VOC Historical Society

Steven van den Hagen
The VOC’s First Admiral
By Monica de Knecht—Supporter and Member of the VOCHS
Steven van der Hagen, born in Amersfoort in 1563, was the first Admiral of the Dutch East India Company. He made three visits to the East Indies, spending six years in all there. He was appointed by the Raad van Indië. Van der Hagen protested against the very harsh administration of the directors there, who wanted a complete monopoly on the clove trade and were willing to fight against their Spanish, Portuguese, English or Asiatic trade competitors, in order to get it. Laurens Reael, the 3rd Governor General of the VOC and Steven van der Hagen, wrote with disapproval on how the Heeren XVII treated the interests and laws of the Maluku population.
EARLY YEARS.
Steven van der Hagen was brought up by an aunt, his father’s sister, after his parents fled to the Southern Netherlands, due to the Dutch revolt. He was given a very good education, which included Latin. When he was ten years old, he went to visit his father, Andries van der Hagen in Bruges and together they went to Ypres and Doornik, to seek work for him. Steven started work at a silkworkers’ shop on the market square, before returning to Ypres to receive further education from his uncle Willem van der Hagen.

ANDALUCIA
At only 12 years of age, Steven developed a great interest in Spain and travelled to Calais, on foot, to catch a ship there. A ship’s captain heard that Steven was not a Fleming and asked him if he had run away from home. Talking with them, Steven found out that five Antwerp merchants were travelling to Spain, on this ship. He made a very good impression on one of the merchants, who thought him very well bred and very mature for his age. He offered to take him to Seville with him. Because Steven had run away secretly from his uncle, he used another name, as his uncle was very well known.
Only a few days later, Steven was discovered by his cousin, who told him to go home, but Steven refused to give up his voyage, because his uncle had not been that kind to him and beaten him often. The ship left within a few days and he was taken on by a shopkeeper in linen, in Sanlucar, who had a very troublesome and difficult wife. Stephen stayed there for the next two years and learned to speak Spanish fluently. On a walk through Seville, he met one of the merchants, who had brought him to Spain. He avoided him and instead moved to Jerez de la Frontera. Steven enjoyed his time there and watched bullfights in the market square and horse-mounted fights in the streets.
SPAIN’S WAR WITH BARBARY AND STEVEN’S RETURN TO HOLLAND.
In 1578, Spain warred with Barbary and a number of Dutch boats fought for Spain, against the Berbers. However their crews returned dangerously ill and when they were being given the Sacrament as part of the Last Rites, so that they could be buried in holy ground, Steven was useful as an interpreter.
Steven met a ship’s captain from Medemblik, many of whose crew had died of diarrhea and joined the rest of the crew for the return journey to the Netherlands. When Steven got back, he returned to Amersfoort and heard that his mother had died and his father had remarried.
ENCOUNTER WITH FRANCIS DRAKE AND MARRIAGE
With money he had inherited, he then travelled to Italy. In 1587, his ship was lost in Cadiz in the raid by the English Admiral, Sir Francis Drake. He managed to get back to Hoorn and in 1589, he married Stephania van der Made, in Amsterdam in a civil ceremony, before the schepenen (aldermen). He also married Stephania in a Church wedding in Utrecht, a few months later.
LIFE AT SEA FROM 1585 – 1601
Steven van der Hagen served as a Merchant and pioneer of the so-called ‘Straatvaart’ to Spain by the Northern Netherlandish ship owners (1585 – 1593). He is also known as a ship’s captain, who as early as 1587, at the age of 24, on behalf of his clients from Hoorn, let a convoy of 240 ton ships through the straits. This made it possible, not only to transport heavier wheat cargoes, but also longer goods, like ships’ masts.
He was also merchant on two ships to the Gulf of Guinea (July 1597 – March 1598) and Admiral of three ships of the Compagnie van Verre (1599 – 1601). In 1599, he landed on Madagascar. It is possible that had he or other Dutchmen conquered it at this time, South Africa’s history could have been very different.
In 1600, the three fleets, lying at anchor, in Bantam, decided to bargain and load pepper together. Steven then sailed back to Ambon with 27 soldiers. The islanders were far happier to deal with him than the Portuguese. Van der Hagen was allowed to build a fortification. Interesting to note that, in 1603, Frederik de Houtman returned from Ambon Island, on a ship captained by Steven van der Hagen, surrendering the fort there to the Portuguese.
