Israel-Alma

11/10/2026

The pager operation changed the Middle East. But Hezbollah is rebuilding.

Alma estimates it still holds up to 15,000 rockets and missiles. A historic blow is not a lasting victory.

Read Sarit Zehavi’s analysis in The Jerusalem Post.

Hezbollah is weaker, but it's not disappeared. It still possesses thousands of rockets and missiles and continues to invest in expanding its drone capabilities

08/10/2026

If the IDF does not target civilians, why were civilians killed? Sarit Zehavi explains the target approval rules.

05/10/2026

Since mid-August 2026, three major gas pipelines in Syria have been damaged. At least two of the incidents were defined as deliberate acts of sabotage, but at this stage there is no evidence linking them, and it remains unclear who was responsible.

ISIS is one of the possible lines of investigation and an immediate suspect, but other actors operating in Syria also have an interest in undermining the regime and targeting critical infrastructure.

The incidents are taking place precisely as the regime in Damascus seeks to turn Syria’s geographic position into a regional energy hub linking Iraq, Turkey, and the Mediterranean. The infrastructure intended to strengthen Syria’s position could also become one of its key vulnerabilities.

Syria is trying to turn its geographic location into a strategic asset faster than it is able to establish stability and effective security control across its territory.

The recent incidents highlight the gap between the economic opportunity now open to Syria and the security reality on the ground.

Read the full analysis >>

04/10/2026

On September 26, the “Christian Conference in Support of the South” was held in Beirut at the initiative of “Independents for Lebanon,” (لقاء مستقلون من أجل لبنان ( a Christian group that has maintained ties with Hezbollah over the years and promotes positions closely aligned with the discourse of the “resistance.”

Why does “Independents for Lebanon” matter to Hezbollah?

Not because of its electoral strength, but because it gives Hezbollah’s “resistance” narrative a Christian voice. By portraying Israel as the principal threat and the “resistance” as a national necessity, the group helps Hezbollah present the justification for its weapons as a cross-sectarian Lebanese position-not merely a Shiite interest.

For a weakened Hezbollah facing growing demands to disarm, this form of political legitimacy is particularly valuable.

04/10/2026

Nabatieh is becoming a key arena in the struggle between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah—and not only over the issue of weapons.

Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s visit to the city was intended to project the image of a state returning to southern Lebanon, rebuilding, and strengthening its institutions.

At the same time, Hezbollah-affiliated actors used the visit to promote the opposite narrative: a state failing to address residents’ needs, contrasted with “the people of the south” demanding reconstruction and the right to return to their homes.

The incident follows a series of protests over the past month in which civilian and local platforms have been used to advance messages associated with Hezbollah.

Is the civilian sphere becoming a central tool in Hezbollah’s struggle against the government’s efforts to strengthen state authority?

Read the full article >>

Hezbollah seeks to promote that the government is failing to return the displaced, rebuild the south, or address the needs of its residents.

28/09/2026

Two Years After Nasrallah’s Elimination: Hezbollah Is Weakened but Still Controls the Narrative

Hezbollah has suffered severe blows to its leadership and military strength. The wars have also brought destruction and displacement to its support base in the south, the Dahiyeh, and the Beqaa, fueling criticism of the organization in Lebanon. Yet the commemorations for Nasrallah and Safieddine showed that the organization can still mobilize supporters and maintain its hold over its support base.

Through ceremonies, symbols, and messages of loyalty and continuity, Hezbollah seeks to turn loss into a justification for continuing its course. The events are not evidence that it has restored its military strength, but they do demonstrate its enduring power to shape the narrative.

27/09/2026

Hezbollah’s media ecosystem does not rely on a single media outlet, but on a division of labor among bodies that perform different, complementary roles.

Al-Manar gives the organization’s messages a television presence and an official stamp; Al-Nour Radio maintains a continuous daily presence in the Lebanese arena; Al-Ahed provides news, commentary, and a written archive; and Baqiatollah Magazine builds a long-term religious and ideological foundation.

