02/09/2026
🔥 Current Philosophy PhD Student Balint Bekefi Publishes Three Papers!
Our PhD student Balint Bekefi has already published two papers this year and a third one has been accepted for publication in "Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy".
👏 Congratulations Balint, we can't wait to see what you're working on next!
🌟 If you're thinking about joining us for an MA or PhD in Philosophy find out more about our programs at https://buff.ly/IVDFtVO
For more about the papers read below
In "No Ghost in the Machine: Doubting AI Ensoulment" (Faith and Philosophy), Balint develops objections to Brian Cutter's arguments regarding artificial general intelligence having a soul. Cutter's missing-integrity objection contends that functional human-likeness is insufficient for fitness for ensoulment. The system’s physical parts and functional capacities should also be difficult to decouple, but this isn’t true for AI systems ordinarily conceived. The mimicry objection argues that our knowledge of how AI systems are engineered de feats the justification for their ensoulment in a way that is disanalogous with aliens. The paper concludes that Cutter has not given us reason to increase our credence in AI ensoulment.
https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol42/iss1/7/
In "Traducian Dualism: A Comparative Defence" (Religious Studies), Balint defends the traducian answer to where the soul comes from – the unfashionable view that souls are passed on by the parents through procreation. The defence is comparative: the paper argues that traducianism’s two main alternatives – emergent and creationist dualism –endorse assumptions based on which an at least equally plausible traducian model can be constructed. Two of the three traducian models proposed turn out also to be versions of emergentism or creationism. After reconstructing traducianism based on its paradigmatic historical representatives, the paper develops the comparison first with emergentism, then with creationism. Finally, two objections to traducianism are considered. The objection from the origin of the first soul is argued to fail, but the objection from monozygotic twinning appears to hold some weight for those not already committed to life beginning at conception. Thus, traducianism’s plausibility is higher than usually thought, but it partly depends on one’s broader positions.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/traducian-dualism-a-comparative-defence/F6DFC73C094BC4B34EB5891E54366CAD
In "Dualism’s Animal Problem(s) Resolved (Ergo), forthcoming, Balint aims to resolve the argument that animals pose a problem for substance dualism by distinguishing its two aspects: the problem of diverse mental capacities and the problem of vagueness. With respect to the former, it is argued that the best dualist accounts of embodiment in the human case already imply that mental capacities correlate with neural complexity. The implication of vast unexercised capacities in lower animals can be avoided if we allow that minds or souls can differ in their capacities. With respect to the problem of vagueness, the paper points out that the vagueness of consciousness is contested, and defending it comes at the cost of precluding the identification of any particular instance of a borderline case. Therefore, there is no reason to think there are borderline conscious animals. Taken together, these responses aim to resolve dualism’s animal problem.
https://philpapers.org/rec/BKEDAP