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Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar (2026)

​This is a very recent and significant Supreme Court judgment delivered in January 2026 regarding the powers of a High Court to recall its own signed order under Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

​Here are the key details of the case:
​Case Details
​Case Title: Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar
​Court: Supreme Court of India
​Bench: Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice Prasanna B. Varale
​Date of Judgment: January 19, 2026
​Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61; Criminal Appeal No. 105 of 2026

​1. Brief Facts of the Case

​The appellant, Rambali Sahni, was an accused in a case under the NDPS Act (Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act) involving the alleged recovery of 6.33 kg of G***a. He was implicated primarily on the confession of a co-accused who claimed the contraband was meant for Sahni.
​The matter reached the Patna High Court for anticipatory bail.
​The First Order (Grant of Bail): On August 27, 2025, the Patna High Court signed an order granting bail to the appellant. The order stated the petition was "allowed."
​The Recall Order: Three days later, on August 30, 2025, the High Court recalled its own order. The justification was that the Court Master had made a "clerical error"—he had mistakenly typed "allowed" when the judge intended to say "rejected." The High Court accepted the staff member's apology and cancelled the bail.

​2. The Legal Issue

​The core legal question was whether a High Court can recall a judgment or final order after it has been signed and pronounced, citing a "clerical error" by court staff, especially when the change completely reverses the outcome (from bail granted to bail rejected).
​This involves Section 362 of the CrPC, which prohibits a court from altering or reviewing its judgment once signed, except to correct a "clerical or arithmetical error."

​3. Supreme Court’s Decision

​The Supreme Court set aside the Patna High Court's recall order and restored the original order granting bail.
​On "Clerical Error": The Supreme Court held that the error cited by the High Court (recording "allowed" instead of "rejected") could not be treated as a mere clerical or arithmetical error under Section 362 CrPC. Recalling a signed order to reverse the decision amounts to a review on merits, which is impermissible under the Code.
​Sanctity of Signed Orders: The Court emphasized that once an order is signed and pronounced, it becomes final. It cannot be altered based on an internal administrative mistake if it substantively changes the verdict.
​Restoration of Bail: Consequently, the original order dated August 27, 2025, granting anticipatory bail to Rambali Sahni, was restored. The Court directed that he be released on bail subject to conditions set by the Investigating Officer.

​4. Why This Judgment is Important
​This case serves as a strict precedent regarding Section 362 CrPC. It reinforces that the bar on reviewing signed judgments is absolute. Courts cannot use the "clerical error" exception to fundamentally change a decision (e.g., changing acquittal to conviction or bail granted to rejected) once the ink is dry on the judgment.

Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement Criminal Appeal No. 47 of 2026
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Alok Aradhe
Date of Judgment: January 6, 2026

​1. Background & Facts

​The Accused:
Arvind Dham, former Chairperson and promoter of the Amtek Group.

​The Allegations:
The Enforcement Directorate (ED) initiated a money laundering probe based on FIRs by the CBI (IDBI Bank and Bank of Maharashtra complaints). The allegations involved a bank fraud of approximately ₹27,000 crore, diversion of loans to shell companies, and creation of false assets.
​Arrest: Dham was arrested by the ED on July 9, 2024, and remained in custody since then.

​Procedural History:
​The Delhi High Court rejected his regular bail application on August 19, 2025, citing the gravity of the economic offence and the risk of tampering with evidence.
​Dham approached the Supreme Court challenging the High Court's order.

​2. Issues Before the Court
​Whether the gravity of the alleged economic offence (₹27,000 crore fraud) justifies the continued incarceration of the accused without a trial.
​Whether the statutory restrictions on bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, are subject to the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.

​3. Supreme Court’s Decision
​The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Delhi High Court's order, and granted bail to Arvind Dham.

​4. Key Reasoning & Ratio Decidendi
​Primacy of Article 21 (Right to Speedy Trial):
The Court held that the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence or statutory restrictions (like Section 45 of PMLA). Prolonged incarceration without the commencement of the trial effectively converts pre-trial detention into "punishment," which is impermissible.
​Economic Offences Not a "Homogeneous Class":
The Bench rejected the argument that economic offences form a separate, monolithic class warranting a blanket denial of bail. While economic offences are serious, they must be judged on individual facts, particularly regarding the length of incarceration.

