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THE HINDU EDITORIAL 17 MARCH, 2017

Missing the Spirit for the Body

The Central Board of Film Certification, the ‘Censor Board’ to most Indians, has done it again. It has turned down yet another film. This one, Ka Bodyscapes directed by Jayan Cherian, has the distinction of having been viewed thrice by the Board. By its act the Board has lowered its credibility, and by association that of the Indian republic in whose name it acts. It is time that its authority to effectively ban films should go. This not because of its provenance (the beginning of something's existence; something's origin.) — it is after all a vestige (a trace or remnant of something) of colonialism — but because by refusing to certify the film in question, it has revealed itself as tendentious (पक्षपातपूर्ण) , driven by prudery (the behavior or thinking of people who are too easily shocked or offended) , ignorant of India’s history and unmindful of the Constitution.
The narrative circle
As Ka Bodyscapes cannot be viewed in the cinema hall, and I was not fortunate enough to view it in the private screenings that have taken place in India, I must rely on descriptions of those who have watched it and on the statements of the Board that have made their way into the public domain via the media. So what is the film about? We get an idea from the writ petition filed in the High Court of Kerala seeking restraint on the CBFC’s virtual ban. We are told that it revolves around three characters. Haris is a free-thinking artist who also happens to be a Muslim. He is in a relationship with Vishnu who comes from a family of right-wingers and is a Hanuman-bhakt himself, which presumably makes him Hindu but does not bring acceptance from his family. They have a friend in Sia who comes from a conservative background and is as Muslim as Haris is. She chooses feminism and faces flak (आलोचना) for it. On behalf of the director, the petitioners clarify that the film is about societal attitudes towards individual freedom and is not a critique (समीक्षा) of religion. Finally, the film is set in Kozhikode, a city the rooted cosmopolitanism of which belies its size.
Now, what are the Board’s objections? I rely on what is reported in the media. Thus, on March 3, it was reported in The Hindu that the Board has objected that: “… the film is glorifying (describe or represent as admirable, especially unjustifiably.) the subject of gay and homosexual relationship, nudity accentuating (जोर देना) vital parts of male body (in paintings). The film is explicit of scene offending Hindu sensibilities depicting vulgarity and obscenity through the movie.” There is also recourse to the trope of ‘law and order’. It is extraordinary for an order from a public body that there is no trace of reasoning to be found in all this. The Board appears innocent of both our storied past as a people or of the Indian Constitution. Temple sculpture celebrates sexual union of every kind, which only the philistines miss. Moreover, there is no stricture (बाध्यता) against the depiction of nudity in Hinduism. Further, the Board appears to not have heard of court judgments which categorically reject the argument of ‘law and order’ as a criterion for banning a film. As for religious sensibilities, the Constitution gives an individual the freedom to practise his or her religion but not the right to be protected from any reference to it that may be interpreted as giving offence. All practices are open to scrutiny and no ‘religious immunity’ is on offer. India is a secular republic and, accordingly, no special rights are accorded to religion. Therefore, all Indians are subject to the laws of the land. Moreover, political rights are due only to individuals. It is by a strange anthropomorphosis (the attribution of human characteristics or behaviour to a god, animal, or object.) that sensibility is assigned to a whole religion. A more sensational instance of this was when Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses was banned under the Customs Act. By taking recourse to religion, the Board has left it easier to challenge its ruling.
It is true that in India religious identity is often an ascriptive marker of persons, and it is difficult to get very far away from it. But the role of public institutions in a democracy is to wean (accustom (someone) to managing without something which they have become dependent on.) society away from this practice by weighing in on behalf of individuals trying to break free of oppressive social custom so long as this does not violate the freedom of others. It is not obvious that Ka Bodyscapes comes even close to achieving the last. If religions are to be granted sensibility and the religious is the only identity a person is allowed to have, in this instance India’s religions must find the film affirming, because when forming intimate associations with persons of other religions, we seemingly recognise one another’s religion. But, actually, all this is utterly irrelevant in the context as religion should have no role to play in determining the sexual lives of people.
The CBFC cannot be allowed to get away with the pettiness (संकीर्णता) that it hides behind the fig leaf of religion. Its beef clearly is with “glorifying the subject of homosexuality”, by which prospect the Board is clearly shocked. It cannot be unaware that much of what Bollywood does is the untiring propagation of the heteronormative ideal in human relations. The Board has taken the law into its own hands as there is no legal stricture on the representation of homosexuality in any form. It has gratuitously gone the extra mile. Even Macaulay had contended himself with the somewhat blunt shield of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code which is applicable to all Indians. It is a reflection of the career of cultural fascism in India that the rights of Indians of an alternative sexual orientation can be taken away so casually. The right at stake is that of affirmative representation.
There are three ways of seeing Ka Bodyscapes. The first one is the construction that it is an affront (अपमान/तिरस्कार) to religion. Of the three, it is the most simplistic. Consider the imagery of Indra’s youthful companions, the marut, as men in the sky who relish one another’s bodies. Devout (धार्मिक/भक्त) Hindus are not upset by this picture as they treat it as beside the point of their belief. The Board reveals its lack of understanding of so confident a religion when it rushes unsolicited to its defence. The second is to see it as a story of friendship between a Hindu and a Muslim directed by a Christian. The academic secularists would be made happy by this characterisation, but it gives primacy to religion, which is what the film is trying to get away from.
The most promising way of seeing the film is to see it as showing how Indians are rejecting social strictures to follow their instincts. I am entirely open to the possibility that whenever I do get to watch Jayan’s film I might find it unappealing. Many films on the same theme clumsily purvey (spread or promote (an idea, view, etc.).) stereotypes (a widely held but fixed and oversimplified image or idea of a particular type of person or thing.), are historically inaccurate and politically naive. However, accounts are that this one at least presents gay relationships in a self-affirming way for a change.
On other screens
In its design to torpedo (destroy or ruin (a plan or project) the project, the Board may have unwittingly done more for the gay movement in India than they care to, for as Oscar Wilde had put it, “There is only one thing worse in the world than being talked about, and that is not being talked about.” And, it may have scuttled (विफल कर देना/बिगाड़ना) the possibility of Ka Bodyscapes being watched in the cinemas, but there’s always Amazon.

