Annual Philosophy Graduate Conference at AUB

Keynote Ray Brassier's talk is up next at 12:40 don't miss it!
"Subject Naturalism versus Object Naturalism: Brandom's Critique of Sellars'"

Updated full schedule

The last talk,, "Hegel – Teleology / Repetition," by Armin Schneider who is a graduate in philosophy at Humboldt University Berlin.

3:30 PM- 4 PM

Some of the recent debates in continental as well as analytic Philosophy come together in a general
call for an actualization of Hegel's thought. I argue that such a re-reading might start with an
investigation of Hegel's concept of
labor in his Jena Period. This period leads to a concept of
labor, for which two aspects are crucial: 1st labor in the narrow sense of a practical process is explicated as a teleological
process, 2nd labor as memory has in it a dimension of
repetition. Departing from those two aspects it is possible not only to formulate the very general structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit as a multilayered process of labor. I show that also the Science of Logic is driven by those two aspects: While the beginning of Logic starts with and as an act of repetition, the final chapter articulates the immanent tension of its general process as the conjuncture of teleology and
repetition.Therefore it explicates in the field Logic what already coincided in the concept of labor, as it had come to terms in the Jena period.

Our fourth talk, "The weak critique of Malabou's critique of psychoanalysis: a case of anosognosia," is by Ante Jerić who is a PhD student at ZRC SAZU (Scientific Research Centre of Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts): The Institute of Philosophy

2:40 PM- 3:20 PM

Catherine Malabou severely critiqued the psychoanalytic concept of causality. The aim of this paper is to to critique her critique. It seems there are two ways to do that: to put her critique under the strong critique that aspires to show how Malabou misses something crucial regarding the very foundations of psychoanalytic theory at the cost of rendering her virulent attack on psychoanalysis ineffective; or to put Malabou's critique under the weak critique that includes the revision of clinical cases which she uses as evidence in the carefully constructed case against psychoanalysis. The claim defended in this paper is that the weak critique of the critique, which refrains from examining the foundations of psychoanalytic edifice, can present a more serious challenge to Malabou's project than the strong critique. It can also point directly to the contemporary relevance of psychoanalysis. The paper takes two ideas from Malabou: the distortion of the psychic apparatus reveals the mechanisms of its functioning; the difference between the psychic wounds lies only in degree, and not in kind. It also follows Malabou steps by taking anosognosia as the paradigm of the psychic wound - the most exemplary of all cases of the psychic dysfunctioning and, at the same time, just one case among the others. After reassessing clinical studies which dealt with the diagnosis of anosognosia, paper ends with a conclusion that anosognosia does not display features which would contradict the presupposed foundations of psychoanalysis: the psychoanalytic model of causality should not be abandoned, but retained, expanded and upgraded.

The keynote address will be given by Dr. Ray Brassier (AUB)
The talk is entitled "Subject Naturalism versus Object Naturalism: Brandom's Critique of Sellars"

12:40 PM- 1:40 PM

Our second talk, "Seeing and Differentiating,"
is by "Jørgen Dyrstad" who is a current PhD student in philosophy at King's College London.

Time: 11:40 AM- 12:20 PM

It seems very natural to hold that to be seen, an object must stand out from or be differentiated from its surroundings. Call this the ‘differentiation condition’ on seeing:
(DC) If O is seen, then O is differentiated from its environment
DC is usually defended by examples. Consider a white moth on an entirely matching white background. It is natural to hold that it cannot be seen. To be seen, the moth would have to stand out, for instance by having a different colour. This can seem close to self-evident, which is also how philosophers seem to regard it.
DC was carefully defended by Dretske (1969 chap. 2). From the standard references to that work one could easily get the impression that he simply established it. Thus it is ironical that in a much later footnote, Dretske himself seems to reject DC (2007 p. 221n9). His argument is very brief and seems hardly to have been noted, let alone convinced anyone. I present a much more elaborate argument, which, though not Dretske’s, is Dretskean in spirit.
Though it can seem a mere curiosity, DC serves as premise to substantial conclusions. For instance, it is reasonably built into the still-orthodox Content View. Thus, rejecting DC has potentially wide-ranging consequences. The more immediate lesson concerns the distinction between what we see and what we come to know on the basis of such seeing.

Our first talk, "In Favor of Moral Typecasting,"
is by Fatima Sadek who is a current graduate in philosophy at AUB.

Time: 11 AM- 11:40 AM

The essence of moral judgment, judging an act as right or wrong, is mind perception. Mind perception is the act of assigning minds to other entities. To be perceived to have a mind entails being given a moral status. Agency and experience are the two fundamental factors from which people compare entities on. To have agency is to possess thought, intention, self-control, an ability to act and influence, etc. whereas, to have experience is to be able to feel pleasure or pain. Moral judgments are rooted in a moral dyad of two different perceived minds: an intentional agent (i.e. the doer of an action) and a suffering patient (i.e. the feeler/experiencer). This dyad acts as a unifying cognitive template from which we judge moral actions, with perceived harm as the criteria. The Moral Dyad gives rise to the phenomenon of Moral Typecasting. Moral Typecasting claims that in every moral situation, an entity is characterized as either a moral agent or a moral patient, with the dimension of moral agency and patiency being inversely, causally related. This perception holds and carries over to other moral situations. Moral Typecasting has two major implications: (1) Moral agents are perceived to be less sensitive to pain while moral patients are seen to be less responsible for moral transgressions, and (2) A neutral target paired with a moral agent would be perceived to be more sensitive to pain or pleasure whereas when paired with a moral patient, they would be perceived to have more agency. Gray and Wegner (2009) set forth some studies to test out these implications. The studies offered empirical support for Moral Typecasting and answered well to many presented objections.

REMINDER: The Graduate Conference is this Thursday on the 18th of May
Location: Auditorium A, West Hall. The first talk will start at 11 AM. Check the upcoming posts for the detailed schedule.

All are welcome!

There have been some changes in the conference schedule

10:30-11:00 Registration
11:00-11:40 Fatima Sadek (AUB) - "In Favor of Moral Typecasting"
11:40-12:20 Jørgen Dyrstad (King's College London) - "Seeing and Differentiating"
12:20-12:40 Coffee Break
12:40-1:40 Keynote Address by Dr. Ray Brassier (AUB)
1:40- 2:20 Lunch Break
2:20-3:20 Ante Jeric (ZRC SAZU)- "The Weak Critique of Malabou's Critique of Psychoanalysis: A Case of Anosognosia"
3:20-4:00 Armin Schneider (Humboldt University Berlin) - "Economy, Labor, Repetition, in Hegel's Jena Period"

The schedule for this year's conference set to take place on the 18th of May

After the success of the first conference in 2016, the Graduate Philosophy Conference at AUB is here for a second time!

Date: 18th and 19th of May 2017
Keynote speakers: Rebecca Comay (UToronto) and Maria Baghramian (UCD)
Please find the details for the call for papers in the attached photo.

Send your submissions to [email protected]
Deadline for submissions is 15th of January 2017

Conference will start in an hour! Make sure to join us at Auditorium A - West Hall.