07/14/2024
Red Zones and The Trump Assassination Attempt
by Rick Sweeney
July 14, 2024
This is what we have been teaching for years and it is not invented curriculum because an incident that just happened, but solely to give some clarity on how we identify and deal with Red Zones.
My experience is 30-plus years working in high threat environments. A good majority of this work in the personal protection space. Myself and my team are currently on-the-ground in Lebanon to support clients here with risk mitigation, crisis management, and evacuation planning. Most of our work is in Latin America, the Middle East ,and Caribbean (particularly Haiti)
I was awoken at approximately 130am (Local Lebanon time) with messages coming into my phone about the assassination attempt. I looked over all of the open source intelligence, was relieved that Donald Trump was not more seriously injured, and saddened to find out that a rally attendee was shot and killed, and two were critically injured.
My initial instinct on any major incident such as this is to find out certain pieces of information that might be relevant to putting our own close protection plans together in the future.
1) Where did it happen? (Inside, Outside, Static, Mobile, are there any maps?)
2) Distances involved: Since protection at this level works in layers, which layer may have been exploited
3) Types of weapon(s) used
4) Was any deception used that put the assassin in position to strike?
5) What protective resources were on hand?
6) What can we learn from this?
Currently I am less interested in the who, the why, and the protective intelligence that may have lead to the wanna-be assassin. I will definitely be interested in these other factors later, but at 130am, these first 6 points listed above are on the top of my mind.
Once I received a cursory intel dump on the above points, the classes that I teach in our protective academy immediately came to mind. Any student that has been through our long-form protection academy will no doubt remember what I call a “Red Zone” and what significance it has in protective assignments.
Here’s how it works; When you are assigned a protectee (the person to be protected), you will do what is called a protective advance. This is multi-faceted threat-risk-vulnerability report designed to find vulnerabilities and put mitigations in place. This is everything from what to do in case of food poisoning, all they way to actions-on a car bomb detonating along your route. We will not go over the entire process, but will focus on just one part which brings us to Red Zones.
A Red Zone is any area around your principal (The protectee) that can be utilized for surveillance of, or to do harm to, your client(s). How I put this in class is that, this zone is conducive to Watch and Hit your principal. If somebody can Watch your client, this could be setting you up for a future hit. Or the hit could be happening now.
After the class about the finer points of Red Zones, we do a drill in class where the students are provided a satellite map of a “client” residence, and students pick out the red zones and potential mitigations around the house. This is reinforced throughout the course over a series of on-the-ground exercises where the students have to identify and mitigate red-zones during realistic advance missions and mock protective details.
Let’s get into some specifics. If you are tasked with protecting a principal, the depth in which you can set up threat & risk mitigation will be restricted by number of personnel, finances, and other resources available to you. If you are a two-person detail, you will not have the same protective capability as a 30-person Secret Service detail with law enforcement support. But, there are some things that are constant to all details.
Before most protective details, you will conduct a detailed “Advance” focusing on People, Places, and Problems among other things.
Several key elements regarding Places includes:
- Principal’s home(s) or Hotel/Off Site housing
- Principal’s office(s)
- Venues
- Routes to and from
The Trump assassination attempt took place at what we consider a “Venue”. There are many venue types (Speaking Engagements, Concerts, Sporting Events, Restaurants, Meeting locations, etc) This incident took place at a Speaking Engagement venue.
During the advance, we have to consider two specific elements, Client Type (Politician, Musical Artist, Business Executive) and Threat Environment. These two things will help dictate the types of threats and mitigations a protective team may put in place.
Here are some examples:
- Musician: Overzealous fans; Obsessive and Aggressive Fans; Pranks, Aggressive Photogs; Delusional individuals. History shows us that these attacks will typically happen within arm’s length
- Politicians; Assassination by rifle, handgun, IED, Assaults. History shows us that weapons up-to and including rifles and IEDs may be utilized to do harm
- Cross-Border Business Executive: Kidnapping, Robbery, Bribery/Extortion
The point of looking at the client types and threat environment helps the advance team focus on the most likely threats, risks, vulnerabilities and mitigations. If I am securing roof-tops across from a restaurant where a musician is having dinner before their concert in San Diego, California, would this be a waste of resources? We don’t ignore any potential risks to the client, but a rifle attack on a last-minute dinner reservation for an artist in San Diego is not a likely attack scenario we are going to dedicate resources to. In this case, we would utilize our resources in a way that would focus protective resources more on the issues listed next to Musician above.
A political client conducting an outdoor speaking engagement would provide a host of new protective challenges based on historical data. Rifles, Distance, and IEDs would definitely be considered during this advance. Now we may alter our protective plan to include, and maybe prioritize, certain potential risks to the client based on what history has shown us about this client type and threat environment. Unfortunately for political clients, all distances and attacker profiles have been utilized to attack in the past. Close and Far.
RED ZONES 101
I will forego the entire speaking-venue checklist and focus only on some key points we typically consider on a venue advance. Throughout the advance, you are looking for the Red Zones that would match the threats based on your client type and threat environment.
The Arrival
Drive/Walk through the entire arrival, The Drop, The Path, The Secure Place (Green room or staging area). Walking through what is supposed to happen is usually the first thing we will do. Looking for vulnerabilities along the way. What are the Red Zones?
When the vehicle arrives, where can “Unknowns” post to Watch or Hit our principal. When we identify these areas, we come up with a plan to “clean” and keep clean these areas. If we cannot keep these areas clean (void of unknowns) we need to put resources in place to mitigate the threat that this red-zone offers. Because we are mobile on arrival, we will look at other threats and mitigations that would be relevant to driving into a venue IE getting blocked in, IEDs, etc.