THE HINDU EDITORIAL 15 MARCH, 2017

A More Perfect Union

In India we often express legitimate concern about threats to the integrity of the Union, as relating, for instance, to Maoist or regional insurgencies. But think for a moment that burgeoning (फैलना/बढ़ना) economic, social and other disparities among sub-national regions in large, federal states have historically fed secessionist (अलगाववादी) movements at least as much as ideologically or religiously inspired insurgencies. Ought this to be of concern to us in India? I think the answer may be yes.
Take what is perhaps the most well-studied and well-known secessionist movement in any major democracy in modern times, the US Civil War (1861- 65). Popular histories of the conflict, the bloodiest by far in US history, far surpassing both world wars, focus on slavery and secession (the action of withdrawing formally from membership of a federation or body) as the key wedges between the northern (free) and southern (slave) states. While this is true, the debates about the legal standing of the institution of slavery, both within the Union and within new territories that were being absorbed in the Union’s westward march, as well as the legality of secession by a state from the Union, were but the culmination (पराकाष्ठा/चरमबिन्दु) of a long period of divergence, economic and otherwise, between the northern and southern states.
I can, at best, offer a potted history of the necessary background. In this, it is useful to pinpoint the conflict over the national tariff in the 1820s and 1830s, arising from the divergent economic interests of the north and south. In short, import-competing manufacturing interests in the north favoured a protective tariff, while slave-driven plantation interests in the south, which benefited from cheap imports and access to the export market, opposed it. The conflict culminated in the “nullification” crisis of 1832, in which South Carolina adopted an ordinance of nullification (निरस्तीकरण), which declared unconstitutional and unenforceable the federally imposed tariffs of 1828 and 1832, declaring that, if the Union attempted to enforce these, the state was prepared to secede (निकाल देना/अलग करना).
You can see here that the seeds of the Civil War had not only been sown, but had begun to sprout (विकसित होना/अंकुरित होना) . In a sense, the secession crisis of January 1861, in which seven southern states (joined later by four others) seceded from the Union to form the Confederate States of America, is but a footnote to the earlier nullification crisis.
What is noteworthy is that, at its core, the conflict between the Union and the Confederacy was rooted in economic conflict, or, to be more precise, conflict over economic policy—whether the national tariff, or whether to admit new states as slave or as wage labour states, the latter crucially determining the balance of power in the Senate.
Furthermore, as the conflict became increasingly intense, it brought to the fore a contentious legal debate on whether it was constitutionally permissible for a disaffected state to secede legally from the Union. That constitutional question became moot (विवादास्पद/विवाद ग्रस्त) and was settled in the US, not in a court of law, but on the battlefield, by the victorious Union armies of President Abraham Lincoln seeing off the Confederate armies of President Jefferson Davis. The political reality of an indissoluble Union was eventually given judicial sanction, when in Texas v. White (1869), the Supreme Court declared unilateral secession by any state to be unconstitutional.
In India, the latter question has never been legally contentious. With our very different history, inheriting British-created presidencies and princely states, the constituent assembly, and the Constitution its members crafted, ruled out secession. Furthermore, unlike in the US, our Constitution does not guarantee the territorial integrity of member states of the Union, allowing for existing states to be split into new states if linguistic, economic, administrative or certain other considerations warranted. By contrast, in the US, despite the defeat of southern secessionists, the territorial integrity of member states of the Union has always remained sacrosanct (रक्षणीय) , including of the defeated Confederacy.
But on the question of widening economic divergence among states of the Union, present-day India is not as different from the antebellum (लड़ाई के पहले का) US as we might comfort ourselves into believing.
As Praveen Chakravarty and I have documented, and this year’s Economic Survey confirms, economic disparity between wealthy states of the south and west and poor states of the north and east is skyrocketing. With diverging economic outcomes may follow the desire for state-specific economic policies.
Yet, India is moving in the opposite direction: with increasing centralization of economic policy, as crystallized, for instance, in the goods and services tax (GST).
With the imminent advent of the GST, a large element of states’ fiscal autonomy, protected under the Indian Constitution, will be voluntarily ceded by states to the Union.
The hope is that by knitting (जोड़ना) India together into a single market, the GST will help lift all boats, and thus stem the tide of widening regional disparity (असमानता) . Yet the very opposite could happen, with agglomeration (संकुलन) economies driving investment to the already prosperous peninsula and leaving the hinterland even further behind.
It cost the US a bloody civil war to bind together by main force the bonds of a fraying union. Now, there’s a cautionary tale.

