Dawn Editorial With Meanings

An unsettled world in 2026
THE world faces heightened (بڑھی ہوئی) uncertainty (غیر یقینی صورتحال) in 2026 as geopolitical (جغرافیائی سیاسی) and geo-economic (معاشی و جغرافیائی) tensions (کشیدگیاں) intensify (تیز ہونا) and conflicts persist (جاری رہنا).

With the world appearing more unsettled (غیر مستحکم) than at any time since the end of the Cold War, President Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ unilateralism (یک طرفہ پالیسی) will inject more instability (غیر استحکامی) into global affairs. The rules-based order, in precipitous (تیز اور خطرناک) decline (زوال), will fragment (ٹکڑے ہونا) further. Multilateralism (کثیرالجہتی نظام) will come under greater stress. Western dominance (غلبہ) will decline even though the US-led West will continue to exert significant influence (اثر و رسوخ) in the international system. China’s global power and role will increase. Volatility (غیر یقینی اتار چڑھاؤ) will be a pronounced (نمایاں) feature of the fractured (ٹوٹا ہوا) international landscape. A more multipolar (کثیر قطبی) world will see middle powers play a growing role in shaping geopolitics and acting assertively (جرات مندی سے).

Six major trends will shape world affairs in the coming year, although this of course is not an exhaustive (مکمل) list.
The first is a shifting geopolitical landscape with changing alignments (اتحاد), eroding (کمزور ہونا) rules and a high degree of unpredictability (غیر پیش گوئی). Geopolitical shifts will principally (بنیادی طور پر) be determined by how the situation evolves (ترقی کرنا/بدلنا) in the Middle East and Ukraine, the course of US-China relations and adjustments (تبدیلیاں) countries make in response to the trade war unleashed (چھوڑ دینا/شروع کرنا) by Trump.

With global norms being upended (الٹ پلٹ ہونا) by Trump’s disruptive (خلل ڈالنے والی) policies and other powers showing similar disregard (نظرانداز کرنا), the drift (بتدریج جھکاؤ) to what some call a ‘no-rules world’ (بے ضابطہ دنیا) will become more evident (واضح). In its assessment (جائزہ) of top risks for 2026, Control Risks, a London-based consultancy (مشاورتی) firm, forecasts (پیش گوئی کرتا ہے) a world in which established (قائم شدہ) rules will fade (مدھم ہونا) and even break down (ٹوٹ جانا). This will make international relationships more transactional (مفاداتی) and situational (حالات کے مطابق). Interests, it argues, will become the “new values”.

The second trend continuing into the coming year is greater use of hard power that characterised (خصوصیت ہونا) international politics in 2025. This is apparent (واضح) in military or economic coercion (دباؤ ڈالنا) rather than dialogue and diplomacy becoming the preferred policy choice of powerful countries and regional powers to bend other states to their will (اپنی مرضی پر مجبور کرنا).
The threat or the use of force in defiance (خلاف ورزی) of international law has become more frequent in this new era of conflict. Israel’s war on Gaza, attacks on Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, the Russian invasion (حملہ) of Ukraine, US bombardment (بمباری) of Iran and India’s military action against Pakistan all testify (ثابت کرنا) to the increasing use of force. It means a fraying (بکھرتا ہوا) global order will fragment further.

Trends point to heightened geopolitical tensions, persisting conflicts and fragmenting world order.

In its annual publication ‘The World Ahead’, The Economist poses the question whether the world is headed towards a new Cold War between blocs (گروہ) led by the US and China or will Trump’s deal-driven (معاہدہ پر مبنی) approach divide the world into American, Chinese and Russian “spheres of influence” (اثر و رسوخ کے حلقے) where each of them will decide the rules of the game (نظام کار) in their domain. It notes foreign policy experts are conflicted (متفق نہ ہونا) on this and there is little certainty (یقین) which of the two will materialise (حقیقت بننا).

