Sadeq Institute

17/03/2021

NEW PUBLICATION: to mark the anniversary of UN resolution 1973 Sadeq launches an Interactive World Map of 12 countries that have shaped Libya’s transformation over the past decade.

https://www.sadeqinstitute.org/the-great-game

On March 17th 2011, the passed Resolution 1973 under the Responsibility to Protect civilians ( ). A decade on UNSC members and regional powers facilitated Khalifa ’s April 4 2019 assault on endangering civilians. How did we get here?

After UN resolution 1970 failed to stop ’s advance on Benghazi, UN resolution 1973 was passed under the R2P doctrine in response to the international community's call for a means to protect ’s civilian population.

https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm

Amongst the permanent members of the UNSC, the , and approved the resolution while and abstained, revealing deep divisions and the beginning of the end for the liberal global order:

https://twitter.com/un/status/48512720999428096

Resolution 1973 authorized UN member states “to take all necessary measures” to protect civilians in Libya. This cleared the path for regime change in 2011, but established fault lines at UNSC and opened the flood gates for further military intervention in 2014.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-un-france-idUSTRE75S7XR20110629

Nearly 8 years later many of these same powers that enforced UNSC 1973 to protect would facilitate Khalifa Haftar’s April 2019 18 month assault on Tripoli during a visit by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to the capital.

UN envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame remarked at the time “What Libyans do not understand is that the international system has changed dramatically since then.” https://www.npr.org/2019/04/14/713195744/u-n-envoy-to-libya-on-situation-on-the-ground

14 authors share their unique take on this transformative period of foreign policy towards Libya: Karim Mezran, Alissa Pavia, Peter Millett, Mattia Giampaolo, Dr Yahia H. Zoubir, Habib M. Sayah, Noamane Cherkaoui, Bilgehan Öztürk, Dr Andreas Krieg, Hafsa Halawa, Samuel Ramani, Matthew Hedges, Jihâd Gillon and Anas El Gomati

A decade on from the February 17th revolution, how the global disorder transformed Libya into a battleground for interest, ideology and influence.

17/02/2021

As marks the 10th anniversary of the revolution, we take a look back at some of the first voices & reporting of that time.

Protests began in on February 15 2011. Back then Reuters referred to a day of rage planned on Feb 17 following a “rare show of unrest in the oil-exporting country.”
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-rioting-benghazi-idUSTRE71F1A820110216

Here are some of the earliest Tweets from Feb 17:

Reported on Feb 16 on how it all began in Benghazi: https://twitter.com/EnoughGaddafi/status/37646206742183936

Calls to protest 24 hours before Feb17 began to circulate on social media: https://twitter.com/ShababLibya/status/37661753403912192

Early violence against protesters: https://twitter.com/ASanalla/status/38012993979547648

Here’s an early call on Feb17 to Libya’s youth:
https://twitter.com/FreeLibya/status/38006679991877632

Mohamed Nabbous, an activist from Benghazi emerges online as one of the faces of the revolution Feb17:
https://youtu.be/38EXALI60hg

International journalists arrive in Benghazi to report on the revolution from the ground: https://twitter.com/MaryFitzger/status/418954481218519

11.45pm UK Time 19.02.11. The Interview is with the BBC. More to come. WATCH AND SPREAD THIS VIDEO. We have a duty to help.Original video by account Leakspin...

18/01/2021

Security sector news in . reshuffling the deck.
PM Sarraj appoints a prominent Tripoli armed group leader - Abdul-Ghani Al-Kikli, also known as , to take the lead on a new body under the PC, the "National Security Service" according to Libyan media sources.

https://www.218tv.net/%D8%BA%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A/

Since 2016 the GNA has been heavily reliant on armed groups to provide security with ‘four armed groups in particular who acquired unprecedented influence over public and private institutions and established extensive criminal and embezzlement networks.’ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/tripoli-a-kaleidoscope/

These brigades have a history of internal fighting between them. In 2018 clashes between the Ghneiwa brigade and another key group the Al-Nawasi brigade took place in Tripoli, although both groups were “under the umbrella of the Interior Ministry in Tripoli.” https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/overnight-heavy-fighting-rocks-libyas-capital

Moreover, it was reported that the Ghneiwa brigade ”attacked and ransacked a camp for displaced residents of the town of Tawergha in August 2018.” https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c2006b45

And in November 2019 it was reported that the Ghneiwa brigade was linked to the detention of ’s from eastern .
https://twitter.com/amelgasir/status/1060896677295464449

With the movement of brigades under new institutional cover within the GNA, it begs the question of how this move impacts the Berlin process’s overall military track?

