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Sorry guys I was just instated back on Facebook after being tagged for whatever. Doesn’t matter. Anyway I was allowed back so maybe we are in for better relations with this site. I’m adopting the attitude that we are. My only interest is to provide information that is educational and of interest to you and those like you. I look forward to get back to posting more interesting subjects and hopefully wake up interest in the subject of past aviation history. Thank you all for all the likes and following.

Many thanks to all of you that have taken the time to follow my page and like what you see. I apologize for not posting in some time, but I have been away and not in a position to do so. However I fully intend to get back on it. Found this book on an American Airlines accident I thought some of you might be interested in. I have not read it as of now but plan to soon. I am familiar with the accident and plan to order the book. Once again a sincere thank you to all of you for your kind support

On the night of October 17, 1937, at approximately 9.00 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, in mountainous terrain 51 miles east of Salt Lake City, Utah, and 20 miles south and slightly west of Knight, Wyoming a United Airlines DC3 carrying 16 passengers and three crew crashed at 10,000 feet into the side of Humpy Ridge. All crew and passengers excluding the Co-Pilot were thrown out in front of the aircraft due to the sudden stop and were killed instantly. The co-pilot remained in the cockpit but died as well.

United Trip 1 originated in Newark, New Jersey, at 8:00 A.M., Eastern Standard Time, October 17, 1937. Boarding the flight in Newark were two men associated with the Film/News company Pathe Gazette by the name of William H. Pitt and James Pergola. They were to document with press coverage, both print and video, as to the advances in air safety and travel cost to coast via modern airliners of the day. With its last stop before the accident, Trip 1 received a plane change along with a crew change as well, in Cheyenne, WY. The new aircraft was to be DC3 - NC16074 which had arrived in Cheyenne 15 hours earlier. The plane change was due to the late arrival of Trip 1 from the east into Cheyenne.

DC3 number NC16074 was one of the first DC3’s purchased by United Airlines from Douglas Aircraft Company in 1936. It was in -fact one of the first production aircraft of the newly designed DC3 line of airliners. This was due to American Airlines President CR Smith’s request from Douglas to build for his company a sleeper version of the then popular DC2. This would become the primary reason for the birth of perhaps the most iconic aircraft in airline history. By increasing the wingspan and width of the fuselage as well as numerous other engineering redesigns, the most beautiful aircraft in history was born. Because of Americans involvement it was CR Smith and his airline that would receive most of the first production aircraft.

As per American’s request the DC3 protype was built by Douglas in 1935 as (MSN # 1494) Registration X14988 and first flew on December 17, 1935. With completion of testing, it was delivered to American on July 11th, 1936, to become NC14988, ship number 115, the Flagship Texas. After six years of service with American their very first DC3 was sold to TWA in 1942 and later taken into the US Army inventory in March of 1943. It would crash on 15 October 1943 with lose of all abord at K**b Noster, Missouri near what is Whiteman AFB.

United’s first DC3-A purchase was (MSN # 1900- Registration Number NC16060) in December 1936 and operated till sold to Western Air Express in May of 1938. Unfortunately, this aircraft was lost in an accident on December 15,1942 while being flown by a totally inexperienced crew out of Salt Lake City. The Co-Pilot with extremely limited flight experience was in the captain’s seat and a tolly new and inexperienced Co-Pilot trainee was occupying the right seat. The captain with what I would deem limited experience himself was in the jump seat. You can read the accident report listed in the references at end of this presentation.

United sometime back was looking to purchase the oldest once owned by the company DC3 still in existence which is in the Michael King Smith Museum located at 500 NE Captain Michael King Smith Way, McMinnville Oregon, 97128. Mr. Smith, President/CEO of Evergreen International Airlines, which I flew for years back, was not willing to sell and has not to this day. So, it is still part of the museum. This aircraft is the 11th DC3 purchased by United as NC16070 just a few numbers ahead of NC16074, the accident aircraft. All previous aircraft United purchased were either destroyed or crashed while in service with United or other airlines. One of the few older remaining United DC3’s is NC16071 completed as the succeeding aircraft after NC16070 and today is displayed at a museum in Wroughton near Swindon, Wiltshire, England. It is the Science Museum at Wroughton.