Three, the course of relations between the US and China will be the most significant strategic dynamic (حیاتیاتی/اسٹریٹجک تبدیلی) in the year ahead as it has been in recent years. This remains the world’s most consequential (اہم ترین) relationship with far-reaching (دور رس) global impact. Trump’s tariff offensive (جارحانہ تجارتی حکمت عملی) against China set relations onto a turbulent (غیر مستحکم) course. Nevertheless (باوجود اس کے), Trump has repeatedly said he wants a deal with Beijing and he did reach a trade agreement with President Xi Jinping in their October 2025 meeting. But this only marks a temporary (عارضی) truce (جنگ بندی) in the trade war as the one-year sunset clause (مدت ختم ہونے کی شق) indicates difficult negotiations later next year. Other issues of discord (اختلاف) that drive tensions also remain unresolved (غیر حل شدہ).

China’s effective pushback (جوابی کارروائی) against US tariffs by using its leverage (اثر و رسوخ) on critical rare-earth minerals, on which it has a near-monopoly (تقریباً اجارہ داری), showed two things — that it can also inflict (پہنچانا) pain on America and is not hesitant (ہچکچانا) to flex its muscles (طاقت دکھانا).
China is set to emerge (ابھرنا) as the largest economy in 2026 and is already the largest trading partner of around 70 countries. Its global influence is therefore expected to grow especially as it projects (پیش کرنا) itself as a stable partner in contrast to Trump’s whimsical (غیر مستقل/من مانی) conduct. While both countries have a mutual (باہمی) interest to de-escalate (کشیدگی کم کرنا), 2026 will determine how durable (پائیدار) the temporary calm (سکون) in their relations will be.

Four, efforts for peace in the Middle East will continue to dominate (غالب رہنا) the international agenda. Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan, endorsed (منظور شدہ) by a UN Security Council resolution, hangs in the balance (غیر یقینی حالت میں) as obstacles (رکاوٹیں) to its implementation have yet to be surmounted (عبور کرنا). Hamas rejected the resolution on several counts (نقاط). Israeli violations (خلاف ورزیاں) of the ceasefire continue. So does its occupation (قبضہ) of over half of Gaza and violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.
In these circumstances, Hamas will not disarm (اسلحہ چھوڑنا). Muslim countries that earlier indicated their intention to join the international stabilisation (استحکام) force are now getting cold feet (ہچکچانا) because of their reluctance (ناپسندیدگی/ہچکچاہٹ) to undertake Hamas’s disarmament. The fate (انجام) of the peace plan will be decided in 2026.
The coming year will also determine whether a US-Russia agreement can be forged (تشکیل دینا) to end the Ukraine war. For now, uncertainties (غیر یقینی صورتحال) abound (بہت زیادہ ہونا) on both fronts.

The fifth trend is the growing importance of middle powers. Structural changes and dispersal (تقسیم) of power in the international system have created a favourable (موافق) environment for middle power diplomatic activism (سفارتی سرگرمی) and for them to wield (استعمال کرنا) influence.
US-China competition has offered opportunities and leeway (گنجائش) to countries to increase their leverage by playing off (ایک کو دوسرے کے خلاف استعمال کرنا) that rivalry and strengthen their bargaining power.
The reinforcement (مزید مضبوطی) of this trend in 2026 will oblige (مجبور کرنا) the two global superpowers to spend more diplomatic capital (سفارتی توانائی/وسائل) to engage middle power countries.

The sixth trend is fast-paced (تیز رفتار) advances in AI but with rising concerns about its unintended (غیر ارادی) adverse (منفی) consequences.
AI-powered tools in business, workplaces, entertainment, media and healthcare have transformed (بدل دینا) the way we live, learn and work.
But among areas of concern are its impact on jobs and risks for cybersecurity (سائبر سیکیورٹی). The military uses of AI also pose (پیش کرنا) a challenge. There is also the question that is being widely raised and debated about whether the AI boom, fuelled (چلایا گیا) by heavy investments in infrastructure, will burst (پھٹ جانا/ختم ہو جانا).

The year ahead offers an unsettled (غیر مستحکم) global outlook. Geopolitical tensions, superpower rivalry, continuing conflicts and pressures on the global economy mean the world will continue to be in an unpredictable (غیر یقینی) and unstable (غیر مستحکم) state.