THE HINDU EDITORIAL 14 MARCH, 2017

The Art of Building Majorities

The BJP’s ideology has more takers than before because it is framing the main issues for elections.The State elections of 2017 clearly demonstrate that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has replaced the Congress as the principal national party in the country. It won massive victories in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, and emerged as a big player in Manipur. In Goa it remained the single largest party in terms of vote share despite a hugely unpopular outgoing Chief Minister. The only disappointment is Punjab where the party was routed (पराजित करना/हराना) with its senior partner Shiromani Akali Dal after ruling the State for 10 years.
The spectacular performance of the BJP in U.P. should not detract (कम होना /घटना) from its formidable achievements in the recently concluded local elections, where it made huge strides in previously uncharted territory. In Odisha’s Zilla Parishad elections, the party expanded its footprint from 36 seats in 2012 to 306 in 2017, snatching second place away from the Congress to become a formidable contender to the long incumbent (पदस्थ/पदासीन) Biju Janata Dal. In Maharashtra, the BJP won eight of 10 municipal corporations with its total number of seats nearly equal to that of all other parties combined.
Explaining the rise
The electoral success of the BJP raises an important question. Without being able to meet expectations built up in 2014, in the absence of a surging economy, and with the poor decision on demonetisation, how is the party achieving so much success? There is one obvious reason: Prime Minister Narendra Modi remains very popular while the Congress party’s leadership no longer resonates with voters. However, leadership is not the only factor. The BJP is acquiring hegemonic (प्राधान्य/आधिपत्य) status in the Indian polity owing largely to ideological consolidation and its creation of an unparalleled election machine.
The BJP’s ideology has more takers than before because the party frames the main issues for the elections. Its long-standing ideological association with nationalism renders nationalism an issue on which it has a huge advantage over all other parties. Parties that are able to successfully shape election campaigns around their own issues ultimately succeed in winning elections. By placing a large emphasis on nationalism, the party has cleverly tailored its ideological message to be able to capture the imagination of a larger section of the public. It has opened ideological battlefronts in many different spheres — from universities to movie theatres — and promoted conflicts across the board. It has also placed a large emphasis on other issues that it has traditionally been associated with, such as national security and terrorism, patriotism and more recently, corruption.
For a very long time the Jan Sangh and then the BJP relied almost exclusively on the hard-line Hindu nationalists who reside with its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). This is no longer the case. Hindu traditionalists, those who are drawn to a conservative Hindu way of life but are largely opposed to the hard-line Hindutva world view and its intolerance towards other religions, have now shifted their support from the Congress to the BJP. This allows the BJP to win elections without nominating a single Muslim, as it did recently in U.P.
Forging multi-caste coalitions
The party has also revamped its electoral strategy, one focussed on widening its appeal by stitching together multi-caste coalitions. As is widely known, the BJP’s traditional social base is predominantly upper caste. To increase its support base, it has been building an electoral machine of its own at the local level in the form of caste-based coalitions. Fully aware that the party would not receive much support from the Muslims and perhaps even the Jatavs, the former traditionally associated with the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the latter with the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), its leaders targeted the smaller groups that don’t have adequate representation in any of the larger parties. For instance, the BJP tied up with parties like the Apna Dal and Suheldev Bharatiya Samaj Party, giving it the support of a large section of the Kurmi and Rajbhar populations, respectively. It also increased its ticket allocations to non-Yadav OBCs and non-Jatav Dalits. Its campaign was led by a galaxy of local and national leaders, together covering an eclectic (संकलक/चयनशील) set of caste groups — almost a Congress-style coalition — but without the Muslims and some Dalit communities.