​Delay in Trial:
The Court noted that:
​Dham had been in custody for about 18 months (since July 2024).
​The trial had not even commenced; the court had not yet taken cognizance of the prosecution complaint, and the matter was still at the stage of document scrutiny.
​With 210 witnesses cited by the prosecution, there was no realistic likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future.

​Nature of Evidence:
The evidence in the case is primarily documentary and already in the custody of the prosecution, reducing the risk of tampering.

​5. Conditions Imposed
​While granting bail, the Court directed that:
​Dham must surrender his passport to the authorities.
​He must provide a mobile number to the ED officers to ascertain his whereabouts.
​Other terms and conditions of bail are to be fixed by the Trial Court.
​Significance of the Judgment
​This judgment reinforces the legal principle that in PMLA cases, Section 45 (twin conditions for bail) cannot be used to keep an accused in indefinite detention if the trial is not progressing. It aligns with recent precedents like Manish Sisodia v. ED and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, emphasizing that "bail is the rule, jail is the exception" even in serious economic offences when there is a violation of the right to a speedy trial.

S. Nagesh vs. Shobha S. Aradhya
​Citation: 2026 INSC 27
​Court: Supreme Court of India
​Date of Judgment: January 6, 2026
​Bench: Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Alok Aradhe.

​Key Legal Point

​The Supreme Court held that in a cheque bounce case (Section 138 NI Act), the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a complaint filed after the limitation period unless and until the delay has been formally condoned. Condonation of delay is a condition precedent to taking cognizance.

​Facts of the Case

​Loan and Dishonour:
The Respondent (Complainant) lent ₹5,40,000 to the Appellant (Accused). The Appellant issued a cheque which was dishonoured for insufficient funds on 17.07.2013.

​Filing of Complaint:
The Complainant sent a legal notice but received no payment. She filed a complaint on 09.10.2013.
​The Delay: There was a delay of two days in filing the complaint beyond the statutory period.

​Magistrate's Error:
The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 09.10.2013 (the same day filed) without noticing the delay and without any application for condonation of delay at that stage.

​Later Condonation:
The delay was condoned by the Magistrate years later, on 30.10.2018, long after cognizance had already been taken.

​High Court View:
The High Court dismissed the Appellant's petition, holding that taking cognizance before condoning the delay was a "curable irregularity" since the delay was eventually condoned.

​Issue Before the Supreme Court
​Can a Magistrate take cognizance of a delayed complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act without first condoning the delay?.

​Supreme Court's Decision and Reasoning
​Mandatory Procedure:
Under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act, a court can only take cognizance of a delayed complaint if the complainant satisfies the court that there was "sufficient cause" for the delay.

​Sequence of Events:
The Court ruled that satisfaction regarding sufficient cause (condonation of delay) must precede the act of taking cognizance. The Magistrate cannot take cognizance first and condone the delay later.

​Legal Status of Delayed Complaint:
A complaint filed with a delay does not become a "regular matter" on the court's file until that delay is condoned.

​Rejection of High Court View:
The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's view that the order of proceedings (condonation vs. cognizance) was interchangeable. The Magistrate acted without jurisdiction by taking cognizance before condoning the delay.

​Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the complaint against the Appellant was quashed.

This case,
Babasaheb Ramdas Shirole & Ors. vs. Rohit Enterprises & Ors.,
is a significant judgment from the Supreme Court of India concerning a fundamental principle of civil law—the rejection of a plaint (the initial complaint or petition) based on the law of limitation.
​The key takeaway from the Supreme Court's order is the reaffirmation of the principle that limitation is generally a mixed question of law and fact, and a suit cannot be summarily rejected unless the bar is "patently and unequivocally clear" from the plaint itself.
​Here is a breakdown of the case and the judgment:

​🏛️ The Core Legal Issue
​The case revolved around Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which allows a court to reject a plaint if the suit appears to be barred by any law (such as the Law of Limitation).

​➡️ Case Progression
​Trial Court (Sangamner):

​Plaintiffs (Appellants): Babasaheb Ramdas Shirole & Ors. filed a Special Civil Suit (No. 126/2023) for declaration of title, permanent injunction, and cancellation of a Sale Deed dated July 20, 2013 (a decade prior to filing).

​Defendants (Respondents): Rohit Enterprises & Ors. filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 to reject the plaint, arguing that the suit was barred by the 3-year limitation period.