Back to the accident now. The new crew was to be Captain Earl D. Woodgerd with Co-Pilot John B. Adams and rounding out the crew as stewardess was Miss Leah Derr. The scheduled time of departure of Trip One from Cheyenne was 6:01 P.M., Mountain Standard Time. However, the actual departure was not made until 6:26 P.M. due to the late arrival of this flight to Cheyenne and a slight passenger delay. Prior to the flight the weather reports were of no real concerns to the pilots and most of the flight was planed as a contact operation. This meant that for a portion of the flight would be visual flight (Contact) until after Rock Springs whereas a mix of Contact and Intermittent Instruments would be applied all the way to Salk Lake City.

From Cheyenne the flight was to travel direct to the fix Dana just west of Medicine Bow as you can see by the airway depicted on the 1937 sectional chart in the photo section. Most of these fixes and beacons were part of the old airmail navigation system from the 20’s but still in use in 1937. Radio navigation was adopted later over the original routes and the beacon lights were left in place. There are two maps shown. The first from Cheyenne to just shy of Rock Springs and the second from Rock Springs to Salt Lake. After leaving Cheyenne Trip 1 would report Dana followed by Cherokee and then Rock Springs radio beacon. After Rock Springs the flight would proceed direct to Knight Aux Field radio beacon than on the Salt Lake City. The captain would select an altitude of 10,000 feet for the trip. Remember the 10,000 feet altitude selection in the flight plan as it plays an important clue as to what I believe really happen later in the flight.

In the next paragraph is the written recorded Nav Log by Co-Pilot Adams on the flights progress. You can see from his compass courses he is more less using the forecast winds given in the weather information briefed to the pilots before departure. This however would all change as the flight moved westward and lead to deadly consequences. From the flight brief winds and visibility were reported as followed:

Rock Springs Winds WSW - 25 Knots - Visibility 25 Miles
Bitter Creek Winds WSW – 24 Knots – Visibility – 30 Miles
Knight Aux Field Winds SSW – 22 Knots – Visibility – 20 Miles
Salt Lake City Winds SW – 7 Knots – Visibility - 15

If you look at the weather as it happened that night with an approaching cold front and snowy conditions that interfered severely with radio navigation and the ability to positively fix their position, along with the recorded rough air from the aircraft data recorder in the final minutes of the flight, you will see what really took place. Winds were nowhere near what was forecast.

The weather recorded by co-pilot Adams on the flight log shows an ever-increasing deterioration in flight conditions as the DC-3 traveled west towards its destination of Salk Lake. Recorded were high thin broken clouds in the vicinity of Cheyenne, the departure point, with high thin scattered clouds in the vicinity of Two Rivers and a temperature of 38-degrees. High scattered clouds were recorded at check point Dana with lower broken clouds between 10,000 and 11,000 feet, high thin overcast at Cherokee east of Rock Springs with lower broken clouds at approximately 9,000 feet and temperature of 37 degree. Between Cherokee and Rock Springs, the flight passed through clouds with occasional breaks, light to moderate snow and just prior to reaching Rock Springs light rime ice and a temperature of 32 degree.

Just after passing Rock Springs, slightly rough air is shown. The occasional breaks in cloud cover apparently continued to a point approximately 20 miles east of Knight where the notation was made showing overcast, lower scattered clouds and snow static with air conditions rough. The last notations in the log coincide with the last recorded compass heading of 235 degrees and no further weather conditions were recorded. The cloud conditions encountered by Trip One between the last recorded position and the scene of the accident are unknown. It is apparent that with the information taken from First Officer Adams’s flight log, Trip 1 was traveling into worsening weather conditions with each mile flown westerly. With snow static this would have no doubt caused interference with the crew’s ability to navigate via radio signals to or from the Knight Aux Field Beacon and with the ship’s ever-closing distance to a cold front and winds becoming more northly, conditions would push the aircraft closer and closer to the high terrain south of Knight and to its ultimate demise.