The BJP’s active use of state patronage has also played a big role in strengthening its national footing. In States where the party has come to power, and even at the national level, it has actively worked to break down the existing patronage machinery and replace it with one of its own. For instance, in Maharashtra, a State ruled by the Congress-Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) for more than a decade before the Devendra Fadnavis government assumed office, the BJP has been steadily dismantling the patronage structures put in place by its predecessors. Through ordinances and amendments, the government has managed to severely weaken the hold of NCP and Congress leaders on the powerful cooperative bodies in the State, including the cooperative sugar factories which have been under the tight grip of NCP leader Sharad Pawar for decades. The government not only created a provision whereby it could appoint independent members to the boards of these bodies, but also imposed restrictions on the existing board members, hailing largely from the Congress or NCP, from contesting elections to particular cooperative banks. At the national level, the Modi government removed scores of previous United Progressive Alliance-era political appointees, particularly those notorious (कुख्यात/कुप्रसिद्ध) for their role in creating the large NPA (non-performing assets) problem facing the public sector banks today, and replaced them with its own people.
Risks of rapid expansion
On the electoral front, this has translated into the BJP aggressively co-opting individuals and units of other parties to strengthen its leadership. From Rita Bahuguna Joshi in U.P. to Himanta Biswa Sarma in Assam, the BJP has taken in many rival leaders into its fold before elections. This resembles the strategy followed by the Congress in the 1970s, at the peak of Indira Gandhi’s rule. While in the short term, this strategy is giving the party immense electoral success and helping it expand its footprint, just as it had done for the Congress back then, in the medium to long term it poses grave risks. Many politicians and smaller parties have joined the BJP bandwagon as it looks the most lucrative (लाभ कर/फायदे का) option electorally, and they may desert (त्यागना/छोड़ना) it at next chance. In addition, as the BJP continues to bring into its fold leaders and parties from outside its ideological umbrella, it risks diluting the content of its ideology over time. If uninhibited, this could also lead to tensions between the BJP and the RSS.
The BJP has undoubtedly replaced the Congress as the dominant national party and the cornerstone of India’s political and electoral system. This development has squeezed the space for centre-left forces in India’s polity and has given popular legitimacy to the centre-right narrative on issues of nationalism, secularism and social justice. As Yogendra Yadav has rightly pointed out, the centre-left needs a new vocabulary on the issue of social justice as the BJP has managed to convince a large section of society that the left’s language on the issue reeks of biases based on caste and religion.
However, in order for the BJP to remain the dominant national party for a sustained period of time, it too needs to introspect to ensure it isn’t compromising long-term success for short-term rewards. Going forward, it should continue to widen its social base while ensuring it doesn’t lose its ideological identity. Otherwise, it will only remain dominant as long as a Mr. Modi remains at the helm (शिखर पर) . As when individuals acquire larger salience (प्रमुखता) over ideology and organisation in parties, it leads to their decline down the road. That is exactly what happened to the Congress.