THE fragile (کمزور) ceasefire (فائر بندی) between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been tested yet again, this time with an exchange (تبادلہ) of fire along the Afghan border in Balochistan. Hostilities (دشمنی/جھڑپیں) began late on Friday, with officials saying the Afghan side had resorted to “unprovoked (بلا جواز) firing”. The Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, accuse Pakistan of instigating the hostilities (جھڑپیں شروع کرنے کا الزام دینا) at Spin Boldak.

Though the exchange ended, it illustrates (واضح کرتا ہے) that without a permanent mechanism (مستقل نظام) between both sides, flare-ups (اچانک جھڑپیں) can occur at any time, with the potential (امکان) of evolving (بڑھ کر بن جانا) into larger confrontations (ٹکراؤ). Kabul had also accused Pakistan of conducting strikes in November — an accusation (الزام) the government has denied. A ceasefire was signed in October following mediation (ثالثی) by Qatar and Turkiye after heavy fighting between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Perhaps one of the reasons that limited outbreaks (چھوٹے پیمانے پر واقعات) of violence continue is that the negotiation (مذاکرات) process appears to be stalled (رکا ہوا). Turkish negotiators (مذاکرات کرنے والے) were due to arrive in Islamabad, but the visit has not materialised (عملی شکل اختیار نہ کرنا). As per the Foreign Office, “perhaps a lack of cooperation (تعاون کی کمی)” from the Taliban is behind the delay. Pakistani and Afghan officials also met recently in Riyadh, but that process also seems to have stalled without producing any results. However, friendly states should continue their mediation efforts, and both Islamabad and Kabul should participate fully in these endeavours (کوششیں) in order to arrive at a peaceful solution to the bilateral (دو طرفہ) impasse (بن بست). The alternative — continued hostilities — is in neither country’s interest.

Yet the key sticking point (اہم رکاوٹ) remains the Taliban’s refusal (انکار) to act against terrorists based on Afghan soil, and in particular not attempting to stop them from conducting cross-border attacks. Pakistan has long been a victim (شکار) of terrorist groups such as the TTP and BLA based in Afghanistan. But as recent events have shown, the security (سلامتی) of other regional states has also come under threat due to the lax (غیر سنجیدہ/نرم) policies of the Afghan Taliban towards terrorist groups active in their country.

For example, a number of Chinese workers were killed in Tajikistan last month in attacks that originated (جڑیں) from Afghanistan. Dushanbe has condemned (مذمت کی) the “illegal (غیر قانونی) and provocative (اشتعال انگیز) actions of Afghan citizens”. As this paper has previously argued, Pakistan, along with Afghanistan’s other neighbours, needs to communicate in unambiguous terms (واضح الفاظ میں) the need for the Afghan Taliban to clamp down on (سختی سے روکنا) cross-border terrorism. If left unattended (بغیر دیکھ بھال کے چھوڑ دینا), the problem will grow, adding to insecurity across the entire region.

Afghan flare-up
For Pakistan, along with continuing the process of mediation facilitated (آسان بنایا گیا) by friendly states, there is also a need to remain vigilant (چوکس) at the border. Yet Islamabad’s decision to allow UN humanitarian (انسانی ہمدردی سے متعلق) supplies into Afghanistan needs to be welcomed. As the FO spokesperson noted, Pakistan intends (ارادہ رکھتا ہے) no harm to the Afghan people. Therefore, while remaining firm (مضبوط موقف رکھنا) on its demand for Kabul to end cross-border terrorism, Pakistan should continue to facilitate (مدد جاری رکھنا) humanitarian and people-to-people exchanges (عوامی روابط) with Afghanistan.

Demonising the NFC Award
THE newfound (نئی دریافت شدہ) eagerness (جذبہ) to recast (دوبارہ ترتیب دینا) Pakistan into a ‘hard state’, with its attendant (ساتھ آنے والے) power-centralising (اختیارات مرکزیت دینے والا) and anti-participatory (شمولیت کے خلاف) tendency (رجحان), has given an impetus (تحریک) to rolling back (واپس لینا) the federal structure enshrined (مضبوطی سے شامل) in the 1973 Constitution. Reworking (دوبارہ بنانے) the NFC Award by fiat (حکم سے) rather than political consensus (اتفاقِ رائے) is a part of this misplaced (غلط سمت) effort. This is a mistake that history will neither forget nor forgive (معاف کرنا).