There were two eyewitnesses camped along the flight path of Trip 1 that spotted the airliner traveling due west. The first was 12 miles south of Rock Springs and the second 20 miles farther west of this point. Both group of witnesses stated that through breaks in the cloud cover they were able to see the aircraft first at 8:15pm and the second group at 8:30 traveling due west. The CAB Board would later identify this aircraft as Trip 1 (NC16074).

The check points associated with the flight and recorded on the trip log were (1) Two Rivers (2) Dana (3) Cherokee (4) Rock Springs and then (6) Knight Aux Field. Afterword’s a direct track along the beam from Knight to Salt Lake City would have completed the trip. I have never located the Two Rivers fix however you will note that the flight must have followed Cheyenne’s radio beam (281-degrees) direct to Dana then picking up the 248-degree track transmitted from Medicine Bow to Rock Springs. Leaving Rock Springs, a track of 231-degrees would take them directly to Knight Aux Field beacon which was their last required reporting point prior to Salk Lake City. This was to never happen as snow falling in and around the area of Knight as well as the crash site, caused such static in the atmosphere the crew could in no way use the radio beams for tracking the correct path.

A pilot lost at night in bad weather is bad enough in itself, but to have this happen in a mountainous area as dangerous as the one Trip 1 traversed could only end in disaster. I have flown this area many times and if Captain Woodgerd had climbed his ship above 12,000 feet he would have just made it into Salk Lake City. A pilot with his experience I think would have done just that. He knew the area well. After all he had flown the route many times. Could it have been he experienced icing that would not allow the aircraft to climb. The accident report makes no mention of this or any other factor that would not allow the aircraft to climb.

I do not believe the crew attempted to climb and this is puzzling to say the least. Trip 1’s alternate was to return to Cheyenne if for any reason Salk Lake City was not favorable for landing. In accordance with the latest weather reports however the conditions between Knight Field and Salk Lake were at best troublesome to border line dangerous for this flight’s operation. I do not believe the crew attempted to climb, perhaps believing they were still east of Knight and would re-establish signal with the beacon very soon. Had Captain Woodgerd felt he was in any danger all he had to do was make a right turn and return to Cheyenne as per the flight plan’s alternate.

Trip 1’s last communication came at 8:18 P.M. when dispatch at Salt Lake informing the crew that they had heavy rain and icing reported by another airline (WAE) at an altitude of 10,500. At 8:19 United Trip 1 responded by requesting the latest altimeter setting. Salk Lake responded with altimeter rising rapidly at 29.86 inches. Wind has shifted from the north about 45 minutes ago. With the rising altimeter and shift in the wind this would have indicated that the cold front approaching Salt Lake had passed and was now much closer to the accident site of Trip 1. One of the most puzzling factors in the flight was the fact that from 8:19 P.M. till the time of the crash at around 9:00 P.M., no communication was sent to or received from the aircraft. I doubt the crew had re-established reception from the beacon at Knight and certainly not Salk Lake City beacon as their altitude was far too low to receive such a signal. If so, they would obviously know they were way off course and in danger of striking a mountain at any time. The crew just motored along without a peep for some 41 minutes till impact with the ridge line at 9:00 P.M.

Was Woodgerd confident he could navigate through the mountains blind as he was or was there an underlining reason that forced the crew to push on in conditions most pilots would have bailed on. As an experienced pilot I do not understand what this crew was thinking. I know on several occasions myself along with other crewmembers have pushed on just to get the job done, sometimes with no good reasons and some just plain stupid, but never once did we force the issue without 100% confidence of a safe outcome. This is the greatest killer of the inexperience pilot, but Woodgerd had over 11,000 hours. Maybe Woodgerd had that 100% confidence, but for the life of me I just cannot see it.