218TV

15/01/2021

Who will be the next envoy to ?

“U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres plans to appoint veteran diplomat Jan Kubis as his envoy in Libya. Kubis, a former Slovakian foreign minister, is currently the U.N. special coordinator for .”

Kubis would be the 7th special envoy to Libya since the revolution in 2011 and follow Ian Martin, Tarek Mitri, Bernardino Leon, Martin Kobler, Ghassan Salame and Stephanie Williams.

The UN has been searching for a new SRSG since Ghassan Salame resigned in March 2020. Former Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and special envoy to the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov had been appointed but later declined the position due to personal and family reasons.

Kubis will likely take the position following the completion of the LPDF and a smooth transition can be guaranteed.

U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres plans to appoint veteran diplomat Jan Kubis as his envoy in Libya nearly a year after the last mediator stepped down, according to a letter to the U.N. Security Council seen by Reuters on Thursday.

13/01/2021

What next for - relations? In an interview with AP - MoI positions himself as a potential partner in counter-terrorism to the administration, as he reveals his ambition to be the next prime minister in a post unity government.

Bashagha has long been suggested as Libya’s next prime minister and was en route to securing this position through negotiations in 2019 prior to ’s April 4th offensive.

Since the end of the conflict in June 2020 - the GNA has been beset with internal fissures, as it’s members compete to be considered for the next unity government.

Bashagha’s announcement reflects these dynamics. He has announced a new military operation targeting terrorists and human smugglers in a move that will be appealing to US and European officials who have traditionally viewed Libya in security terms and could strengthen his diplomatic backing in his candidacy for PM.

Internally Bashagha has some way to go and will require building alliances with his defence counterparts in the GNA namely Namroush/Haddad/Jweli who were left in the dark. However, an internationally backed operation and a new lease of legitimacy could bring these actors and others on board.

Deep questions remain over the future; a fragile ceasefire, the role of international actors, and of course Khalifa Haftar. However, behind Bashagha’s latest move is an attempt to build a broad internal alliance of actors we are likely to see featured in a next unity government.

https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-turkey-libya-tunisia-islamic-state-group-a6730818ce23b78283cda430abc32c56
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TUNIS, Tunisia (AP) — The powerful interior minister of Libya’s U.N.-backed government, seen as a contender for the post of prime minister, has expressed hopes that bringing stability to his...

08/01/2021

What is happening with Libya’s ceasefire agreement? Here’s a short recap of the , positions in light of proposal to send international monitors to .

Guterres has pushed for a monitoring mission to Libya against a backdrop of increased tensions and continued breach of the arms embargo. The UN has yet to offer a clear path of how it intends to withdraw a suspected 20,000 foreign fighters from Libya.

LAAF spokesperson Mesmari has responded by signalling approval of a UN ceasefire monitoring mission, though with conditions. He was quoted by Lana News: “We welcome the sending of retired civilian and military observers to implement the provisions of the Geneva Agreement”.

Mesmari indicated a number of conditions - namely “the withdrawal of some military units is not on the table at all.” This position would violate the ceasefire agreement and could be an entry point for conflict.

The GNA is yet to issue an official statement on their website regarding the UN international monitoring mission. The GNA is occupied with internal differences over the conditions of the ceasefire, that could also endanger the agreement.

Libyan MoI is applying pressure to comply with the ceasefire agreement. On the 5th of Jan 2020, he met with members of the JMC 5+5 in to discuss measures needed to be taken to reopen the closed coastal road.

The coastal road between West and East Libya was closed by members of the GNA’s own Sirte-Jufra Operations Room 2 weeks ago. Their precondition was the removal of the LAAF’s mercenaries in Libya.

Going forward: , and have sent foreign fighters to Libya. Turkey has secured parliamentary approval to extend their troop deployment for 18 months, whilst Russia and the UAE have denied accusations they have deployed mercenaries to Libya.