Ever since the seventh NFC Award came into effect (نافذ ہونا) in 2010, it has been characterised (بیان کیا گیا) in conventional wisdom (روایتی سوچ), either mistakenly (غلطی سے) or disingenuously (بدنیتی سے), as the real reason for the country’s slide (تنزلی) towards fiscal (مالی) ‘insolvency’ (دیوالیہ پن). Has the said award been solely (صرف) responsible for sinking (ڈبونا) Pakistan’s public finances? This false conclusion (غلط نتیجہ) is the result of simplistic (سادہ لوح) reductionism (اختصار پسندی) and is not borne out (ثابت ہونا) by facts.

A clinical (غیر جانبدارانہ), dispassionate (جذبات سے پاک) and thorough (مکمل) analysis of Pakistan’s public finances since 2010 reveals the following facts and underlying (بنیادی) trends, most of which are not touched upon (زیر بحث لانا) in the discourse (مباحثہ). Instead, a lazy (سست) consensus has developed blaming the seventh NFC Award for the start of the country’s fiscal troubles. As this article will illustrate (واضح کرنا), this position is not supported by the evidence (ثبوت).

Pakistan’s public finances are under water (بری حالت میں) due to four proximate (قریب ترین) factors. One, perennial (ہمیشہ رہنے والا) low revenue mobilisation (آمدن اکٹھا کرنا). Two, lack of fiscal discipline (مالی نظم) on the expenditure side. Third, Covid-19. Fourth, the shock (جھٹکا) introduced by the rapid slide (تیز گراوٹ) in the rupee since 2018, especially the large devaluations (قدرفی کمی) in 2019 and 2023, combined with the steep (کھڑی) hike (اضافہ) in the policy rate since. None of these are directly related to the seventh NFC Award per se (بذاتِ خود), or are factors that could not have been anticipated (اندازہ لگانا) and accommodated (جگہ دینا) with better governance (حسنِ انتظام).

Firstly, Pakistan’s public finances have been in deep water (مشکل میں) since the late 1980s. Profligate (فضول خرچ) spending and chronic (پُرانا/مسلسل) low mobilisation of revenue led to persistently (مسلسل) high fiscal deficits (مالی خسارے), resulting in public debt touching around 535 per cent of revenue by 2000. This led to the need for debt relief (قرض میں رعایت) under the Paris Club in 2001. By 2008, the fiscal deficit had once again shot up (بہت بڑھ جانا) to 7.6pc of GDP.

The NFC Award’s real failure is not its formula but the misgovernance (بدانتظامی) of the ruling elite (حکمران طبقہ).

While the fiscal deficit did receive an impetus (تحریک) in the first few years after the seventh NFC Award went into effect, a result of the centre continuing to pay for substantial (خاطر خواہ) provincial expenditures despite the passage (منظوری) of the 18th Amendment, it was contained (قابو میں رکھا گیا) from 2014 onwards. Despite the need for additional fiscal resources (وسائل), the centre made no serious effort to raise tax revenue, with FBR’s tax effort remaining underwhelming (کمزور). The tax-GDP ratio remained flat-lined (مستحکم رہنا) at around 10pc of GDP.

In spite of (کے باوجود) the weak tax effort, growth in federal revenues roughly matched (تقریباً برابر رہنا) the annual increase in debt servicing from 2012 till 2018. As a result, the ratio of debt servicing to net federal revenue (after provincial transfers) was on a declining path (کم ہوتا ہوا رجحان) in this period.

The real shocks to Pakistan’s public finances have come from 2019 onwards. First of these was the impact of the massive (بہت بڑا) rupee devaluation combined with the steep increase in the policy rate by SBP since then. The rupee has lost 63pc of its value against the US dollar since 2017. Cumulatively (مجموعی طور پر), the twin shocks have added Rs23.1 trillion to the public debt stock between 2018 and 2025, accounting for (تشکیل دینا) a full 48pc of the increase in public debt over this period. Rather than provincial transfers, the sharp fall in the rupee combined with the skyrocketing (آسمان کو چھونا) of the SBP policy rate have strained (دباؤ ڈالنا) public finances. A compounding factor (مزید بگاڑ لانے والا سبب) occurred in 2020 and 2021, with the government responding to the Covid-19 shock with a fiscal stimulus (مالی سہارا) amounting to over 4.9pc of GDP.