Pilots learn and gain experience by years on the job and time in the seat. Mistakes are wonderful teaching tool as well. We call them fast learning techniques if you end up surviving them. I must say it is easy to second guess anyone for any reason, but this guy was a professional and knew what he was doing. Even his co-pilot John Adams was somewhat experienced with over 3,500 hours. We all learned faster back then, even into the 70’s before the advent of automation. Like Woodgerd and Adams you had to think for yourself and do it own your own back then. No color radar, GPWS or GPS, ADF, not even a VOR/DME and weather reporting that gave you the system and not a definitive answer as to what it was going to be like out there. You had to understand weather systems and figure it out for yourself. Hopefully, you had someone good in the weather and dispatch office, yourself, along with a good co-pilot to pull off a successful flight.

I love when the CAB says that the weather in this case did not pose a particular risk to the flight. I beg to differ. It played an extremely dangerous role in this flight. For one thing to approach a cold front without radar is something that would never be considered today in airline operations. The possibility of Icing and Snow Static and Turbulence in mountainous areas can and does wreak havoc to navigational abilities as well as communications, coupled with extreme control issues which can simply cause these older aircraft to simply go out of control. Flight instrumentation back then was nothing like what we have today. So was it a dangerous flight, you bet it was? Should it have been attempted? Maybe, but there is no question that the flight should have turned around and proceeded to the alternate at once when their navigation ability was lost, and position was uncertain. Sad thing about it was even though the flight had the option of turning around it would have still crashed due to a southerly wind drift. I believe on its track westward it passed no more than two or three miles north of Mt. Elizabeth, hovering 10,853 feet in height. With a turn back to Rock Springs the flight would encounter additional drift to the south and slammed into this high terrain at Mt. Elizabeth never sure of their position.

So, what really happen? If you look at the sectional chart from 1937 and the same chart from 2011 you will see the course from Rock Springs and Salt Lake is almost directly over Knight airport and the beacon location. Also, to the southeast of Knight by 10 miles is Mt. Elizabeth topping 10,000 feet in height. In order to reach the crash site United Trip 1 would have to have passed north of this location, because all around and south of this mountain is terrain well above the cruising altitude of NC16074. Also Flight 1 could not have flown a direct route to the crash site without slamming into the Mt. Elizabeth so its selected heading was more less correct in the initial portion of the leg departing Rock Springs. This illustrated that Co-Pilot Adams was correct in his navigation and logs leaving Rock Springs. It was not until the plane came closer to the approaching cold front that things begin to go wrong.

It was at a point 30 to 40 miles east of Knight that the flight would encounter strong northwest winds causing a southerly drift towards higher terrain. I believe this wind steadily increased as they progressed westwardly to as high as 35 to 45 knots or stronger out of the northwest. Afterall the front passed Knight 20 minutes before the crash. At 30 miles east of Knight Trip 1 would have to apply some 10+ degrees to the right to stop the drift southerly. This was never done.

With no reception from Knight’s Navigational Beacon the crew would have no idea they were drifting dangerously to the south, towards much higher terrain. This very terrain would also block any hope of receiving a signal from the beacon at Salt Lake City. When the crash was found and examined both navigation radios were tuned to the Knight Radio Beacon showing that the crew was desperately trying to establish contact with Knights Nav Beacon.
So did the crew know about the strong cold front moving rapidly southeast. I do not believe they did or if they did the true importance of it was misunderstood. In the report completed by the CAB it shows that one of the 55 minutes after the hour weather updates was missing from, I believe Rock Springs Radio. Only local weather in the immediate area of this station was reported. Woodgerd would have not received critical information on weather conditions he was entering.

Was Captain Woodgerd negligent in his continuing flight with no signal to fix his position. Maybe so but he knew the old navigation system in this area better than I. Perhaps he knew or expected to pick up a signal from Knight soon and proceed on the Salt Lake. Also, if you look at the 1937 map from Knight to Salt Lake you will see terrain is no higher that slightly over 9,000 and there is a lighted beacon route just to the southwest of Knight leading to Salt Lake with lowering terrain. He might have been hoping to find this route. I honestly believe this crew did not anticipate the effect on track associated with this cold front. Woodgerd may not have climbed because he was looking for the lighted beacon route.
So, who is at fault? Well, the crew is in my opinion not completely or solely responsible for what happen but having said this you have to look at the times. Navigation was not anywhere near what it is today and maybe flights into hazardous areas like this should have never been attempted giving the weather conditions that night. After all, would a stay in Cheyenne overnight have hurt anyone? I doubt it. I do fault the crew directly for not climbing to an altitude that would have safely crossed the terrain, at least until a positive location could be identified. The mountains around Salt Lake City and Ogden UT have been collecting airplanes for years. Many of them from the early days of airline travel.

