31/05/2026
Oriental Law Representative: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Confucius Statue
Text/Professor Alan Yeung, Hong Kong Mencius Institute
In May 2026, U.S. President Trump mentioned the statue of Confucius engraved on the U.S. Supreme Court building during his visit to China. Indeed, a statue of the Chinese philosopher Confucius is carved into the East Pediment of the U.S. Supreme Court building, alongside statues of Moses and Solon, representing three great civilizations. The work, by sculptor Hermon A. MacNeil, is intended to symbolize the contributions of three ancient civilizations to law and morality—representing foundational Eastern legal ideas and moral principles.
Whether Americans truly understand Confucius—or even correctly perceive traditional Chinese jurisprudence—is not the focus of this article. Instead, this article aims to examine the inherent value of Confucian and Mencian jurisprudence itself.
Given that ancient Chinese legal practice was primarily influenced by Legalist 法家 jurisprudence, it reflected the phenomenon often summarized as “Confucianism on the surface, Legalism at bottom” (or “outwardly Confucian, inwardly Legalist” 外儒內法 ). In other words, it publicly upheld Confucian morality and moral education, while internally relying on harsh Legalist laws and political maneuvering to govern the state and regulate the people.
That said, the profound influence of Confucian and Mencian jurisprudence is undeniable, especially their core principle: “education is more important than punishment.” The Analects 《論語》 state: “Guide them by laws, regulate them by punishments, and the people will try to avoid punishment but will have no sense of shame. Guide them by virtue, regulate them by rites, and they will develop a sense of shame and, moreover, become good.” 「道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥；道之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且格。」In other words, although harsh laws may bring short-term relief, they cannot truly create a sense of shame or inspire people to follow the rules voluntarily. Confucius therefore advocated addressing root causes rather than using remedies.
However, Confucius also had shortcomings, such as overemphasizing the legitimacy of titles—like king and minister君君臣臣, father and son父父子子. What, then, should be done if a tyrant oppresses the people for personal gain? Mencius made important additions to Confucius’s legal and political thought. For example, he affirmed the people’s right to overthrow a tyrant.
With regard to King Wu of Zhou’s周武王 campaign against King Zhou of Shang商紂, even though the latter was the former’s “ruler,” Mencius explicitly supported the campaign’s legitimacy. As Mencius put it:
“He who harms benevolence is called a thief; he who harms righteousness is called a cruel; a cruel and thieving person is called a mere tyrant. I have heard of the ex*****on of the tyrant King Zhou, but I have never heard of the murder of a ruler.” (Mencius, Liang Hui Wang, Chapter II) 「賊仁者謂之賊，賊義者謂之殘，殘賊之人謂之一夫。聞誅一夫紂矣，未聞弒君也。」（《孟子•梁惠王章句下》）
This passage indicates that King Zhou of Shang forfeited his right to be considered a true ruler 喪失了為君的資格 by failing to uphold benevolence and righteousness. Therefore, King Wu of Zhou did not commit regicide; rather, he executed only a “tyrant.”
As we need to keep social posts short, this article can only briefly highlight a few key points of Confucian and Mencian jurisprudence. To be fair, since Confucius and Mencius lived more than two thousand years ago, their perspectives were inevitably shaped by the limitations of their time. Their ideas therefore require critical inheritance and revision by later generations.
Unfortunately, Western culture can sometimes be overly dismissive—easily rejecting the wisdom of traditional Chinese sages and replacing it with a “kingly” attitude. In fact, every system of thought has both strengths and weaknesses. The value of Confucian and Mencian jurisprudence deserves sustained and deep reflection, and it should complement Western culture rather than being positioned in a simplistic “either/or” opposition or imposed on others with a self-congratulatory, victorious mindset.