Together with a perennial revenue mobilisation failure (ہمیشہ ناکامی), Pakistan faces a public spending crisis (بحران). Nothing illustrates (واضح کرنا) the spending misgovernance as much as the utilisation (استعمال) of the additional resources transferred to the provinces under the seventh NFC Award. Cumulatively, Rs40.4tr has been transferred to the provinces since 2010, ostensibly (ظاہری طور پر) for education, health services, etc, and yet, the number of children out of school has increased exponentially (بہت تیزی سے) instead of declining, health outcomes are not better, and nearly every social and development indicator (اشارے) in Pakistan has worsened (بدتر ہونا).

The combined public budget for 2024-25 starkly (کھل کر) demonstrates this governance failure. Total government expenditure (خرچ) (federal and provinces combined) amounted to Rs24tr. After paying interest, salaries and pensions, and for defence, an amount of Rs12.6tr (or $45 billion) was available for discretionary (اختیاری) spending. Not enough money for the impact on the lives of citizens to be visible? (کیا شہریوں کی زندگیوں میں تبدیلی کے لئے رقم کافی نہیں؟) Where has the money gone? The recently released IMF Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Assessment provides an answer with relation to the corruption (بدعنوانی) of the ruling elite. (Interestingly, to support the political project underway (جاری) in the country since 2022, a sharp increase in low-efficiency, high-leakage and misdirected (غلط سمت) public spending has occurred under the watch (نگرانی میں) of the very same IMF).

In summary (خلاصہ), the seventh NFC Award is at best a compounding factor (مزید خرابی بڑھانے والا عنصر) but not a proximate cause (براہ راست وجہ). Pakistan’s weak public finances predate (پہلے سے موجود ہونا) the award, and multiple governments since have failed to respond adequately (مناسب طور پر) by stepping up (بڑھانا) fiscal effort or introducing guardrails (حفاظتی اقدامات) for public expenditure. The real failure is a failure of governance of the ruling elite — unwilling (تیار نہیں) to tax themselves or their constituents, and unwilling to spend the country’s resources on meeting its challenges. This predatory (استحصالی) mindset is independent of the nature of the NFC Award.

Having said this, it is also important to recognise that instruments of redistribution (وسائل کی دوبارہ تقسیم) of resources, such as NFC Awards, should necessarily (ضروری طور پر) be the result of political processes. They should inherently (بنیادی طور پر) be democratic in nature. In federations such as Pakistan, the NFC Award anchors (بنیاد رکھنا) the project of federalism itself. Hence, technocratic (تکنیکی ماہرین کی) proposals to roll-back (واپس لینا) the vertical distribution formula, are relics (باقیات) of non-democratic set-ups (غیر جمہوری نظام) and thinking — and must be resisted (مخالفت کرنا).

The real issue is not how the resources are distributed, but how they are raised and where they are spent. Redistributing the federal divisible pool from mis-spending provinces to a mis-spending centre will not address (حل کرنا) Pakistan’s fiscal woes (مسائل).

ACROSS (پورے) Pakistan - from the floodplains (سیلاب کے میدانی علاقے) of Punjab to the heat-stricken (شدید گرمی سے متاثرہ) cities of Sindh - the climate crisis (موسمیاتی بحران) is taking a quiet, deadly toll. Children (بچے) and the elderly (معمر افراد) are dying not just from drowning (ڈوبنے) or heatstroke (لو لگنے), but from the diseases (بیماریاں), displacement (بے گھری) and neglect (لاپروائی) that follow. Yet the true scale (پیمانہ) of this loss remains hidden (پوشیدہ).