Below are interesting web pages where you can learn more about this accident and others. I advise you go through all the photos as they contain a lot of information not covered here. I am no professional writer, but I am a professional pilot that has flown over 22,000 hours in just about everything from small single engine aircraft to large corporate jets (Challenger 604’s - Gulfstream II / III) and aircraft like the Boeing 747 100/200 for the airlines. Was an Army helicopter for 10 years as well. So, I know a little bit about aviation. I do this for educational purposes and to expand others knowledge about something they might otherwise have never known. Hope you enjoy the site. Please like and follow.

Find below 1937 Sectional Charts showing the route flown by United Trip 1 on the night of October 17, 1937. Please give the site time to open the charts as it may take a minute or two.

1937 Cheyenne WY Chart:
https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3701pm.gct00089/?sp=1221&r=0.433,0.177,0.125,0.077,0

1937 Salt Lake City, UT Chart:
https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3701pm.gct00089/?sp=5321&r=0.107,-0.006,0.772,0.474,0

DOT Special Liberty of Aviation Accidents for United NC16074 Trip One. Accident Report (You may have to type in the date of the crash 10-17-1937 as well as the State UT and Carrier United):

https://dotlibrary.specialcollection.net/Document?db=DOT-AIRPLANEACCIDENTS&query=(select+10+(byhits+(general+(anyof+United+Trip+One+%601937))))
You will have to copy and past to address line to go directly to the accident report. You cannot simply click on this link.

Knight Aux Field Location. Ramp Location and Google Maps Address:
41.12852 - 110.873358
https://www.google.com/maps/place/41%C2%B007'29.5%22N+110%C2%B052'24.1%22W/@41.124856,-110.8755467,842m/data=!3m2!1e3!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x0:0x0!8m2!3d41.124852!4d-110.873358

NC 16074 - United Trip 1: Crash Site Location:
N40.51.43 – W111.00.06

Lost Flights Report on this Crash. Great Site Please Visit:
https://www.lostflights.com/
https://www.lostflights.com/Commercial-Aviation/101737-United-Air-Lines/

Accident Report for United’s First Acquired DC-3 which was Sold to Western Air Express in May of 1938.
https://dotlibrary.specialcollection.net/Document?db=DOT-AIRPLANEACCIDENTS&query=(select+0+(byhits+(andf+(eq+ACCIDENT_DATE+%601942%2F12%2F15)+(field+CARRIER+(anyof+Western+Air+Express)))))

Video of Crash in 1937.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Ngqjt-aIEqM

Dana Nav Station Today. Arrow Pointing to Medicine Bow. Airfield is now gone.
41°49'01.4"N 106°40'36.3"W
https://www.google.com/maps/place/41%C2%B049'01.4%22N+106%C2%B040'36.3%22W/@41.8170715,-106.6778661,391m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x0:0x0!8m2!3d41.8170556!4d-106.67675?hl=en

Medicine Bow Airport and Beacon Light Today.
https://www.google.com/maps/place/41%C2%B053'13.6%22N+106%C2%B011'23.7%22W/@41.8890418,-106.1903069,1859m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x0:0x0!8m2!3d41.8871111!4d-106.1899167?hl=en

Site with Old Routing and Beacon Locations Used in 1937 by Airmail Pilots and later Airlines Like Trip 1.
https://www.dreamsmithphotos.com/arrow/airmail_routes/route_11_20/18/cam_18_sl_o.html

DC3 Production List:
https://rzjets.net/aircraft/?page=1&typeid=275
Douglas Production List Part 01 (abcdlist.nl)

Restoration Project of a Beacon Facility in New Mexico
The Western New Mexico Aviation Heritage Museum
https://web.archive.org/web/20130930053323/http://www.cibolahistory.org/aviation-heritage-museum.html