SERVICE WITH THE NEWLY FORMED VEREENIGDE OOSTINDISCHE COMPAGNIE. So with this wealth of experience in trade and seamanship, who better for the VOC to choose as their very first Admiral than Steven van der Hagen. For two months, his ships – despatched from Amsterdam, Hoorne and Enkhuizen – lay off the coast of England, awaiting a favourable wind. He was sent to sea, with secret instructions, only to be opened after leaving port. (Very hush hush secret agent type stuff from the Heeren XVII.) On reading those instructions, he became very angry, since the Company directors had ordered him to fight the Spanish and the Portuguese. Other sources suggest it was the crew that became angry because they had not taken service to fight with other nations.
After six months at sea, on 30th May, 1604, they sighted the Cape of Good Hope. Then they hijacked a Portuguese ship, laden with ivory. On 21st September, the ships arrived in Goa and one month later in Calicut, the city of the Zamorin. On the 11th November, van der Hagen reached a political agreement to trade at Kozhikode and Ponnani and promised the Zamorin help against the Portuguese.
After a few weeks, he reached Pegu and sold its sovereign an emerald. The Dutch were fascinated by the opulence and wealth of the monarch, but also by the crocodiles and white elephants in the kingdom. (A white elephant {also known as an albino elephant} is a rare kind of elephant, but not a distinct species. Although often depicted as snow white, their skin is normally a soft reddish-brown, turning a light pink, when wet.) With the help of the local population, van der Hagen captured the Portuguese fort on Ambon (25th February 1605), without any shot, the first territory captured by the Dutch Republic in south-east Asia. On this Indian coast van der Hagen founded the Masulipatnam (1605) and Petapuli (1606) factories, aimed especially at getting a hold on the huge trade in cotton, spices, precious stones and pigments.
WILLEM JANZOON – DISCOVERY OF AUSTRALIA At the end of the year, one of the fastest sailing ships in van der Hagen’s fleet, the Duyfken, a yacht under Willem Janszoon, sailed to the south and discovered the north coast of Australia. However, Jansz thought that it was connected to New Guinea and it was not feted as it should have been at the time. In 1607 van der Hagen sailed to Mauritius and met with Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge and ate a dodo, whose taste, he noted was rather disgusting.
BACK HOME THEN FIGHTING THE PIRATES. Back home he bought a house in Utrecht on the Oude Gracht. He spoke with the naturalist Carolus Clusius about the plants and animals he saw during his voyage: Clusius took notes in Latin, which were published after his death. In 1614, he sailed to Malabar and Goa to fight the Moorish pirates there. He then left for the Red Sea for negotiations and in 1615 sailed to the Straits of Malacca and in 1615 defeated the Portuguese at the Malay Peninsula.
He was most dissatisfied with the governance of Adriaen Maertensz Block, so van der Hagen convened an assembly there. Block was replaced and van der Hagen (temporarily) took over command at Amboyna. (June 1617). In 1618, he and his ship set off for Pulau Naira (or Banda Neira), one of the Spice Islands. At the end of the year, he was appointed to the Raad van Indië. He became the first councillor under Governor-generals Gerard Reynst, Laurens Reael and Jan Pieterszoon Coen.
It was probably about this time, that he ‘blotted his copybook a bit’ with the Heeren XVII Both he and the 3rd Governor-General, Laurens Reael argued that the VOC had no right to compel the natives of the Moluccas to sell their spices exclusively to the Dutch, unless the latter could supply them in return with adequate supplies of food and clothing, at reasonable prices. They urged that it was better, in the long run, for the Dutch to content themselves with large sales and small profits, rather than strive for a rigid and oppressive monopoly, which aimed at small sales and big profits. They also stressed that it was unwise to use force against their English competitors, for to do so would affect the Anglo-Dutch relations in Europe. Obviously this did not worry Jan Pieterszoon Coen, who later used excessive force, so as the Dutch became supreme in the clove trade. Finally Reael and van der Hagen considered it unfair and ill-advised to exclude Asian traders, whether Chinese, Malay or Javanese, from the Moluccas by force.
Van der Hagen was painted in 1619, possibly by Paulus Moreelse. In 1620, he lived either in Slot Zuylen, on the River Vecht or on Bleyesteyn. He was buried on 25th July, 1624, in Utrecht, having died of the plague. His direct descendants still live in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Australia. He has many streets named after him in Rotterdam, Amersfoort and Den Helder.
