The Russia Program at GW

09/07/2026

Join us on September 15 for a book talk with Sergei Chapnin on Religious Communities Under Pressure: The Russian Orthodox Church and the War in Ukraine.

Register here: https://shorturl.at/dqiQ8

Drawing on his new book, Chapnin will examine how Russia’s war against Ukraine has transformed the Russian Orthodox Church, intensified pressure on anti-war clergy and believers, and contributed to a broader crackdown on religious freedom across Russia.

📅 September 15, 11:30 am–12:30 pm
📍 Elliott School of International Affairs, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
1957 E St NW, Washington, DC

The discussion will explore the rise of Russian Christian nationalism, the relationship between religious authority and state power, and the future of Orthodox ethics and freedom of conscience.

06/03/2026

New from The Russia Program: Russia-Related Lobbying in U.S. Congressional Disclosures

Who actually lobbies in Washington on issues connected to Russia?

➡️ https://therussiaprogram.org/russia-related-lobbying-in-u.s.-congressional-disclosures/

A new study of Lobbying Disclosure Act filings shows that the answer is more complex than it may seem. The Russian state itself does not appear in LDA filings, but Russian state-affiliated companies—such as Gazprom, Sberbank, Gazprombank, Novatek, and others—do. At the same time, the majority of Russia-related lobbying in the United States has not been carried out by Russian-affiliated clients at all, but by U.S. companies and organizations.

Key findings:

— U.S. companies dominate Russia-related lobbying, both in the number of filings and in the scope of activity.

— Russian-affiliated clients have maintained a relatively limited but steady presence in LDA filings.

— Major shifts in U.S. policy toward Russia—Russia’s WTO accession, the granting and later suspension of normal trade relations, the introduction of sanctions after 2014, and the sweeping post-2022 sanctions regime—triggered spikes in lobbying activity by American companies.

— Nuclear fuel and uranium imports have remained one of the most important and contested Russia-related lobbying topics, with U.S. producers pushing for restrictions and utilities seeking continued access to Russian fuel.

The paper shows that registered lobbying has played only a limited role for the Russian state under Putin. But it also reveals how deeply Russia-related economic interests have been embedded in U.S. policy debates—and how much of this lobbying has been driven by American commercial actors responding to changes in trade, sanctions, and energy policy.

Read the full study: https://therussiaprogram.org/russia-related-lobbying-in-u.s.-congressional-disclosures

The Russia Program at The George Washington University is a data-driven analytical center dedicated to advancing evidence-based research on Russia’s society, politics, and economy

06/03/2026

Join us for an online conference launching the latest special issue of Demokratizatsiya, exploring the Global South’s evolving relationship with Russia after 2022. Moderated by Marlene Laruelle.

Register here: https://shorturl.at/LqAlt

04/21/2026

📝 We’ve published the full Digital Methods School tutorial series on YouTube.

The series covers AI and prompt engineering, text analysis, and methods for tracking narratives and bot networks on Telegram and VK.

It’s a great starting point for researchers working on Russia who want to incorporate digital methods into their work.

Watch here: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLl9oTlacstNU-AfZpLRHpiDPJ1LkC66zC

03/24/2026

📍 New research. How does the Kremlin decide which cultural initiatives deserve support — and which values that support should promote?

➡️ https://therussiaprogram.org/presidential-foundations

Our study shows that while the Presidential Grants Foundation has largely continued to prioritize social-service projects, the creation of the Presidential Foundation for Cultural Initiatives in 2021 changed the system in important ways: cultural funding expanded sharply, access widened to commercial organizations and individual entrepreneurs, and support became heavily concentrated among a relatively small circle of trusted recipients.

The result is not just more money for culture, but a more direct mechanism for promoting traditional values, patriotic narratives, and state-approved cultural content.

➡️ https://therussiaprogram.org/presidential-foundations

The Russia Program at The George Washington University is a data-driven analytical center dedicated to advancing evidence-based research on Russia’s society, politics, and economy

03/17/2026

Why does a failed revolt from 1825 still trouble the Kremlin?