THE HINDU EDITORIAL 13 MARCH, 2017

The Degradation of indian Universities through politics

Universities are in the news. Yet again, for the wrong reasons. It would seem that February is jinxed (अभाग्य या बदकिस्मती होना) for universities in the Capital. This year, it was the violence in Delhi University’s (DU’s) Ramjas College. Last year, it was the storm in Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU).
There have also been several instances elsewhere in India during the past 12 months, sparked by the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), where harassment, intimidation or violence have been used to stifle (दबाना) independent voices. Invitations have been withdrawn. Events have been cancelled. Meetings have been disrupted. Sometimes, university administrations have taken action against the organizers, after the event, as in Jodhpur last month.
It is no coincidence that the aggressive, often militant, posture of ABVP on campuses surfaced following the election of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) governments in states. This has now been reinforced by the comfort of a BJP government at the Centre. In such episodes, university administrations have been silent spectators or have acted against those targeted by the ABVP.
These occurrences negate the essential concept of universities as autonomous spaces, where freedom of expression, exploration of ideas and advancement of knowledge are an integral part of the learning process. There are bound to be differences in views, but these must be addressed through discussion, with open minds. In this, there must be respect—not contempt—for the other. The attitude of the ABVP is the opposite, as it seems to believe that those who are not with them are against them, or worse, anti-national. And its behaviour is simply unacceptable. The ABVP has a right to disagree. It should pose questions, engage in debate, or organize events to articulate (स्पष्ट रूप से कहना) its views, but it cannot and must not seek to silence others. Universities are, above all, about reason and tolerance.
Such political intrusion in universities is not new. It began almost five decades ago, has gathered momentum in the past 25 years, and has now reached a stage that could be the edge of the precipice (a very steep or overhanging place) for public universities in India.
Starting in the late 1960s, state governments began to interfere in universities. For one, it was about dispensing patronage (संरक्षण/अधिकार) and exercising power in appointments of vice-chancellors (VCs), faculty and non-teaching staff. For another, it was about extending the political influence of ruling parties. Unions of students, teachers and employees became instruments in political battles. Campuses were turned into spheres of influence for political parties. Provincial politics also played a role, with an implicit rejection of national elites and an explicit focus on regional identities. Just as important, political parties and leaders were uncomfortable with, if not insecure about, independent voices and critical evaluation that could come from universities.
It was not long before similar reasons began to influence the attitudes of Central governments towards universities. Similar actions were a natural outcome. The turning point, perhaps, was 1977, the end of the era of majority governments and one-party rule. It gathered momentum after 1989. There were short-lived coalition governments. And there were regime changes after almost every general election. The competitive politics unleashed by changes in governments soon spilt over to universities not only as spheres of influence but also as arenas for political contests. The discomfiture (घबराहट) with independent or critical voices, even if few, grew rapidly. Central universities were no longer immune.
The decline of public universities in India has been an inevitable consequence of this process. The first set to bear the brunt were the universities of national standing in states. The obvious examples are Allahabad, Lucknow and Patna among the old, with Baroda and Rajasthan among the new. These are not even pale shadows of what they were until around 1980. The next set to be progressively damaged were the oldest national universities in the states—Bombay, Calcutta and Madras—established more than 150 years ago. Their drop in quality is alarming. DU and JNU continued to look good in comparison, not because they got better but because others declined so rapidly. Unfolding reality suggests that they cannot be exceptions for long.
This downward trajectory might just gather pace. It takes years, even decades, to build institutions. But it takes much less time to damage them. What is more, short-term actions have long-term consequences, so that revival is a difficult task. Indeed, we are simply mortgaging (Used figuratively - expose to future risk or constraint for the sake of immediate advantage.) the future of public universities in India.