Interesting Site on 1930’s Beacon Locations:
http://thesurveystation.com/map-of-ngs-airway-beacons/

Thanks so much for taking the time to stop by and look through my pages. Just writing here about things I have seen and know of from the past. I have had a 40+ yearlong piloting career flying with some of the most incredible pilots ever to take to the skies. Where can you fly with the Son-In-Law of the man who helped create and write the series Sky King as well as many other great aviation radio and television shows of the 30’s and 40’s. From beginning on the Cessna aircraft as a kid, to the US Army and 10 years of helicopter operations, then on to private corporate aircraft and later the airlines as a Boeing 747 pilot, I flew so many hours and had some great experiences. In many ways yes, an adventure. If you have a story idea or just something aviation related, maybe a father or relative that was a pilot and think others might be interested in and would like to have it posted here, please email or give me a call. If you would like to contact me and you are overseas, I have added a WhatsApp button for easy calling via your smart phone. This page is just for fun and is not a commercial advertisement in any way. Please share and comment as well and like and follow the page if this kind of thing interest you. Thanks again for participating.

This December 28th, 2021 will mark the 73rd anniversary of the disappearance of Airborne Transport, Inc. DC-3 on a charted flight from San Juan, Porta Rica to Miami International Airport. Folk lore has it that the flight simply vanished within sight of Miami while preparing for arrival and landing at the South Florida airport. Aboard the DC-3 were 29 passengers on a Christmas Vacation Tour and 3 crew members consisting of Captain Robert Linquist, Co-Pilot E.E. Hill, and Stewardess Mary Burke.
Well known writers on the subject of the Bermuda Triangle have told the story for years that Captain Linquist contacted Miami Tower not more than 15 minutes from arriving and in sight of the city, then simply vanished into thin air. No trace of the airplane or its occupants have ever been found, even though the area in which the plane should have gone down is shallow and mostly clear water allowing the bottom to be seen. Most of this is not even close to the truth.
Fact is the position report given by Captain Linquist was that his location at 4:13 am was approximately 50 miles south of Miami and did not state that he was able to see anything of the city or South Florida. This position report transmitted to Miami was more of a guess than a verified location. It was really based on the old Time-Distance-Heading method of navigation used for years. The report itself was never heard in Miami Center or the airfield Control Tower but received by New Orleans Center who acknowledged the transmission. The DC-3 did not reply to New Orleans at any time thereafter. I believe the fact is that Captain Linquist and his Co-Pilot Hill were flying blind for the past several hours due to battery charging problems and were unable to transmit or receive further due to total power failure.
Dead Reckoning is a form of navigation, although mostly accurate, required up to date information on wind conditions which this crew did not have. While flying over land a pilot can update the wind effect on his craft by using known locations as seen on the ground. This flight was at night over water and in part enveloped in cloud cover with no ability of correcting for wind effect. Using the Dead Reckoning Method (Time-Distance-Heading) over a long distance without updated wind information could allow one to drift off course several miles. To give you an example of this just in heading alone, the computed distance off course of even a small inaccuracy, say five degrees, would equate to a five-mile error in just 60 miles of forward travel.
So, what really happen? Why did a plane the size of the DC-3 simply disappear so close to its destination without a distress call or trace of visible evidence to be found? For several reasons. Number one being is that it was never 50 miles south of Miami and secondly is the fact that its ship batteries were more than likely dead by the end of Captains Linguist transmission of his last position report at 4:13 am. This report had drained the last of the power from the already depleted batteries. This is the reason he never heard or answered back to New Orleans Center.
I believed Linquist had turned his batteries off early in the flight to conserve what power he had remaining and did not turn them on until time to report his position for the Turks and Caicos Islands which was made 30 minutes south of the Islands at 11:32 pm and again at 4:13 am to make his final 50 mile south of Miami report. If you look closely at the Turks and Caicos report, you can see there were serious problems already happening with the ships batteries and the flight was some 700 miles from Miami at this time. I believe that due to this He and Hill had been in effect flying blind for hours and would continue from this point forward. Given the distance required to reach Miami and flying without any ad to navigation as I suspect Linquist with even a small error of 5 degrees would have placed him 58 miles southwest of his believed position when he made his report at 4:13 am 50 south of Miami. Why he made the decision to leave Puerto Rico with battery and charging problems I do not know. With this kind of issue most any pilot would consider it to be an extremely serious condition and a grounding maintenance issue.