According to a new Amnesty International (ایمنسٹی انٹرنیشنل) report, fewer than 5pc (پانچ فیصد) of deaths in Pakistan are officially recorded (درج کئے جاتے). Most go undocumented (دستاویز سے باہر) during disasters (آفات). The report reveals a bleak (انتہائی تاریک) picture. In Badin, child mortality (بچوں کی اموات) surged by 57pc (57 فیصد) during the 2022 floods. In Karachi, morgues (لاش خانوں) overflowed during the 2024 heatwave (گرمی کی لہر).

Older adults (معمر افراد) with chronic illness (دیرینہ بیماری) and young children, whose bodies cannot regulate temperature (درجہ حرارت کو کنٹرول کرنا), are the most vulnerable (سب سے زیادہ خطرے میں) - yet the least visible (کم نظر آنے والے) in data (اعداد و شمار), policy (پالیسی) and disaster planning (آفات کی منصوبہ بندی).

The government owes them more. Health spending (صحت پر اخراجات) must rise from 2.91pc of GDP (جی ڈی پی) to meet global norms (عالمی معیارات). Healthcare workers (ہیلتھ کیئر ورکرز) must be trained to recognise (پہچاننا) and manage climate-related (موسم سے متعلقہ) illness in children and the elderly. Death registration (موت کی رجسٹریشن) should be expanded by removing fees (فیسوں کو ختم کرکے) and using outreach models (رسائی کے ماڈلز) that improved birth registration (پیدائش کی رجسٹریشن).

Older people must be included in health data systems (صحت کے ڈیٹا سسٹمز) and protected with a universal pension (عالمی پنشن) to reduce economic vulnerability (معاشی کمزوری) during heatwaves (گرمی کی لہروں) and floods (سیلاب). Children's access to education (تعلیم تک رسائی) must be preserved in disaster times (آفات کے اوقات) through resilient schools (مضبوط اسکول) and alternative teaching methods (متبادل تدریسی طریقے).

Displacement camps (بے گھر کیمپ) must be tailored (موزوں بنایا جائے) to the needs of children and older people. Local disaster authorities (مقامی آفات کے حکام) must be funded to deliver early warnings (ابتدائی انتباہ), cooling centres (ٹھنڈے مراکز), and plans that prioritise (ترجیح دیں) the vulnerable. Restrictions on NGOs (این جی اوز پر پابندیاں) that delay relief work (اِمدادی کام) must be lifted (ختم کی جائیں).

There is also a role for the international community (بین الاقوامی برادری). Climate finance (موسمیاتی مالیات) to Pakistan must come in the form of grants (گرانٹس), not loans (قرضے), and must prioritise adaptation (موسم کے مطابق ڈھلنا) and social protection (سماجی تحفظ). Heatwaves (گرمی کی لہریں), floods (سیلاب), or storms (طوفان) should not be a death sentence (موت کا حکم). The state (ریاست) must act - and the world must assist (مدد کرے) - to protect those most at risk (خطرے میں گھرے لوگوں)

free of cost

Realism’s problem
FOR ivory tower international relations experts, ‘Realism’, with a capital ‘R’, is a doctrine نظریہbased on the stark understanding that powerful states do whatever they want to weaker states, tempered only by the degree to which more powerful states exercise wisdom in using limited resources, and thereby curb their ambitions in a world of rivals.

Law, and indeed common sense, is brushed aside in the pursuit of interests. In this rough universe, there are no purely good or bad guys because everyone operates opportunistically under pressures and temptations. Still, states try to get along insofar as circumstances and interests allow. Realism as a philosophical outlook, then, lacks optimism, and leans towards endorsing, if not preserving, the status quo.

The sole virtue it champions is the exercise of prudence when relating desires to the means available, which annoys superpowers that don’t see the point of self-restraint in grasping for their goals. Realists, to their credit, rarely fall for pious official cant. Less convincingly, they focus on the high strategic realm of diplomacy, and so pay scant attention to national politics even though most nations deploy propaganda to persuade citizens that their leaders act nobly. Still, foreign policy mandarins aren’t always sound in their scheming. Realists can only admonish that nations will pay a high price for excesses, although usually, it is hapless citizenries, and not culpable elites, who suffer most.