07/01/2021

Libya’s mass graves from 1996-2021

Whilst the focus remains on attempts to strike a new political deal and hold a fragile ceasefire agreement together in , the deep wounds of Libya’s last war cast a shadow over the process as mass graves continue to be discovered. This post documents 25 years of mass graves in Libya.

A new report on the “gruesome legacy of a reign of terror” by 7 brothers of the Kani family, who took control of Tarhuna, controlled by the ’s ‘Kaniyat’ brigade, a family-led armed group that spearheaded ’s April 4th offensive on from the town of Tarhuna. The report delves into the story of the further discovery of mass graves, where thus far 120 dead bodies have been found.

Hanan Salah suggested to the BBC ‘that the , a previous ally of the Kanis, "possibly turned a blind eye to some of these very serious allegations, which means that the senior leadership of the GNA, not just the military officers, but also the officials, can be responsible for very serious violations." https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-55564933

Nevertheless, the “vast majority of people missing in disappeared during the fighting that began in April 2019 and ended in June 2020” during Haftar’s April 4th offensive. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/07/libya-militia-terrorized-town-leaving-mass-graves

Tarhuna’s most notable militia have gone by the names of the 7th force, and 9th brigade ruled Tarhuna from 2015-2020 but are often referred to as the Kaniyat. The brigade formally switched their allegiance from the GNA to the LAAF & Haftar in April 2019. They ruled the town until GNA aligned forces took control in June 2020, forcing the Kaniyat to flee to Eastern Libya. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/11/middleeast/libya-un-mass-graves-intl/index.html

On November 20, 2020, blocked a UN Security Council committee from sanctioning the Kaniyat brigade LAAF.
However, on November 25, 2020, government sanctions Libya Kaniyat brigade under the command of Hafter’s LAAF for human rights abuses in Tarhuna committed during the 2019 war on Tripoli.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1192

Unfortunately, these are not Libya’s first mass graves. After the GNA’s military operation to oust Islamic State from Sirte, Libyan authorities announced the discovery of 35 Coptic Ethiopians executed by . https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-bodies-idUSKCN1ON0T0

Following the LAAF’s offensive to capture Eastern Libya In 2017, 36 bodies were uncovered dumped by a road in Abyar, 50km from Benghazi. According to Human Rights Watch, the families reported the men were arrested by the LAAF shortly before their death. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/29/libya-mass-extra-judicial-execution

Libya’s most notable mass murder took place in 1996 at the Abu Salim political prison in Tripoli, where 1270 inmates were killed in a single day. In September 2011 following the overthrow of the former regime, rumours circulated of a mass grave in Tripoli, yet their remains are yet to be discovered.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/25/libyan-mass-grave-abu-salim

On February 15th 2011, the families of the victims of the Abu Salim massacre demonstrated in front of ’s courthouse to demand justice in a move that sparked the February 17th revolution.https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12477275

06/01/2021

The next thread in Sadeq’s mini-series on foreign actors in Libya; What Turkey says vs. what Turkey does in Libya.

Turkey, in contrast to Russia & UAE, hasn’t denied its military presence in Libya. Turkey inked a maritime and security MoU with the GNA in November 2019. For more on our 1st tread on what Russia’s vs what Russia does, read here: https://www.facebook.com/sadeqinstitute/posts/3578889988844601

What Turkey says: On January 2nd 2020 Turkey’s parliament approved deploying Turkish forces to Libya. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/02/turkish-parliament-to-vote-on-sending-troops-to-libya

What Turkey does: Turkey deploys Syrian mercenaries, not Turkish nationals. However, President Erdogan publicly confirms the deployment of Syrians to Libya in a statement claiming “Turkey is there with a training force. There are also people from the Syrian National Army." https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/21/turkeys-erdogan-confirms-sending-syrian-fighters-to-libya

What Turkey says: Turkey publicly endorses a political process and arms embargo ahead of the Berlin Conference on January 20th 2020.

What Turkey does: However BBC reports Turkish naval vessels are reported to have broken the arms embargo to Libya 4 days later on January 24th 2020.
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-52037533

What Turkey says: In October 2020, following UN permanent ceasefire agreement (conditional on removing foreign forces) Turkish President Erdogan voices his scepticism "The cease-fire agreement is not one at the highest level. Time will show how long it will persist at a lower level."
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/libya-truce-deal-seems-not-reliable-turkish-leader/2016663

What Turkey does: Turkish parliament approves extension of troop deployment to Libya for 18 months, talking about ‘threats from Libya to Turkey and the entire region’, continuing its strategy of intervening in Libya. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkish-parliament-approves-libya-troops-motion/2085512

05/01/2021

‘Look behind you.’

