاں).

In geopolitics (جغرافیائی سیاست), nothing is risk-free (بغیر خطرے کے), and alliances (اتحاد) and equations (تعلقات) evolve (ترقی کرتے ہیں) on the basis of mutual interests (باہمی مفادات) and give-and-take (لین دین), not on moral (اخلاقی) or ideological (نظریاتی) grounds. Impartiality (غیر جانبداری) and a non-aligned attitude (غیر وابستہ مؤقف) are diplomatic positions (سفارتی مؤقف) that have value (اہمیت) in realpolitik (حقیقی سیاست), but medium-sized nations (درمیانے درجے کے ممالک) must make decisions to remain geo-strategically relevant (اہم) and to maximise (زیادہ سے زیادہ کرنا) their economic interests (معاشی مفادات).

Pakistan had faced consequences (نتائج) of such confusion in the past as well, for instance (مثال کے طور پر), in its relations with Saudi Arabia and the first Iraq war (پہلی عراق جنگ). If the decision seems difficult, parliament is here to happily provide (فراہم کرنا) its support, as it did in the past. Joining the Board of Peace without considering (غور کیے بغیر) its costs (قیمت/نقصانات) would have been a blunder (بڑی غلطی), but once one has set sail (سفر شروع کر دیا), one must cope (نمٹنا) with the voyage (سفر)

February 22, 2026

Dawn

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NAMAZ

• 48 total numbers of Rakats are in Farz prayer.
• Namaz-e-Khasoof is offered for Moon Eclipse.
• Namaz-e-Kasoof is offered for Solar Eclipse.
• Namaz-e-Istasqa is offered for Rain.
• Holy Prophet offered Jumma Prayer in 1. A.H.
• Namaz-e-Istasqa is offered with backside of hands upward.
• Holy prophet offered first Eid Prayer in 2. A.H.
• Eid Namaz is Wajib.
• Madurak is the person who starts prayer with Immam.
• Musbaq is the person who comes after one rakat.
• Fajar and Isha were essential in the early period of Islam.
• Tahajud mean abandon sleep.
• Qaada is to sit straight in Salat.
• Jasla is short pause between two sajdas.
• Qaumaa is standing straight during Rukus.
• A person who performs prayer alone is Munfarid.
• Farz in wuzu=4, Sunats=14.
• Farz in Ghusual=3, Sunats=5
• Types of Sunnah prayer are of two types.
• In Fajr, Maghrib & witr no chage in farz rakaat in case of Qasr.
• Takbeer-e-Tashreeq is recited in Eid-ul-Uzha.
• Jumma prayer is Farz salat.
• Conditions of Salat are Seven.
• takbeer-e-Tehreema are to be said in the salat: one.
• Jasla is wajib.
• To sit straight in Salat is called Qa’ada.
• Qa’ada is farz.
• Two persons are required for a Jamat prayer.
• Salat Juma became Farz in Madina.
• Five salat made compulsory in 10th Nabvi