Philosophy Department, UCC

UCC Philosopher Dr. Kian MW will be presenting at a Roman climate ethics workshop and it is hybrid (sign up for a link) so anyone can listen in. Register for the WebEx link using the sign up below! More details in the attached image.

https://luiss.webex.com/wbxmjs/joinservice/sites/luiss/meeting/download/8f1fa800698148aebef14fa3c852f0d7?MTID=m2eb08adccc6ab8eda355dc06d5fd0065 .

The last talk in this term’s Boole Lectures Series in Philosophy will be given by Dr Denis Dzanic (Graz) on Wednesday, 25 March. Please note that this talk will not take place in G27 (as Boole Lectures usually do), but in SHTEPPS (the Hub).

Title: How to Husserl a Bayes

Abstract: Formal epistemology of broadly Bayesian persuasion and contemporary phenomenology have little to say to each other. This is a missed opportunity, I argue, for some dialogue could be healthy and beneficial to both. I first provide some general background and outline a few programmatic thoughts; in particular, I probe the question of normative and descriptive commitments of formal modeling. Despite initial appearances, it will be argued, the phenomenological focus on essential analysis and the formal-epistemological focus on idealized models are not entirely dissimilar or incompatible. I then target a specific problem: how should we articulate the core Bayesian notion of credence? Here, I suggest, phenomenological analysis provides useful input. I motivate and develop an experiential account of credence which frames it as a proto-doxastic attitude rooted in the experience of uncertainty. I conclude by briefly exploring the implications of this account for epistemology, phenomenology, and decision theory.

Venue and time: SHTEPPS (The Hub) | Wednesday, March 25th, 1500-1700. (Talks typically last 45–60 minutes and are followed by a Q&A session; participants are free to leave at any time.)

Everybody is welcome!

The next talk in the Boole Lectures Series in Philosophy will be given by Prof. Crescente Molina (Rutgers). CACSSS Seminar Room (ORB G27) | Wednesday, March 18th, 1500-1700.

Title: Normative Powers and Permissive Right

Abstract: To have a normative power is to have a distinctive kind of ability, namely the ability to bring about a change in the normative world by an act of will. Some philosophers are comfortable maintaining that our set of moral entitlements includes normative powers. Others, however, resist this idea on grounds that stem from more general views about the structure of morality. In this article, I examine these reasons for doubt and defend the claim that morality does indeed make room for normative powers. I build on Joseph Raz’s influential account of normative powers, while ultimately proposing a different account of their foundations. I argue that the principle conferring normative powers is grounded in one of our most basic moral rights: a liberty-right to perform or omit any act whose performance or omission is morally unobjectionable. I call this right Permissive Right.
I contend that if we have a Permissive Right, such a right must include a power-conferring moral principle. If an agent can bring about a certain normative change, or refrain from doing so, without violating others’ rights or moral requirements, then she is at moral liberty to bring about that change. And when certain conditions hold, from such moral liberty to effect a normative change at will, we may infer possession of the corresponding moral normative power to effect that change. This account vindicates a longstanding liberal claim: that the place of normative powers in morality lies within our entitlement to a sphere of interpersonal freedom as extensive as morality allows.

Announcing that UCC Philosopher Dr Kian Mintz-Woo will be inaugurating a new lecture series at Trinity College Dublin April 1, 2026. For those in Ireland, please come by. [For those abroad, this is a great excuse to visit Ireland's second-best city!]

The Department of Philosophy is pleased to announce that, thanks to a generous donation from an anonymous benefactor, we are able to offer one MA Philosophy Studentship, worth €1000, in 2026-27. Any graduating UCC BA Philosophy student who is planning to enrol in the MA in Philosophy in the following year is eligible; if you have applied for the MA in philosophy by 1st May 2026, you will automatically be considered for the award. The award will be paid upon enrolment in the MA in Autumn 2026.

Details can be found here: https://www.ucc.ie/en/scholarships/postgraduate/artspg/artspgmaiphilsa/

Questions may be addressed to Dr. Bengt Autzen (Director of Graduate Studies) or Dr. Joel Walmsley (Head of Department)

MA in Philosophy Studentship Award | University College Cork Learn, Study and Research in UCC, Ireland's first 5 star university. Our tradition of independent thinking will prepare you for the world and the workplace in a vibrant, modern, green campus.

The next talk in the Boole Lectures Series in Philosophy will be given by Dr. Alba Montes Sánchez (Madrid). CACSSS Seminar Room (ORB G27) | Wednesday, February 25th, 1530-1730.