As eyes focus on holding together the permanent ceasefire in , tensions are on the rise between the & in the south of

MoI Bashagha stressed in a meeting on Sunday with representatives from Sebha the need for the GNA to focus its attention on security & stability in the south of Libya.

24 hours later LAAF Spokesperson Al-Mismari issued a retort stating ‘moves were observed by subversive elements that received funds from to destabilize security and stability in southern Libya, especially the city of Sebha.”

This latest tension is against the backdrop of escalation more broadly in the south of Libya lately. Forces loyal to launched an attack on a GNA controlled camp in Ubari at the beginning of Dec 2020, violating the Oct ceasefire agreement reached by the JMC 5+5.

As eyes continue to measure Libya’s conflict by what happens in Sirte, there are growing signs of renewed conflict in the south of Libya that could pose a greater threat to the permanent ceasefire agreement

04/01/2021

What is the fate of Libya’s permanent ceasefire agreement?

As the deadline for foreign military forces is 17 days away:

24 Dec: Open-source reports Russian military transport aircrafts landing at the UAE’s Al-Khadim Air Base in Eastern Libya.
https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1344690060751466497

30 Dec: In a press conference with GNA Foreign Minister Siala, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov states Russia’s support for ‘dialogue over a return to military activities’.

Russia has denied its military presence in since June labelling them “fabricated allegations.”
https://tass.com/politics/1165741

In contrast, Turkey acknowledges its military role in Libya that includes delivering mercenaries but suggests they will not be leaving Libya.

29 Dec: Turkey's Foreign Minister Cavusoglu also affirms support for the peace process but publicly states no country or person has the right to demand Turkey leave Libya stating “We have legitimate reasons to be there”.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/turkish-russian-foreign-ministers-meet-in-sochi/2091999

Turkey's Cavusoglu says 2 countries will organize joint production of Sputnik V vaccine - Anadolu Agency

31/12/2020

What Russia says vs. What Russia does in Libya.

What Russia says: GNA FM Siala met with Russia FM Lavrov in Moscow on Wednesday. Lavrov said: ‘We advocate supporting the JMC 5+5 and respecting the peace agreement.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMJVf-8-VQI

What Russia does: According to open-source reporting on Wednesday 3 Russian planes deliver military equipment in Eastern Libya according to MiddleEastWatch. https://twitter.com/MiddleEastWatc1/status/1341964918220853248

What Russia says: At the beginning of Haftar’s attack on Tripoli in April 2019, Russian FM Lavrov remarked: “there is no alternative to political settlement via nation-wide dialogue with the participation of all (...) groups.” https://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/3624959

What Russia does: In April 2019 Russia (and the US) deny support of a UN Security Council resolution to call for a ceasefire in Libya. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-un-idUSKCN1RU2ML

What Russia says: In Sep 2019, at the peak of the conflict in Tripoli, Russia issued a statement at the UN General Assembly: “We believe that there is no alternative to a political settlement in Libya in line with the UN Action Plan.”https://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/3798425

What Russia does: the 1st Russian Wagner Group mercenaries are discovered in supporting Haftar’s military efforts in .

Libyan fighters were quoted by the New York Times in Tripoli, saying “this is the work of Russian mercenaries, including skilled snipers. The lack of an exit wound is a signature of the ammunition used by the same Russian mercenaries elsewhere.” https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/world/middleeast/russia-libya-mercenaries.html

What Russia says: in June 2020, Following the collapse of Haftar’s war efforts in Tripoli, Russia Foreign ministry states they & Turkey “are actively working to support a settlement in Libya.” https://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/4163732

What Russia does: in June 2020, Russia deploys unmarked aircraft and establishes a military base in Jufra, central Libya according to US AFRICOM.
https://twitter.com/USAfricaCommand/status/1265240771269197830

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov holds a joint press conference with Mohamed Taher Siala, Libyan Foreign Minister in the UN-backed Government of Nation...