Law School

PCGG v. SIB, 455 SCRA 526

Ratio: Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government policies." Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of former officials" or their "clout."

Facts: PCGG seeks to disqualify Atty. Estelito Mendoza as counsel for the Lucio Group of Companies in the suit involving the sequestration of shares of stock of the LGC as alleged ill-gotten wealth, on the ground that as former Solicitor General, he intervened in the matter of the liquidation of Genbank, which was subsequently purchased by LGC.

W/N the appearance as counsel of Atty. Mendoza for Tan, et al. violates Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Held: NO. The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of “matter” referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the “intervention” made by the former government lawyer on the “matter.” The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined “matter” as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
Beyond doubt, the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank”s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.” We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 14
Quilban v. Robinol, 171 SCRA 768 (1989)

Facts:
- Father Federico Escaler, it sold said land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters as a possible development site.
- Cong. Taruc broached to Father Escaler the Idea of donating or selling the land (reserved are) cheap to the squatters. The squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala" (Samahan, for brevity), with Bernabe Martin as President, who was entrusted with the task of negotiating on their behalf for the sale of the land to them. But instead, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other Samahan members. Fr. Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the property.
- Thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed Civil Case No. Q-16433, Branch IV, Quezon City but was dismissed.
- To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees on 8 October 1975 (Exhibit "I"). Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing on 10 March 1979
- Collectively the Samahan raised the total amount 75,000.00 for the ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment and etc.. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol.
- After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivera. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Ex*****on had not yet been issued by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had already been dismissed.
- On 17 March 1980 Robinol was informed in writing by plaintiffs of the termination of his services. That was followed by another letter of 31 March 1980 of the same tenor. In his Memorandum of 12 December 1985 and during the proceedings before the lower Court on 5 June 1980 he had stated that he had no objection to Atty. Montemayor's appearance in Civil Case Q-16433. When the latter did enter his appearance, therefore, on 20 March 1980 it was only after assuring himself that Atty. Robinol's services had been formally terminated.

Atty. Robinol claimed that he was unjustly dismissed by his clients

Held:
Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners.

The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In this case, however, there was an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit on quantum meruit therefore, is inapplicable.
There is no gainsaying that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well within their prerogative.

Canon 14.2 COUNSEL DE OFFICIO - AMICUS CURIAE

Ledesma v. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473 (1974)

Doctrine: Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. The law is dedicated to the ideal of service and not
a mere trade

Facts: Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He was also the counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of Judge Climaco. Because of his appointment, he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel de parte. Judge Climaco denied Ledesma's motion. Further, Judge Climaco appointed Ledesma as counsel de oficio for the two defendants in the case. Ledesma then filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Comelec to require full time service. Judge Climaco denied this as well.

W/N Ledesma should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio

Held: NO.
Judge Climaco, in denying the urgent motion of Ledesma, said that when Ledesma assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2 when trial would resume. The case dragged on for almost a year because of the postponements obtained by the defense. Judge Climaco noted that there was no
incompatibility between the duty of Ledesma to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Comelec and that the ends of justice would be served by allowing and requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case.

The SC held that Ledesma was less than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. Ledesma ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. But for lawyers of repute and of eminence welcome such appointments. The law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. Hence, a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. The fact that a lawyers” services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary.

A lawyer has an indispensable role in the defense of an accused in a criminal case. Such should be enough to disallow Ledesma from withdrawing. Though Ledesma is an election registrar, there is not likely an exorbitant demand on his time now. The SC said that Ledesma should now exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing.

Canon 17 and Canon 18

Prudencio B. Portuguese, Jr. Vs. Atty. Jerry B. Centro

Respondent Atty. Centro was complainant Prudencio B. Portuguese, Jr.'s (Portuguese) counsel in Civil Case No. 71772 pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 of Surigao City. Atty.

Atty. Centro committed the following acts:
l) failing to file a Memorandum and even misrepresenting about filing it; 2) failing to inforin Portuguese of the RTC's Decision;
3) failing to protect Portuguese's interest against the adverse RTC's Decision; 4) failing to inform Portuguese of the Motion for Ex*****on, the scheduled hearing, and the resolution granting the said motion; and 5) failing to file an Answer to the instant Complaint. Worse, when Portuguese confronted him about the deliberate lapses concerning the civil case, the latter merely replied that there was nothing more he could do and that he was giving up the case for good.

Atty. Centro's unjustifiable negligence and abandonment of his client's cause violated the Lawyer's Oath as well as the CPR. He casually set aside a legal matter that was entrusted to him and which deserved his full attention and diligence. He was grossly negligent of his duty as counsel and was manifestly disinterested in his client's cause. He must be reminded that as a lawyer, he "is duty-bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client's cause with diligence, care and devotion. This is because a lawyer owes fidelity to his client's cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.

He should have informed Portuguese at the earliest opportunity that he could no longer properly represent him and perform his functions as counsel. This way, Portuguese would have the option to secure the services of another lawyer so that his interests would be protected. Unfortunately, Atty. Centro did not even bother to apprise Portuguese about the developments in the civil case or inform him of his incapacity to continue as counsel. In fine, respondent committed transgressions not only against his client but the IBP and the Court as well.

Nature of client- lawyer relationship
Rule 14
Rule 12.08 TESTIFYING - in behalf of client except on formal matters, and on substantial matters

Regala vs. SB GR No. 105938

Facts:
- A complaint was filed against the clients of ACCRA Law Firm
- Legal services performed by the law firm:
(1) the members of the law firm delivered to its client stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares.
(2) assisted in the organization and acquisition of companies and
(3) acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.
-Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution that basically said that until ACCRA lawyers prove the existence and identity of their clients, they cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts. So they are still impleaded in
the complaint.