The Drop
Is this a secured drop. Is it clean? How close can unknowns get? What can unknowns see and what are the controls to make sure they are unarmed with no hazardous materials? We will walk through the exact drop location and quite simply look around. By walking through the same drop as your client, you will see where the problem areas are. If you can see it, they can see you. Maybe there was a 2nd story business office with windows looking down on the drop. What would you do to mitigate this? If you do not have the authority to “clean” that 2nd story office area, what else can you do? Park a large vehicle between the window red zone and your principals drop? Set up a tent or banners to minimize visual? Have an agent(s) dedicated to watching this Red Zone? This will all depend on your authority and resources available. Hopefully your initial advance is well before the actual scheduled event, so there is time for mitigations to be put in place.
The Path (from vehicle to secured area)
The same process is utilized while moving to the staging area. Maybe it is a better option to leave the principal in their armored vehicle, then right up to the stage, then back to armored vehicle on departure? Do we need to stack vetted venue security upon arrival to keep unknowns away from the drop point? We do a lot of small 2-3 person low-profile protective details in high threat areas and it is normal for us to utilize local vetted resources to put protective layers into place.
The Secured Area
Who has/had access? Are the perimeters vulnerable? (We had an unknown attempt to squeeze under a tent wall one on occasion) Can unknowns watch the comings and going of the Secured area? If so, what can we do to mitigate? How do we control the access and perimeter of the secured area? Parking a vehicle right outside the exterior gate that may be close to the Staging area may be considered to keep unknown vehicles or containers being placed here.
The Path (to stage)
Our personnel would already be checking for the closest “Unknowns” access to the path to the stage. Who has, and have had, access to the path (think IEDs etc) Plan to check the path before the walk to stage, and keep the Red Zones clean or monitored with response contingencies and good communications between the layers. Stage venue security if more support is needed for a move to the stage.
On Stage
This is the one of the most difficult places to secure due to the exposure. During advance we go onto the stage, in the exact position that our client will be positioned. Let the Red-zoning begin. We are looking at stage access, crowd control, and move our eyes out until we get to the perimeter of the venue. What are the physical check procedures and access to get into the venue? Here is where Client Type and Threat Environment come into play. If we have a musical artist in the states, I would not likely look outside of the venue perimeter to distant rooftops. My Red Zones for a Music client doing a concert would likely stop at the venue walls.
For a politician however, you may take historical data into considerations (See Client Types and Threat Environments). How have they hit this client-type in the past? What Red Zones should I consider now based on this knowledge? Would a raised group of buildings less than 150 yards away from the podium catch your attention? What would you do to mitigate this risk? This will likely depend on the resources you have available to you. Would you prioritize this potential threat? Would you post security at the of the buildings to prevent access. Would you post protective personnel on top of this building? How do you think you would prioritize this Red Zone?
Communication
One of the keys in effective layered-security is communication between the layers. If something is seen on one of the outer layers, immediate communication to the close protection team to cover and evacuate the client might be a life saver. Communication can also direct security personnel to check a Red Zone where monitoring agents see suspicious activity. All agencies and personnel on the net should have the same key terms and zone identification designators to make this happen.
War Stories
The early 2000s is when I first starting really thinking about these Red Zones. Two scenarios come to mind. First One: Working in Iraq, my mixed local/expat teams were protecting electrical engineers responsible for rebuilding the electric grid in Iraq. Our teams were small with little to no support other than what we could unofficially work out ourselves.
On one occasion we arrived in a 2-vehicle motorcade with 2 principals, to a remote site where several other principals and their protective teams were already there to supervise the building of the electrical towers. When I showed up, I saw the other protective teams whom I knew personally, and did my quick assessment. Starting close and moving out with my eyes to see what Red Zones I could identify, all looked pretty good except... Approximately 700 meters from our site was a local SUV sitting static on a knoll, in perfect position to watch our activities. I asked the other teams that were already on-site what the deal was with this SUV. Nobody had checked.
We came up with plan to send 2 of our locals agents with 1 vehicle we could sacrifice if a client exfil was needed while the Red Zone check was going on. The 2 locals drove off to check the suspicious SUV and the remainder of our vehicles were positioned to mitigate potential hostility from the unknown SUV. It turned out to be nothing. Do you consider this part of doing the your job? Was the Red Zone dealt with?
Second Red Zone story from another client living and working in the Middle East. Their residence, and ours, was not in a secured area. Apart from all of our site security procedures, we did our Red Zone checks daily. Approximately 1 block from our clients residence in a very typical local neighborhood, there was a multi-storied building that had once been under construction.
This building was just a hollow shell of maybe 10 floors propped up, but no walls. I had never seen any construction going on there the 18 months that we were there. Guess what our teams had to do every morning and most afternoons before movements….Right, they had to get eyes on these dark floors that could look down at the front of our residences.
Without going into too much detail, these Red Zones had to be cleaned often. I was not necessarily concerned with a sniper taking out a client, but I was aware of what a great surveillance point this was to watch our activities to set up a hit. On occasion, there were “Unknowns” in this building. Were they surveilling our principals? Maybe not, but if they were, they would have to tell their bosses that the jig was up. New surveillance points or new targets would have to be chosen, and we would keep changing things up and cleaning the Red Zones.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
A Red Zone is a point that they can watch you and hit you and your principal. These need to be picked out, examined, cleaned, blocked, mitigated, monitored with contingencies put into place. Start close and work your way out, utilizing client type and threat environment as your guide to types of threats.
TODAY IS YOUR DAY!
If you assume that this is the day your client will be hit, and all you need to do is find it and mitigate it….would this change how you provide security, advance work, Red Zone checks & cleaning of the same? I know it does for me.
Rick Sweeney
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