Realism has become a reprehensible perspective, especially because its sour sages regard the US unromantically. No worse than other imperial powers on the butcher’s bench of history, mind you, but no better either. The difference in performance depends on the quality of leadership which, in a US administration brimming with aggressive neoconservatives and liberal internationalists, is deplorable. High officials intoxicated by overestimates of US military and economic power are like children hovering impudent feet over a line when they are told they must not cross and stamp them down. That juvenile pattern sums up Nato’s expansion up to an incensed Russia’s borders. What does a state do, according to realists, when threatened with encirclement by determined rivals? It does not matter who is in charge. Realism predicts the provoked state must fight if the other states do not back off. How does such elementary wisdom get disregarded? Because threatening powers believe they can get away with it, and so far they have. Russia, and only Russia, is painted in the Western media as the villain. In the vaunted liberal rules-based international system, based on US rules, there is no law against merciless provocation, only against responding to provocation.
So, the University of Chicago’s realist John Mearsheimer is excoriated for courageously pointing out what is obvious, that Nato (meaning the US) baited the Russians into its ‘special military operation’ in the eastern-most region of Ukraine already under assault from Western Ukrainian forces during a civil war which the Western press ignores. Mearsheimer’s heretical case is not remotely inaccurate, just inconvenient to indignant authorities. The atmosphere could not be more hostile. No Russian-guided missile, according to Western media, can help but strike a kindergarten or a crowded shopping centre whilst smart Nato-supplied Ukrainian munitions miraculously never explode around civilians.

Nixon-era realist Henry Kissinger, no hero of ours, likewise created ructions among super-sensitive elites when breaking ranks to urge negotiations to end the Ukraine war before it “created upheavals and tensions that will not be easily overcome”. Even Kissinger hits it right occasionally. Foreign policy, though, remains in the hands of shallow ideologues who are on the verge of scoring one of the greatest ‘own goals’ of all time, especially in terms of blowback in the US and Western Europe. How long can they continue this bloodbath farce of fighting Russia to the last dead Ukrainian?

The US government will swallow its press releases until the war hurts its own citizens in acute ways, and that point approaches. The Cold War reflex against Russia is unlikely to survive price surges that are the entirely avoidable result of sanctions. What of Ukraine’s sovereignty? No realist will tell you a given state has a ‘right’ to sovereignty. Ukraine’s government, already indebted and corrupt, is bankrolled by the US and Nato, who in 2014 aided the overthrow of its elected government and did so to cheers. Nato’s advisers afterwards trained neo-Nazis with no misgivings about deploying them in the Donbas war. We do not agree in all particulars with Realism but in time figures such as Mearsheimer and Kissinger will be proven painfully correct. Nothing is more foolish than to disregard Realism in any appraisal of world politics.
حقیقت پسندی کا مسئلہ
آئیوری ٹاور کے بین الاقوامی تعلقات کے ماہرین کے لیے، 'حقیقت پسندی'، جس کا سرمایہ 'R' ہے، ایک نظریہ ہے جس کی بنیاد اس مکمل فہم پر ہے کہ طاقتور ریاستیں کمزور ریاستوں کے لیے جو چاہیں کرتی ہیں، صرف اس حد تک کہ زیادہ طاقتور ریاستیں حکمت کا استعمال کرتی ہیں۔ محدود وسائل کا استعمال کرتے ہوئے، اور اس طرح حریفوں کی دنیا میں ان کے عزائم کو روکنا۔

مفادات کے حصول میں قانون اور درحقیقت عقل کو پس پشت ڈال دیا جاتا ہے۔ اس کچی کائنات میں، کوئی بھی خالصتاً اچھے یا برے لوگ نہیں ہیں کیونکہ ہر کوئی دباؤ اور لالچ میں موقع پرستی سے کام کرتا ہے۔ پھر بھی، ریاستیں حالات اور مفادات کی اجازت کے مطابق ساتھ چلنے کی کوشش کرتی ہیں۔ حقیقت پسندی ایک فلسفیانہ نقطہ نظر کے طور پر، اس کے بعد، رجائیت کا فقدان ہے، اور اگر برقرار نہیں ہے تو، جمود کی توثیق کی طرف جھکتا ہے۔