ANALYSIS OF STEVEN VAN DER HAGEN
All in all, Steven van der Hagen was a brilliant trader/Admiral/entrepreneur for the VOC and, earlier, for the trading companies before united under the VOC. So we wonder why such a valuable and experienced Compagnie employee was not, for instance, buried in the Groot Hollandse Kerk, like other luminaries, such as Jan Pieterszoon Coen. He was successful in trading war, in pirating, trading, and establishing forts for the VOC. Why wasn’t he remembered and treasured as much as many others, past and future, were.
I believe that it was because he was so totally against the VOC’s mandate of ignoring the rights and laws of the people, in order to eliminate every possible rival of their supreme control of the spice trade. It’s interesting that he was one of the councillors under Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the man who was renowned for providing the impulse that set the VOC on the path to dominance in the Dutch East Indies. To the directors of the VOC, Pieterszoon Coen was a hero, but since the 19th century, his legacy has become controversial, due to the violence he employed, especially during the last stage of the Dutch conquest of the Banda islands, in order to secure a trade monopoly on nutmeg, mace and clove. Now Pieterszoon Coen had replaced Laurens Reael, in 1619 and it appears that the Heeren XVII had done this, possibly, because of van der Hagen’s and Reael’s opposition to their decree of obtaining supremacy in the spice trade, at all costs, not discounting, massacre or destruction of clove plantations. Steven van der Hagen would, as a councillor of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, express his disapproval of the powerful Governor-General’s cruel policies. Also Coen became the VOC head in the Dutch East Indies in 1619 and Steven left Batavia in 1620. A man like Coen would not brook any opposition to his rule, as his belief in his divinely-sanctioned authority, to pursue his ultimate goal of trade monopoly in the East Indies, should not be questioned. After all his famous quote was Dispereert niet, ontziet uw vijanden niet, want God is met ons ( Despair not, spare our enemies not, for God is with us.) He would not have such a lenient and understanding man in his council and would have probably written to the VOC directors that he was dissatisfied with van der Hagen. Of course the Heeren XVII would take the side of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the man who single-handedly made the VOC the supreme trader in spices against all the other trading nations in the world. It is probably a blessing for his own peace of mind that Steven van der Hagen died before such atrocities as the Massacre of Amboyna, where agents of the Dutch East India Company, tortured and executed British East India traders and other natives, on false accusations; as the English traders were becoming too friendly in their dealings with the natives. The massacre was used as casus belli (occasion for war) for the First Anglo-Dutch war, and the brochure was reprinted as "A Memento for Holland" (1652). The Dutch lost the war and were forced to accept a condition in the 1654 Treaty of Westminster, calling for the exemplary punishment of any surviving culprits.

REFERENCE AND BIBLIOGRAPHY - WIKIPEDIA AND END NOTES.

University of Pretoria – dissertations at repository.up.ac.za
De VOCsite handelsposten, Amboyna.
Werkstuk Geschiedenis de Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie – scholieren.com
www.thehindu.com/features/digging-up-dutch-legacy/article2388796.ece
The First Discovery of Australia (Gutenberg.net.au – ebooks).
History of Holland – Chapter Vl, The Beginnings of the Dutch Republic, by George Edmundson.
VOCsite – Steven van der Hagen – Tidor Ternate Mauritius Dodo.
History of Holland – Chapter Vl
Boxer, C.R., The Dutch Seaborne Empire, Hutchinson of London. In the Chapter, Mare Liberium and Mare Clausum, P. 97

The VOC and the Genesis of the Corporation
By Peter Reynders Member & Supporter of the VOCHS.
The Dutch United East Indies Company (VOC), a shipping and trading company, was the first modern corporation, as hinted at in much literature1. But these brief mentions rarely explain how or why this corporate form arose, let alone why it would first occur in a small nation with hardly two million people, and not earlier or in a larger country or empire, such as Rome, Spain or Britain. This article hints at some of the answers to these questions from the reams of published work on the issue,2 and the impacts of the corporation in the world economy since. Interestingly the initiative to create that company structure the company had come from the Government.
