09/05/2023
New talk coming up soon: Naftali Weinberger (LMU Munich), "Three Myths About Causal Mediation". Friday, September 15th, 3:30 – 4:30pm, McGill University, Burnside Hall 1104.
https://montrealphilscinet.wordpress.com/activites-activities/
Abstract: Causal mediation techniques are a means for identifying the degree to which a cause influences its effect along particular causal paths. For example, in a model where a cause influences its effect both indirectly via a mediator and directly via factors not included in the model, mediation techniques enable one to measure both direct and indirect effects. Although mediation techniques are widely employed, they are often misunderstood. This is in part due to the long-term influence of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) treatment of mediation, which applies only to linear models without interaction, and which leads one to develop intuitions about direct and indirect effects that do not generalize to non-parametric causal models. In my talk, I identify and reject three persistent myths about mediation. I argue that such methods: 1. Should not be understood as decomposing the total effect into additive components corresponding to the contributions of the paths; 2. Are not a means for eliminating latent heterogeneity; and 3. Do not require one to appeal to causal concepts other than the counterfactual causal ones built into structural causal models. These points are crucial for understanding mediation effects in any contexts in which they are studied, and have particular applications for studies of fairness and discrimination, in which such effects play an increasingly central role (Plečko and Bareinboim, 2022).
This talk is co-sponsored with the Mathematics and Philosophy departments at McGill.
09/19/2022
We are proud to host Stephan Hartmann (LMU) at McGill next week!
Bayesian Explanationism
Stephan Hartmann, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich
Thursday September 29th, 2022, 5-7pm
Hybrid event: in person and online
In person: McGill University, Leacock 927
Online participation: please visit the Montreal Philosophy of Science Network website for the Zoom link: https://montrealphilscinet.wordpress.com/activites-activities/
Abstract: Peter Lipton famously argued that we want our scientific theories to be lovely and likely, that is, we want them to provide good explanations and to be very probable (if not true). Unfortunately, there is a tension between these two epistemic virtues, and it is not clear how they are related. Thus, the question arises whether the Bayesian (who prefers likely theories) and the explanationist (who prefers lovely theories) can be friends, as Lipton claims. Although much ink has been spilled over this question, in this talk I want to take a fresh look at it and make two points: First, I argue that successfully providing an explanation is an example of non-empirical evidence in favor of the theory in question. This point can be made more precise by a simple Bayesian model, which also provides (as a bonus point, so to speak) a justification for the bonus point approach to explanationism inspired by van Fraassen and championed by Douven – at least if certain conditions are met. Second, I investigate how the strength of an explanation – its explanatory power – can be measured in Bayesian terms, and show how this all fits nicely into a coherentist epistemology of science.
04/27/2021
Vous avez manqué les conférences d'Elliot Sober à l'UQAM? Pas de problème : voici les enregistrements!
You missed the Elliot Sober conferences held at UQAM? We've got your back: here are the recordings!
Conférences Hugues-Leblanc 2021 // Elliott Sober // disponible en ligne
Vidéo Audio Résumé « Ockham’s Razor » Mercredi 14 avril, 15h30-17h00Commentatrice // commentator: Molly Kao (Université de Montréal) Ockham’s razor says that simpler theories are better than theories that are more complex, but what does “better” mean? The question isn’t ...