Title: The Phenomenology and Affective Politics of Belonging and Non-Belonging

Abstract: How do subjects experience (non-)belonging to social groups, and how are feelings of (non-)belonging socio-politically modulated? In this paper, we tackle these two questions by addressing both the phenomenology of experiencing and the affective politics of such experiences. Regarding phenomenology, we focus on cases of migration and pluri-culturality to show that feelings of belonging to social groups can often be unsettled or ambiguous and we analyse feelings of belonging and non-belonging as part of a continuum with different shades of grey. We argue that some of these shades are generated by a fundamental phenomenological feature of feelings of belonging: they are relational through and through. They are not just evaluations of how one experiences one fits into one’s social environment (how much perceived congruence there is between oneself and others) but they also evaluate the degree of recognition one receives from others. In other words, feelings of belonging respond to whether and to what extent one perceives one is esteemed by others. “Fitting in” and being esteemed are not binary, on/off states, and therefore neither are feelings of belonging. Stressing relationality thus helps us shed light on a crucial feature of in-between identities. Building on this relational account, in the second part of the paper, we focus on the socio-normative issues regarding the affective politics of (non-)belonging. Here, we will employ Young’s (1997) notion of “asymmetric reciprocity” and argue that any claim of “reciprocal recognition” (ibid.) that feelings of belonging articulate must be seen against the affectively relevant background of asymmetric sociocultural positions.

Here's a new paper from Dr. David Walsh in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, comparing the theories of Nishida Kitaro and Alva Noe:

Strange and Ordinary Tools: The Reciprocity of Art and Life for Nishida Kitarō and Alva Noë Abstract. In Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature, Alva Noë argues that art is defined, in part, by its ability to disturb the organized activities that sha

The next talk in the Boole Lectures Series in Philosophy will be given by Professor István Aranyosi (Bilkent) on Wednesday, 11 February, CACSSS Seminar Room (ORB G27), 1500-1700

Title: Flashbacks

Abstract: Intrusive memories, informally known as flashbacks, play a central part as a subject matter in trauma theory, but have only incidentally been discussed in the more general and currently burgeoning philosophy of memory and remembering. The phenomenon of flashback is a disruption of the standard memory system, and it differs in many respects from voluntarily retrieved episodic memory. Though there is a temptation to dismiss it as marginal, I will argue that it is worth taking a closer philosophical look at this phenomenon, in that the way we are forced to analyze and interpret it might impact the way we should look at the standard cases of episodic remembering. The latter, in effect, involves a longstanding debate between realists (causalists, relationalists) and constructivists (simulationists, narrativists). I will address the question of whether my own, strongly realist view, which I dubbed “preteriception”, benefits from the discussion of flashbacks.

Everybody is welcome!

The first talk in this term’s Boole Lectures in Philosophy will be given by Professor Samir Okasha (University of Bristol) on Wednesday, 4 February, in the CACSSS Seminar Room (ORB G27) from 1500-1700

Title: Biological Essentialism Re-examined.

Abstract: Biological essentialism is the idea that species, and possibly other biological taxa, have essences: properties that all and only the members of a species exhibit, and in virtue of which they belong to that species. Despite its venerable Aristotelian pedigree, and its prevalence among lay people, the notion that species have "essences" has long been regarded as incompatible with both modern taxonomic practice and evolutionary theory. For this reason, philosophers of biology are virtually unanimous in rejecting biological essentialism. But in a recent book, Michael Devitt argues that this anti-essentialist consensus is fundamentally mistaken, since it arises from an inadvertent conflation between two questions. The taxon question asks what makes an organism a member of one species rather than another; while the category question asks what all the different species taxa have in common. Devitt argues that these two questions are independent, and that a non-essentialist answer to the category question is compatible with an essentialist answer to the taxon question. I scrutinize this claim and find it to be untenable, on the basis of a logical analysis of the relationship between the two questions. This shows that the traditional anti-essentialist consensus was correct all along, though not for exactly the reasons that some philosophers have thought.

Everybody is welcome!

Body and Mind Philosophical Festival, Knocknagoshel, Co.Kerry, Saturday Jan.24th and Sunday Jan.25th

Here's Prof. Vittorio Bufacchi in today's Irish Examiner (and on the cover!) with a piece on the virtues of patience: https://www.irishexaminer.com/opinion/commentanalysis/arid-41774441.html