The corporate form
The modern corporation, multinational or not, is a commercial enterprise which has a separate “legal personality”. It is headed by a board of directors, appointed or elected, which hire managers and other personnel who are responsible to the board. The board operates with a high degree of independence from the corporation’s owners: the shareholders, previously known as the partners i.e. those who invested their money in it. Shareholders are neither liable for the debts that the board incurs, nor can they dictate decision making. They can cash their investment or part thereof at any time by trading their shares on the stock market They do not recoup it from the company, meaning the capital is “locked in”. The owner-shareholders in a corporation tend to change continuously.
The board of directors represents the company when trading and wherever needed, but individual directors are also themselves shielded from liability for the corporation's obligations. Only the corporation is liable for the decisions made by the board and its managers, including those resulting in debts, such as taxes and import duties. This is known as limited liability for owners and shareholders. The board can decide to pay dividends to shareholders, or refrain from doing so. This corporate structure tends to be more expensive compared to a sole trader or traditional partnership, as these additional board and management structures require the additional costs of salaries and corporate offices. The precise legal details of modern corporations differ from country to country, but the basic corporate form is similar. There is a public perception that the corporate form was created to serve its shareholders better, through greater efficiency. But was it?
This system of the corporation did not exist for private firms until it emerged from the VOC, apart from some small, localised and low-risk “entity shielding” examples in France and Belgium.
Why not? (There have been some localised ''entity shielding'' examples recorded in Antwerp in the 16th century, and multiple mill ownership in Toulouse, France in the 14th Century, which had tradeable shares of multi-ownership commercial entities that were however neither considered risky nor very large investments.)
The pre-VOC business form
Roman law was the basis for legal systems in Europe well past medieval times, deep into the Renaissance. It did allow partnerships: enterprises based on a private contract for a common purpose, such as to share the profits and the losses between all partners. But Roman law also stipulated that no-one could make an agreement on behalf of someone else: ''no representation''; which prevented a management agency from running other people's joint investment. Owners had to be involved and were directly responsible and liable for decisions taken. This prohibition was occasionally circumvented in some jurisdictions including in post Roman commercial law, but even at the start of the 17th century courts did not always accept this.
So, by the beginning of the 17th century individual investors were still jointly liable for transactions of the commercial partnership. Each individual partner could veto commercial decisions because a consensus was required. The death of a single investor could cause the whole enterprise to be liquidated so the investment could be paid to the heirs, or requiring an entirely new partnership to be negotiated for operations to continue. Thus, the size and scope of these Roman law-based partnership-companies was limited, as they required consensus of all shareholders for every decision, with no avenue to provide 'locked in' private capital to a firm for the long term. Legal change would be required to create this.
The first VOC charter
Before 1602, maritime trading investors exclusively formed partnerships for a single voyage only, often of a whole fleet. Not only was then the cargo sold after each voyage, but the ships as well, with the Captains and crews dismissed upon their return. This arrangement made the overall profit of each trip instantly clear and often more profitable for the owners, as there was no remaining investment either at home or overseas. The total returns were then distributed to partners. This was referred to as 'default liquidation upon return'.
The VOC's first charter of 1602 is the statutory document that established the company.3 While innovative, the charter did not contain all the basic characteristics of the corporate form yet. But it did provide for a capital lock-in for ten years, paired with the provision that no dividend would be paid until sufficient profits had been generated to repay all investors in full. This no-cash-for-a-decade likelihood was considered to be unattractive to investors in intercontinental business ventures. To make investing in the VOC more attractive, the first Charter provided that shares could be traded from the start, which was previously only possible with approval from all investor partners. In turn, this stimulated an active Amsterdam stock market. Personal unlimited liabilities for almost all debts still applied to the seventeen shareholder-directors, but the Charter granted them limited liability for wage arrears but only until the fleet returned and the cargo was sold.
In Portugal, Spain and England, royal monopolies had been granted to firms trading with Asia which sought to protect traders against competition from fellow nationals, prevent free-riding on military protection, and promote investor confidence. The first VOC Charter similarly provided a trading monopoly for the Dutch. The Charter gave sovereign rights and obligations to the VOC managers to act on behalf of the National Government in many circumstances to deal with foreign nations.
Short-term trading investments caused problems, as The Far East was about a year's sailing away, and required ''sunk investments'' to maximise success, such as overseas military action, protective fortifications, armaments and real estate for trading posts and a mapping agency. By requiring a capital commitment for ten years, the VOC was free from the need to distribute any profits for an extended period, and could accommodate the sunk investments necessary to establish its position in Asia. After ten years, investors could re-invest in the company.