It would seem that the political class and the ruling elite do not have an understanding of the critical role of universities in society and democracy. It is a serious mistake to think of universities as campuses or classrooms that teach young people to pass examinations, obtain degrees, and become employable, where research is subsidiary (less important than but related or supplementary to something.) or does not matter. Universities are about far more. For students, there is so much learning outside the classroom that makes them good citizens of society. For faculty, apart from commitment to their teaching and their research, there is a role in society as intellectuals who can provide an independent, credible, voice in evaluating governments, parliament, legislatures, or the judiciary, as guardians of society. This role is particularly important in a political democracy.
Thus, academic freedom is primary because universities are places for raising doubts and asking questions about everything. Exploring ideas, debating issues and thinking independently are essential in the quest for excellence. It would enable universities to be the conscience-keepers of economy, polity and society. Hence, the autonomy of this space is sacrosanct (रक्षणीय) . Of course, this cannot suffice where quality is poor or standards are low. That needs reform and change within universities.
Alas, the political process, parties and governments alike, meddle in universities. In India, this has become more and more intrusive with the passage of time. Micromanagement by governments is widespread. Interventions are purposive (having or done with a purpose.) and partisan (पक्षपातपूर्ण). These can be direct, or indirect, through the University Grants Commission and pliant VCs. The motives are political. Such interventions are characteristic of all governments, whether at the Centre or in the states, and every political party, irrespective of ideology. There are no exceptions. The cadre-based parties are worse: the Communist Party of India (Marxist), mostly in the past, and the BJP, on the rise, at present. Of course, the Congress is almost the same, much experienced through long practice. The irony of double standards is striking. The same political parties when in government invoke public interest and when in opposition wax eloquent about autonomy and freedom for universities.
It is essential for governments to recognize that the provision of resources to universities does not endow them with a right to exercise control. The resources are public money for public universities, which are accountable to students and society through institutional mechanisms that exist or can be created. Every government laments the absence of world-class universities, without realizing that it is attributable in part to their interventions and the growing intrusion of political processes. Where politics is largely kept out—as in Indian Institutes of Technology, Indian Institutes of Management or the Indian Institute of Science—institutions thrive.
The blame for the present state of our universities cannot be laid at the door of politics and governments alone. Universities as communities, and as institutions, are just as much to blame. The quality of leadership at universities has declined rapidly, in part because of partisan appointments by governments of VCs who are simply not good enough as academics or administrators, and in part because most VCs simply do not have the courage and the integrity to stand up to governments but have an eye on the next job they might get. The professoriate (a group of professors.) is mostly either complicit (involved with others in an activity that is unlawful or morally wrong.), as part of the political process in teachers’ unions, or just silent, preferring to look the other way, engaged in their narrow academic pursuits. Those who stand up are too few. The students are either caught up in the same party-political unions or opt out to concentrate on their academic tasks.
For university communities, it is imperative to recognize that such compromises are self-destructive as acts of commission. So is opting out, as an act of omission. Indeed, if universities want autonomy, it will not be conferred on them by benevolent (हितैषी) governments. They have to claim their autonomy. In this quest, solidarity within universities—leadership, faculty and students—and among universities—is absolutely essential. The whole is greater than the sum total of parts. And its voice cannot go unheard.
Structures of governance in universities must be conducive to autonomy. The best model would be a board of governors, to which governments could nominate at the most one-third the total number. The other members, two-thirds or more, should be independent, of whom one-half should be distinguished academics while one-half should be drawn from industry, civil society or professions. The chairman should be an eminent academic with administrative experience. Members of the board should have a term of six years, with one-third retiring every two years. The VC, to be appointed by the board with a six-year tenure, would be an ex-officio member. Except for nominees of governments, the board should decide on replacements for its retiring members.
Such institutional mechanisms are necessary but not sufficient. A better world will become possible if we can make two radical departures from our past. Governments and political parties must stop playing politics in universities and stop turning them into arenas for political battles. Universities must reclaim their autonomy from governments, for which university communities need to come together, and just focus on raising academic standards in pursuit of academic excellence.