Alongside them, the Military Media Unit produces operational footage and integrates the media dimension into military activity. The Al-Markazi website serves as a “media bank” for producing, archiving, and distributing videos, photographs, posters, and infographics, while the Electronic Unit works to disseminate and amplify this content, manage campaigns, and maintain a presence in the digital sphere.

Media outlets such as Al-Akhbar and Al Mayadeen also operate around these bodies. They are legally and organizationally independent, but their editorial lines are aligned with Hezbollah and the “Axis of Resistance,” and they serve as major mouthpieces for the organization.

Together, these bodies form a multilayered system: content is produced by one hub, framed on another platform, and redistributed through a broad network of channels and accounts. This enables Hezbollah to maintain consistency in its messaging, adapt it to different audiences, and continue disseminating it even when accounts are blocked or infrastructure is damaged.

Read Alma Center’s special report on Hezbollah’s media ecosystem, published on September 24.

Hezbollah’s media ecosystem is a strategic component of the organization’s power, rather than a complementary layer surrounding its military

27/09/2026

In recent weeks, a series of protests has spread across Lebanon that, on the surface, appear to be civilian demonstrations by displaced persons and residents of areas affected by the war. In practice, however, Hezbollah is directly involved in managing the protests and shaping their message: the anger is directed at the state and its institutions, rather than at Hezbollah.

By framing the protests as civilian in nature, Hezbollah can channel public frustration toward the government, while at the same time exploiting the state’s weakness to present its own institutions as an alternative capable of addressing the population’s needs.

Read the full article >>

In recent weeks, a series of protests has spread across Lebanon that, on the surface, appear to be civilian demonstrations by displaced

27/09/2026

Special Report: Hezbollah’s Media Ecosystem — Media Outlets, Influence Mechanisms, and the Evolution of Its Narratives

Since October 2023, Hezbollah has not merely changed its slogans, it has gradually changed the standard by which it defines victory.

Having entered the war under the banners of the “Support Front” and “On the Road to Jerusalem,” the organization was forced, following the severe damage to its leadership, infrastructure, and support base, to explain how the destruction and losses could be reconciled with its promise to defend Lebanon and deter Israel. In response, the narrative focus shifted from projecting strength and promising victory to messages of survival, loyalty, commemoration, and continuity. Following the ceasefire, these were joined by the return to the villages, reconstruction, and the struggle over the “weapons of the resistance.”

The new report maps the multilayered media ecosystem that enables Hezbollah to shape a central message, adapt it to different audiences, and disseminate it through established media outlets, military and digital units, and a network of official and unofficial channels.

The analysis shows how the commemoration of the dead, reconstruction, and the discourse surrounding the continuing threat converge into a single narrative designed to transform loss into continuity, survival into victory, and loyalty to leaders and martyrs into opposition to disarmament.

Hezbollah in 2026 no longer tells a simple story of victory. It tells a story of a “necessary price” and its continued power depends largely on its ability to convince its audience that the sacrifice was not in vain.

Hezbollah’s media ecosystem is a strategic component of the organization’s power, rather than a complementary layer surrounding its military

24/09/2026

Our September 22 publication on the Deir Mimas incident apparently touched a sensitive nerve: one day later, Al-Akhbar, one of Hezbollah’s main mouthpieces, responded to it directly.

The central issue is loyalty.

Hezbollah has significant influence and a foothold within the Lebanese Armed Forces. In southern Lebanon, a single officer acting in accordance with Hezbollah’s interests can turn a tactical incident into an escalation with strategic consequences and undermine the process between Israel and Lebanon.

Lebanon’s test is clear: anyone serving in the Lebanese Armed Forces must be loyal to the Lebanese state, not to the Hezbollah state.

Deir Mimas is a warning sign.

It appears that someone in Hezbollah did not like our September 22 report on the incident between the IDF and the Lebanese Army in Deir Mimas