The VOC established itself rather quickly in Asia, particularly at the expense of the Portuguese. But this came at a cost, as the VOC's military actions were far more than planned for, such as sea battles against Spanish and Portuguese fleets and capturing their forts. As a result, funds to send out trading fleets were low, so only eight fleets had been sent between 1602 and 1609, seeing the VOC share price tumble to 80% of nominal value by 1609.
But the VOC had managed to beat planned English expansion in the East Indies as well, by outspending the (English) East India Company (EIC). The EIC at that stage was working exclusively with short term capital, also because their King had shown a tendency of breaching their granted monopolies by granting further ones or cancelling monopolies to raise more funds. English investors were also wary that company resources were often expropriated by the Government for war.
Deciding the corporate form
The first Charter, including its monopoly, was granted for twenty years, revealing the intention to continue the 10-year period, beyond 1612. But already in 1606, it appears, its Directors began to see difficulties with the 1612 liquidation and began to promote the idea of lifting it.
Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, the Chair of the governing body of the confederate Dutch Republic, the States General, asked the Fleet Commander Admiral Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge, to prepare a report with his analysis and views on the approaching 1612 liquidation. Matelieff reported that the military investments should not be lost, but should be stepped up, as it would benefit the company for the years after 1612. Liquidation would mean virtually starting afresh. Matelief advised that the decision to liquidate should not be left to the Directors, as they may liquidate to recoup their investments, contrary to the interests of the fledgling Dutch nation, now at the beginning of a 12-year truce in its independence war against Spain. Instead, the Asian trade should continue to build upon what had been achieved so far, so advised Matelieff. 4
But this idea was not without its opponents. By 1609, two of the Directors had revolted against aspects of the Charter including the 'no return for 10 years' provision and resigned. One of these, Isaac Le Maire, after resigning in 1606 bought significant numbers of the then cheap shares to force a change. He also actively challenged the VOC's monopoly and launched two of his own vessels to sail around South America to the East Indies, commanded by his son Jacob. The single ship that arrived there was confiscated by VOC authorities for a breach of the monopoly. But Le Maire's passionate and expensive challenge to his loss of authority as an owner in the developing corporate structure stands as testament that the interests of share-holders and governing bodies was in conflict from the beginning.
Soon after, the company received a large rebate on customs duty, whereby the Dutch government admitted it had encouraged the VOC to wage war on behalf of the nation. From 1610 the Board lobbied hard to have the liquidation lifted, arguing the VOC was not just private enterprise but also pursued State affairs, formalising this request in March 1612.This was clearly contrary to private shareholder rights as specified in the Charter.
The Board argued elaborately on a number of fronts. By 1612, the VOC accounts were weak, risking that a renewed investment round would fail to attract sufficient capital and that the company could not continue to represent the Dutch government overseas. They pointed out that competition from the EIC was increasing, as the English had lower military costs and could undercut VOC prices in Europe. Spain and Portugal continued hostilities in the east as the 1609 twelve-year truce with Spain did not cover the East-Indies, and without a continuing military presence, the Dutch would lose access to trading ports. In short, they argued that if the liquidation obligation was not lifted, the requested subsidy was not provided and the government failed to start negotiations with the English, trade would stop and high unemployment would result.
Shareholders were threatening court action to enforce the Charter. The VOC leaders argued that shareholder sovereignty was preserved in overturning the liquidation provision, as shareholders could sell their shares on the stock market, and so would not suffer losses. To show good faith, the Board agreed to draw up and present annual accounts that conformed to government specifications.
The Dutch government began considering this controversial and pressing bundle of submissions on 28 July 1612. On the 30th news came that the Spanish were preparing a massive assault on VOC fortresses. On the 31st the States General legislated to suspend the Charter article requiring liquidation.5 The other requests took months to deal with, but the VOC's capital had become permanent, de facto, and the VOC the first private company with a possibly indefinite life. Its likely discontinuation from 1612 had been averted.
Use of the corporate form
The VOC would trade as a modern corporation in inter-continental trade and intra-Asian trade for close to two centuries. Only after many decades would other nations start to copy its corporate structure. First was the EIC after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, when the role of the previously absolute monarch became largely ceremonial and parliament held the reigns of decision making. Only then did Britain become a large colonial empire. Where other countries' constitutional circumstances allowed, they followed suit.