W/N the ACCRA lawyers should be subjected to the strict application of the law of agency

HELD:
NO. The ACCRA lawyers are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. They are being impleaded in the complaint so it can be used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. PCGG has NO valid cause of action against the ACCRA lawyers and should exclude them.

The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.

In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent. Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court 21 and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.

LEGAL ETHICS
Rule 15.02. Privileged Communication.
Exceptions to exceptions

Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 105938 (1996)

FACTS: A complaint was filed before the Sandiganbayan by the PCGG against Eduardo Cojuangco for recovery of illgotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks. Among the defendants in this complaint are Regala, Angara, Cruz,
Concepcion, Vinluan, Lazatin, Escueta, and Hayudini who are all partners of ACCRA Law Firm. ACCRA law
performed legal services for clients. More specifically, the members of the law firm delivered to its client stock
certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or
assignment covering said shares. In the course of this, ACCRA law came to know the assets of their clients as well as
personal and business circumstances. They also assisted in the organization and acquisition of companies and they also
acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. (coco levy scandal)

The PCGG said that they would drop the ACCRA law partners from the complaint if they comply with the
following conditions:
1. Disclosure of identity of its clients
2. Submission of documents substantiating lawyer-client relationship
3. Submission of the deeds of assignments the ACCRA law partners executed in favor of its clients covering
their respective shareholdings.
Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution that basically said that until ACCRA lawyers prove the existence and
identity of their clients, they cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts. So they are still impleaded in
the complaint. (So names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint)

ISSUE: Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and acquiring companies allegedly sourced from illgotten wealth is privileged and disclosure of such is unethical.

HELD: The court held that the client identity in this case is privileged. As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. This general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions:

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.

2) Where disclosure would open the client
to civil liability, his identity is privileged.

3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.

Information relating to the identity of the client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the client’s name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under the first and third exception.

The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the Rules of Court provides the disqualification by reason of privileged communication. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court further emphasizes the importance of maintaining client confidence. Furthermore, this duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client.

The Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby annulled and set aside.

Poso v. Judge Mijares

Faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that the occupants of the bench are rich in moral fiber and strong in their grasp of legal principles. # # # no position in government service exacts greater demand on honesty and integrity upon the individual than a seat in the judiciary.

Facts:
- The instant administrative case stemmed from the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 2477 for murder, "People v. Virgilio de Guia," where the victim, a certain Lito M. Galupo, was a relative of complainant Oscar M. Poso. On 6 February 1995 the criminal case was raffled to RTC-Br. 21, Laoang, Northern Samar,2 presided over by respondent Judge Jose H. Mijares in an acting capacity by detail from his regular station at RTC-Br. 26, San Juan, Southern Leyte.

- Judge Mijares granted the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 10 January 1996 filed by the accused for the reduction of the prison term imposed on him.

- Unfortunately however two (2) versions of the same Resolution, one being the alleged draft version, and the other, a final copy thereof, although both were penned by respondent Judge, surfaced and found circulation but each imposing different maximum terms of the indeterminate sentence.

- On 11 January 1996, taking his cue from the reduced penalty in Crim. Case No. 2477 and on the very day that the accused filed his application for probation and release on recognizance, even before respondent Judge could act upon the application for probation,

-he ordered the provisional discharge of the accused from detention upon the recognizance of OIC Clerk of Court Flor Serio without hearing the prosecution or giving any opportunity for the private complainants to object.
-On 3 July 1996, upon the favorable recommendation of the Probation Officer, respondent Judge placed the accused on probation without objection from Public Prosecutor Napoleon C. Lagrimas in a hearing called for this purpose.

Held:
Faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that the occupants of the bench are rich in moral fiber and strong in their grasp of legal principles. Unfortunately, respondent Judge failed to exhibit these qualities in both his discharge of sworn duties and his manner of defending himself before this Court in the instant proceedings. The brazen flaunting of our disciplining authority through the fraudulent imposition of the doctored 10 January 1996 Resolution along with the persistent and deliberate heedlessness of key precedents and elementary legal precepts is palpable from his actions. Having been judge for twenty-three (23) years, he should have appreciated by now that no position in government service exacts greater demand on honesty and integrity upon the individual than a seat in the judiciary. He should have taken this lesson to heart if not for the fact of his status as judge then for the consideration that a previous administrative case had once been decided against him.

respondent JUDGE JOSE H. MIJARES was found guilty of
1. Gross Dishonesty for foisting upon this Court a fraudulent copy of his 10 January 1996 Resolution, or otherwise,
2. of Gross Inexcusable Negligence for allowing a draft of his 10 January 1996 Resolution to circulate freely and unhampered, in violation of the rule of strict confidentiality, and
3. of Gross Ignorance of the Law, Knowingly Issuing Unjust Orders and Commission of Acts punishable under Sec. 3, par. (e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, as a result of his actions in Crim. Case No. 2477 entitled, "People v. Virgilio de Guia" for lowering the penalty upon the accused to absurd limits in order that the latter may avail of, as he was indeed granted, temporary liberty on recognizance and thereafter probation.

The Administrative Complaint against respondent Judge for concealment of documents, and against respondent Flor Serio, OIC Clerk of Court, RTC, Northern Samar, for concealment of documents and conspiracy to commit the foregoing acts is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Ret Judge Marcos v. Judge Cabrera-Faller AM No. RTJ-16-2472

Mga memz, waya ko kabasa regarding anything regarding the topic. Unhon ini pagconnect? nkabasa kamo sa tibook case ani?

Topic: Rule 11.04., Canon 11.
A lawyer shall not attribute to a
Judge motives not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case.