OK so what happen and where is the plane. If you look at the search area that was covered by the Coast Guard, Air Force, Navy, Cuban Government as well as Nassau and many private planes from Charleston SC to Cuba, the Gulf of Mexico and along the preposed flight path all the way to Porta Rico not one thing was found. NOTHING!!! So, I am not going to write everything here that is in the CAB Accident Report but give you the web pages to find and read it yourself.
CAB Report Links:
https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/33355
https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/33355/dot_33355_DS1.pdf
So, I ask where is the plane and why has it never been found. Read the report and comment on where you think it might be? I’ll give you my ideas and what I think happen. I have been a pilot for 45 years now and have flown this kind of aircraft before along with many turboprops and jets alike. First, I would never start a trip in a DC-3 or any other kinds of aircraft over water at night in any weather conditions with an electrical problem. It is my opinion that the Captain flew himself, crew and passengers into a trap and were lost before they ever left the ground.
If you read the report, you will see the winds changed from a westerly direction to an easterly one on the last 1/3 of the trip. The pilots were unaware of this and if he did not compensate for this change, he would in my opinion be some 50 to 100 miles southwest of Miami when he made his last report. His continued flight would have taken him across the island chain of the Florida Keys somewhere between Duck Key and Marathon. Back in 1948 there was little down in that area so at that time of night he might not see any lights from the ground. Remember he also had a scattered layer of cloud cover at around 2,500 feet, which he would still be above.
Another factor for the pilots not spotting land is the fact that on that night there was little to no moon illumination. A possible 5% at best. If they were using flashlights to see instrumentation due to electrical failure this would contribute to not seeing outside the cockpit effectively. If you cross Marathon and continue you would end up somewhere north and west of Marco Island to as far north as maybe Sarasota before your fuel would be expended. That’s if you were able to keep the plane in the air for that period of time, you would still be 40 to 50 miles offshore and in 1948 you would see nothing of the city lights.
Another serious problem Linquist and Hill faced was having enough light to see the basic flight instruments. Almost certain use the flashlights in the cockpit would be a necessity. If these lights failed due to drained batteries, and with the lack of outside references as to the attitude of the aircraft they could have spun into the Gulf out of control. Even if Linquist attempted a water landing at night without lights which he would not have had, he stood no chance of making it successfully.
I do not believe the aircraft crashed east of Florida and if it did it will never be found. Water levels just a few miles off Miami go from 2,000 to over 6,500 feet and the fast-moving Gulfstream would sweep away any object sinking in that area. However, I believe the flight continued over Marathon and flew North West into the Gulf of Mexico. I believe it went down 40 to 60 miles offshore somewhere between Marco Island and Sarasota Florida.
The water in this area is over what is known as the West Florida Shelf and ranges in depth from 200 to a little over 600 feet. This is well within the diving range of professional divers so maybe one day she will be found.
One last thing is that in researching this accident I could find little in the way of photos of the aircraft and none of the crew and passengers. The DC-3 involved in this crash was one of the first DST aircraft built by Douglas for American airlines. Matter of fact it was the 3rd production aircraft off the line, and this was before the DST was to become the DC-3. If you investigate the history of the DST and the DC-3 you will find that CR Smith requested from Douglas to build such an aircraft for American for which he was the CEO at the time. Luckily, NC-16002 was in the movie “Fly Away Baby”, the 1937 Crime and Mystery Film and this is where I found photos of the aircraft in American’s paint livery some 10 years before the accident.
Read the accident report issued by the CAB and comment on your thoughts. Would be interested in seeing what you guys come up with. I am going to say the aircraft is 55 miles WSW of Venice Florida in, believe it or not, less than 100 feet of water. I hope one day she can be found.