​Trial Court Ruling (April 8, 2024): Dismissed the rejection application, holding that limitation was a mixed question of fact and law requiring a trial with evidence.

​Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench):
​High Court Ruling (April 9, 2025): Allowed the revision application and rejected the plaint. The High Court agreed with the defendants, holding that since the Sale Deed was executed in 2013 and the suit was filed in 2023, it was barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act. The court found the plaintiffs' allegations of fraud to be vague and insufficient to extend the limitation period.
​Supreme Court of India:
​Supreme Court Ruling (November 2025): The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment

​🌟 Supreme Court's Key Ruling
​The Supreme Court reiterated the settled legal position on the rejection of a plaint due to limitation:

​Limitation is a Mixed Question: The question of whether a suit is barred by limitation is primarily a mixed question of law and fact.

​No Summary Rejection: A suit cannot be summarily rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground of limitation unless the bar is patently and unequivocally clear from a reading of the plaint itself (without reference to the defense or evidence).
​Trial Required: The Court noted that the plaintiffs had made claims, including that the transaction was a sham sale coupled with a development agreement, and that the alleged fraud was discovered at a later date. These were specific factual claims that required evidence and could not be summarily rejected at the threshold.

​⚖️ Conclusion

​The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and restored the civil suit (Special Civil Suit No. 126/2023) to the file of the Trial Court. The matter will now proceed to trial for a final determination based on evidence.
​This judgment is crucial for protecting the right of a plaintiff to have their day in court, preventing the dismissal of a case merely on a technicality unless the bar to filing the suit is indisputable on the face of the complaint.

A is the final constitutional remedy available to a convict after all judicial options (appeal, review, curative petition) have been exhausted. It is an appeal to the executive head of the Union or the State to substitute a lesser punishment for the one awarded by the courts, based on humanitarian or non-legal grounds.

​📜 Constitutional Provisions for Mercy Petition

​The power to grant clemency (mercy) is vested in the President and the Governor by the Constitution of India. This power is executive, not judicial, and is exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.

Types of Clemency:

#​Pardon:
Completely removes the sentence and conviction, making the offender "as innocent as if they had never committed the offence."

#​Commutation:
Substitution of one form of punishment for a lighter one (e.g., Death Sentence to Life Imprisonment).

#​Remission:
Reduction of the amount of sentence without changing its character (e.g., 10 years rigorous imprisonment to 5 years rigorous imprisonment).

#​Reprieve:
Temporary suspension of the ex*****on of a sentence (especially death) to allow the convict time to seek pardon or commutation.

#​Respite:
Awarding a lesser sentence than the one originally given, due to special facts (e.g., pregnancy of a woman offender or physical disability).

​⚖️ Landmark Judgments on Mercy Petitions
​Judicial review of the executive's mercy power, though limited, has been established by the Supreme Court to ensure fairness and adherence to the rule of law.

​1. Maru Ram vs. Union of India (1981)

​Binding Advice:
Established that the power under Articles 72 and 161 is not to be exercised by the President or Governor personally, but must be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers (i.e., the Central Cabinet or State Cabinet).

​2. Epuru Sudhakar vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2006)

​Judicial Review: Affirmed that the exercise of the clemency power is subject to judicial review on limited grounds.
​Grounds for Review: The Supreme Court can review a clemency order if it finds the decision was:
​Passed without application of mind.
​Malafide (in bad faith).
​Based on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations.
​Suffering from arbitrariness.

​3. Shatrughan Chauhan vs. Union of India (2014)

​Inordinate Delay: This is one of the most significant recent rulings. The court held that inordinate, inexplicable delay by the executive in deciding a mercy petition for a death sentence convict is a violation of the convict's Fundamental Right to Life (Article 21).
​Commutation: The court ruled that such a prolonged delay causes extreme agony and mental torture, which is sufficient ground to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment, regardless of the heinous nature of the crime.
​Mental Fitness: The judgment also held that a condemned prisoner suffering from mental illness or physical disability is entitled to commutation.

​4. Union of India vs. V. Sriharan @ Murugan (2016) (Rajiv Gandhi Assassination Case)

​Consultation under CrPC: The Supreme Court clarified the scope of Section 435 CrPC, holding that the State Government must necessarily consult the Central Government before exercising its power of remission/commutation in cases investigated by the Central Government agencies (like CBI). This reinforced the dual nature of executive clemency powers.