Eventually the corporate form was adopted on a massive scale around the world, to the point that there are now corporations everywhere, some larger than many countries' economies. If the performance of public and private institutions substantially determine the economy of a nation, the corporate form may be considered the foundation of modern economic organisation. Capital permanence, the privilege of limited liability are its basic ingredients. When we notice or suspect also that corporations followed the behaviour of the 1612 VOC to capitalise on their clout with government to change the law just for them or to prevent law that disadvantages them, we may realise that too is a four centuries' old practice. The recent financial crisis showed some other side effects, which with the issues of to what extent and how the fruits of the corporations are distributed in the nation, are stories by themselves. Interestingly the Corporation was first created by Government and in the public interest, at the expense of the shareholders' interest. One may wonder: should they return to the primary aim of supporting the nation as their primary goal?
The VOC was not to be forever. The Dutch government took over the remains of the VOC around 1800 when it went bankrupt. Its debts imposed a severe financial burden on the public purse until deep into the 19th century, partly because further investment had not always become shares, but just loans that had to be paid back. The factors that brought the VOC to an end included: the fourth Anglo-Dutch war and its aftermath, deteriorating management in Holland (where nothing substantial happened without approval of the French who had overthrown the Dutch Republic in 1795), growing management costs, increased 'self-trading' by personnel in Asia (so in competition with the company they worked for) and, as hinted at above, defective funding methods5. But its legacy lives on in the ever-expanding role of corporations in the world economy, as does the basic conflict between shareholders’ rights and the prerogatives of Boards.

Peter Reynders
__________________________________________

1. e.g. Gaastra, F. S. De Geschiedenis van de VOC, Walburg Pers, Zutphen , 6th imprint 2002
2. e.g. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2116137 and http://ssrn.com/abstract=2223905; http://ssrn.com/
abstract=874406 ; some points from the papers referred to I used here.
3. for an English version see http://www.australiaonthemap.org.au/voc-charter
4. Johan van Oldenbarnevelt-Bescheiden 1610-1612 p320
5. see http://gutenberg.net.au/VOC.html

Previously published in “map Matters”, newsletter of Australia on the map, a Division of the Australasian Hydrographic Society.

Isaac Titsingh
The Scholar Trader of the VOC.
by Monica de Knecht Member & supporter of the VOCHS.
Isaac Titsingh was a Dutch scholar, merchant-trader and ambassador. He is actually the only known Dutch trader that was a philosopher. He had a very long career in East Asia and was a senior official of the VOC. Forging a stellar career in Japan and China, he was the VOC Governor-General in Chinsura, Bengal. His reception at the court of the Qing Qianlong Emperor stood in marked contrast to the Chinese snubbing of the snooty British diplomat George Macartney. He was an ambassador for his country and at the same time a trade representative.
EARLY LIFE Isaac Titsingh was born in Amsterdam, the son of Albertus Titsingh and his second wife Catharina Bittner. He was baptised at the Amstelkerk in Amsterdam on 21st January 1745, not long after his birth. His father was a very successful and prominent Amsterdam surgeon and was brought up in the ‘age of Enlightenment’ of the 18th century. Titsingh was a member of the Amsterdam Chirurgijngilde (Surgeon’s Guild) and also received a Doctorate of Law from Leiden University at 20 years old, in January 1765 In 1764, he was appointed as a freeman and in 1766 went within his employment to Batavia. A very clever ‘cookie’ indeed.