Igor Torbakov traces how the Decembrists became a lasting symbol of moral resistance to autocracy—and why Putin’s regime now works to suppress that legacy while rehabilitating Nicholas I.

The Russia Program at The George Washington University is a data-driven analytical center dedicated to advancing evidence-based research on Russia’s society, politics, and economy

02/26/2026

📢 Join our digital methods training school! The next series of online trainings starts next week.

We provide hands-on training to turn digital traces into reliable empirical evidence—without requiring specialized technical skills.

The Digital Methods School advances the study of Russia and other semi-closed societies by equipping scholars and experts with accessible digital research methods.

02/10/2026

📍 How Returning Veterans Are Driving a Surge in Violent Crime in Russia

➡️ https://russiapost.info/society/war_comes_home

A new CEDAR study for The Russia Program finds that nearly 8,000 veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine have been convicted of civilian crimes since 2022 — a growing share of them for violence.

🔹 Scale: ~8,000 convictions linked to war participants since 2022; about 7,000 were veterans who had already returned home.

🔹 Rising yearly totals: roughly 350 cases identified in 2022, 2,500 in 2023, and 4,700+ in 2024 (2025 figures are incomplete so far).

🔹 Violence & domestic abuse: 900+ veterans prosecuted for violent crimes; 423+ victims killed (including fatal traffic cases). The dataset includes 52 domestic-violence cases targeting partners, children, and other relatives.

🔹 Disproportionate severity: veterans are prosecuted for murder/attempted murder 2.5× more often than men overall, and 2× more often for assaults causing grievous bodily harm.

🔹 Repeat offenders & pardons: at least 2,139 convicted veterans had prior convictions; 656 were pardoned by presidential decree after being recruited from jail to fight.

🔹 Leniency in courts: about one-third of veterans receive more lenient sentences than comparable civilians, often getting fines or labor penalties instead of prison.

The report also stresses these are minimum estimates: not all cases reach court, not all verdicts are published, and data from occupied territories is largely unavailable.

Read full analysis: https://russiapost.info/society/war_comes_home

01/08/2026

📍 New research. Trump’s Peacemaking Rhetoric: Hope, Polarization, and Disillusionment

➡️ https://therussiaprogram.org/trump_peacemaking

New research from The Russia Program shows that Donald Trump’s peacemaking rhetoric initially raised expectations of a swift end to the Russia–Ukraine war, but ultimately deepened polarization rather than advancing peace.

▪️ Early optimism was high: Before Trump took office, large majorities in both Russia and Ukraine believed peace depended on his intervention.

▪️ Expectations collapsed quickly when bold promises failed to produce tangible results.

▪️ Polarization increased: Russian public opinion shifted toward greater support for continuing the war, while Ukrainians became more committed to full territorial liberation and less open to compromise.

▪️ Trust in Trump as a mediator remained low, with many viewing him as biased or driven by U.S. interests.

▪️ Media framing mattered: Russian state media promoted selective visions of “peace,” reinforcing skepticism toward direct negotiations with Ukraine.

➡️ https://therussiaprogram.org/trump_peacemaking

Donald Trump’s peace rhetoric on the Russia–Ukraine war raised hopes for a quick settlement but ultimately fueled polarization and mistrust in both countries, as media narratives and public opinion hardened rather than moved toward compromise.

12/05/2025

🚨 New research. Outsourcing Social Policy, Controlling Civil Society: Russia’s Presidential Grants Fund

➡️ https://therussiaprogram.org/russias_presidential_grants_fund/

Russia’s Presidential Grants Fund has become the main source of NGO financing since 2017. It fills real social-service gaps and provides rapid crisis support, but it also centralizes state control over civil society.

Most funding goes to a small group of established NGOs, while new or independent groups rarely break through. As foreign funding has been restricted, PGF now shapes which projects — and which narratives — are allowed to thrive, often aligning with government priorities.

The result: a civil society that exists, but largely on the state’s terms.

Sergei Tikhonov and Ksenia Zinder