OPPERHOOFD Titsingh was the commercial opperhoofd (or top guy) in Japan from 1779 to 1780, from 1781 to 1783 and again in 1784. To be head of the VOC in Japan was singularly important because of the policy of Sakoku, the self imposed isolation of Japan during the Tokugawa Sh**unates that lasted from 1633 to 1853, when the Meiji Restoration of the Emperor began and the power of the Sh**unates was permanently extinguished. During the Sakoku, no European or Japanese could enter or leave the Japanese archipelago on penalty of death. It is well known that the VOC trading post on the island of Dejima in Nagasaki Bay was the sole exception. During this period of seclusion, Isaac Titsingh is also believed to have been the first Freemason in Japan. The VOC opperhoofd was accorded the status of a tributary of the sh**un. Therefore Titsingh twice had to pay an obligatory annual visit of homage to the Sh**un in Edo. He was also allowed the singular opportunity of meeting with bakufu officials of Rangaku scholars in Edo. This was rarely accorded to any westerner or foreigner, so these audiences, historically, may be as important as his formal audiences with the sh**un Tokugawa Ieharu
TITSINGH AND THE CULTURE OF THE JAPANESE. Although during the 18th century, there was a vast improvement in the social position of the Dutch merchants and the treatment of the Dutch from the Japanese, the average opperhoofd was not interested in the customs or culture of the Japanese. Isaac was, in vastcontrast, incredibly interested. He certainly distinguished himself as an attentive observer of Japanese civilisation. Titsingh had taken over control of the Dutch factory from Arend Willem Feith on 15th August, 1779. Before his arrival, there had been constant fights over trade issues and a deep hostility towards the Japanese interpreter, who seemed in trade issues negative towards to the Dutch traders. The new opperhoofd met a lot of Japanese daimyo (vassal lords of the sh**un), with whom he later established vivid letter
correspondence; becoming increasingly prominent within the elite society of Edo and became friends with several current and retired daimyo of the area.
HIS INTEREST IN JAPANESE CULTURE ENABLED HIM TO FURTHER DUTCH TRADE. Titsingh returned to Nagasaki, after a short return to Batavia, in August 1781. The VOC were anxious for him to continue his positive and buoyant trade talks with the Japanese. In 1782 there were no Dutch shipments from Batavia due to the Fourth Anglo Dutch War, cutting the trading post in Dejima off from any communication with Java that year. In this year Titsingh concerned himself with more befriending of the Japanese scholars and researching on all scopes of Japanese customs and culture. He also achieved, due to the absence of Dutch shipping that year, important trade concessions from the Japanese on a long-debated increase to copper exports from Japan to the Dutch traders.
RETURN TO BATAVIA, AN INTERESTING MEETING WITH LORD MACARTNEY AND A SPELL IN INDIA Titsingh was three years and eight months in Japan, before finally leaving Nagasaki at the end of November 1784 and arriving in Batavia on 3rd January, 1785.. He was given new positions as Ontvanger-Generaal (Treasurer) and later as Commissaris ter Zee (Maritime Commissioner).
While in Batavia, he met with Lord George Macartney, who was en route to China and discouraged the Earl from venturing to Japan. Macartney’s report to London explained why he had decided to abandon his trade trip to Japan.

……. from the conversations I had at Batavia with a Dutch gentleman of a very liberal disposition, who was several years resident in Japan, Isaac Titsingh, I collected nothing that could induce me to depend on a favourable reception there

After this the VOC appointed him Director of the Trading post in Chinsurah in Bengal. While he was there he greatly interested Sir William Jones, an Anglo-Welsh philogist (one who studies ancient texts and literature). Sir William was also a judge on the Supreme Court at Fort William in Bengal. He described Isaac Titsingh as ‘the Mandarin of Chinsura”.
ISAAC IN CHINA 1794 – 1795 Titsingh was appointed Dutch ambassador to the court of the Emperor of China for the celebrations of the sixtieth anniversary of the reign of the Qianlong Emperor. He received a vastly different reception than the one accorded to Lord Macartney in 1793. The main reason was the supercilious Lord’s absolute refusal to kow tow to the Emperor. He would not grovel on the floor in the humbling way of the kow tow. He grandly condescended to just kneel before the Emperor, not the obeisance that the Chinese Emperor demanded. (Afterwards the Emperor wrote a letter to King George lll stating that ‘the Chinese and the British Way of life is different so he was not interested in developing a trade relationship between the two powers.) The Dutch would do whatever it took to forge trade with anyone. The English got on ‘their high horse’ and refused to humble themselves for anyone, especially an English Lord. The English should have learned not to send Lords on trade missions.
AMBASSADOR TO THE COURT OF THE QIANLONG EMPEROR. The Titsingh delegation to the Chinese court included Andreas Everardus van Braam Houckgeest and Chrétien-Louis-Joseph de Guignes, whose complementary accounts of this embassy to the Chinese Court were published in the US and Europe
Because of the Dutch readiness to humble themselves by kowtowing, Ambassador Titsingh and trade comrades were received with uncommon respect and honours in the Forbidden City and later in the Yuanmingyuan (the old Summer Palace).
DECLINE OF THE VEREENIGDE OOST-INDISCHE COMPAGNIE During the French Revolution, the Dutch East India Company, already in decline, was nationalised by the new Batavian Republic. In that year, Titsingh returned to Europe. For a few years, he lived in Britain at London and Bath and was a member of the Royal Society. In 1801, he went back to Amsterdam and thence to Paris, where he lived until his death on 2nd February 1812. He is buried in Père Lachaise Cemetery. His gravestone reads: “Ici repose Isaac Titsingh, Ancien conseiller des Indes hollandaises, Ambassadeur à la Chine et au Japon. Mort à Paris le 2 février 1812, agé de 68 ans." (Here lies Isaac Titsingh formerly a councillor of the Dutch East India Company, Ambassador to China and to Japan. Died at Paris the 2nd of February, 1812, aged 68 years.
LEGACY Isaac Titsingh had a son, Willem, born about 1790 from Titsingh’s Bengali mistress. He took his son to Europe in 1800 so that he could be recognised as legitimate. When Titsingh moved to Paris, Willem came with with him and attended the French Maritime Academy, graduating in 1810.
He can be described as the only philosopher employed by the VOC in its almost two hundred years existence and the most sophisticated of all VOC employees in the trading post history of the VOC in Japan. (1600 – 1853). He was able to write on religious as well as humanitarian topics. He is really the only true philosopher of the 18th century. Compared to other VOC employees, he was a polyglot, who spoke eight languages; Dutch, Latin, French, English, German, Portuguese, Japanese and Chinese. His eagerness to introduce the European society to Japanese customs and culture was intensely entrenched in his absolute passion for Japan and everything Japanese, above all other orientals he had encountered.
On his departure from Japan as outgoing opperhoofd, he recommended to his masters that his successors should be chosen from among men who “as well as possessing commercial ability should also have knowledge of the arts and sciences’ He imported Dutch books on European knowledge to Japan. In addition, he collected authentic source materials on Japan, which consisted of the first ever European collection on Japan, entailing printed books, manuscripts, prints, maps, city plans and coins. This collection was to form the basis of a then unique history of Japan.
Because of his great learning and willingness to, in turn, learn from the scholars of Japan, he also impressed them to such an extent that trade with them literally poured into his hands. He was an absolute treasure for the VOC and it is, in some ways, saddening that he lived to see its end and therefore was not able to be honoured by his own countrymen at his demise and buried with other notable contributors to the VOC trade in his own land.
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

Wikipedia, Encyclopaedia Britannica and the following books in
END NOTES
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Nussbaum, Louis-Frederic, (2005), “Isaak Titsingh” in Japan Encylopaedia, P. 966, Google Books.
Boxer, C.R. (1950) Jan Compagnie in Japan 1600 – 1850, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, P. 135
Far East Lodge No. 1 “ A Brief History of Freemasonry in Japan”.
Edo-Tokyo Museum exhibition catalog (2000) A Very Unique Collection of Historical Significance. The Kapitan (the Dutch Chief) Collection from the Edo Period. The Dutch fascination with Japan.
Boxer, C.R. (1950), Jan Compagnie in Japan 1600 – 1850. The Hague Martinus Nijhoff, P. 142.
Ibid, P. 144
Ibid, P.145
Jones, William (1835) Memoirs of the life, writings and correspondence of Sir William Jones by Lord Teignmouth, London.
de Knecht, Monica, Bi-Monthly VOCHS newsletter “The Qianlong Emperor – A Tale of 2 Embassies.
Platt, Stephen R., “Imperial Twilight, the O***m War and the End of China’s Last Golden Age (NY, Knopt, 2018)
van Braam, An Authentic Account. Vol l (1798 English edition) pp. 283 – 284.
Platt, Stephen R. “Imperial Twilight, the O***m War and the End of China’s Last Golden Age, (NY Knopf, 2018.
The End of the VOC tanap.net/content/voc/organisation
Media related to the Grave of Titsingh Pere Lachaise, division 39 – courtesy Wikimedia commons.
Screech Timon, Secret Memoirs of the Sh**uns: Isaac Titsingh and Japan, pp. 56, 82.
Boxer, C.R., “Pallas and Mercury”, p. 155 of the Dutch Seaborne Empire, Hutchinson of London, 1972).