خواہشات کو دستیاب ذرائع سے جوڑتے وقت ہوشیاری کا مظاہرہ کرنے کی واحد خوبی ہے، جو ان سپر پاورز کو ناراض کرتی ہے جو اپنے مقاصد کو حاصل کرنے میں خود کو روکنا نہیں سمجھتی ہیں۔ حقیقت پسندوں کو، ان کے کریڈٹ پر، ش*ذ و نادر ہی متقی سرکاری کینٹ کا شکار ہوتے ہیں۔ کم یقین کے ساتھ، وہ سفارت کاری کے اعلیٰ اسٹریٹجک دائرے پر توجہ مرکوز کرتے ہیں، اور اس لیے قومی سیاست پر بہت کم توجہ دیتے ہیں، حالانکہ زیادہ تر قومیں شہریوں کو اس بات پر قائل کرنے کے لیے پروپیگنڈا لگاتی ہیں کہ ان کے رہنما عمدہ طریقے سے کام کرتے ہیں۔ پھر بھی، خارجہ پالیسی مینڈارن ہمیشہ اپنی سازشوں میں درست نہیں ہوتی۔ حقیقت پسند صرف یہ نصیحت کر سکتے ہیں کہ قومیں زیادتیوں کی بہت بڑی قیمت ادا کریں گی، حالانکہ عام طور پر، یہ بے بس شہری ہوتے ہیں، نہ کہ مجرم اشرافیہ، جو سب سے زیادہ نقصان اٹھاتے ہیں۔

حقیقت پسندی ایک قابل مذمت نقطہ نظر بن گیا ہے، خاص طور پر اس لیے کہ اس کے کھٹے بابا امریکہ کو غیر رومانوی طور پر دیکھتے ہیں۔ تاریخ کے قصائی بنچ پر دوسری سامراجی طاقتوں سے بدتر کوئی نہیں، یاد رکھیں، لیکن اس سے بہتر بھی نہیں۔ کارکردگی میں فرق قیادت کے معیار پر منحصر ہے جو امریکی انتظامیہ میں جارحانہ نو قدامت پسندوں اور لبرل بین الاقوامی پرستوں سے بھری ہوئی ہے، افسوسناک ہے۔ امریکی فوجی اور معاشی طاقت کے حد سے زیادہ نشے میں دھت اعلیٰ حکام ایسے بچوں کی مانند ہیں جو ایک لکیر پر بے ڈھنگے پاؤں منڈلاتے ہیں جب انہیں کہا جاتا ہے کہ انہیں عبور نہیں کرنا چاہیے اور ان پر مہر ثبت نہیں کرنی چاہیے۔ نابالغوں کا یہ نمونہ روس کی ناراض سرحدوں تک نیٹو کی توسیع کا خلاصہ کرتا ہے۔ حقیقت پسندوں کے مطابق، جب پرعزم حریفوں کی طرف سے گھیراؤ کی دھمکی دی جائے تو ریاست کیا کرتی ہے؟ اس سے کوئی فرق نہیں پڑتا کہ کون انچارج ہے۔ حقیقت پسندی کی پیش گوئی ہے کہ اگر دوسری ریاستیں پیچھے نہیں ہٹیں تو اشتعال انگیز ریاست کو لڑنا ہوگا۔ ایسی ابتدائی حکمت کو کیسے نظر انداز کیا جاتا ہے؟ کیونکہ دھمکی دینے والی طاقتوں کا خیال ہے کہ وہ اس سے بچ سکتے ہیں، اور اب تک ان کے پاس ہے۔ روس اور صرف روس کو مغربی میڈیا میں ولن کے طور پر پینٹ کیا گیا ہے۔ امریکی قوانین پر مبنی آزاد خیال اصولوں پر مبنی بین الاقوامی نظام میں، بے رحمانہ اشتعال انگیزی کے خلاف کوئی قانون نہیں ہے، صرف اشتعال انگیزی کا جواب دینے کے خلاف ہے۔
لہٰذا، شکاگو یونیورسٹی کے حقیقت پسند جان میئر شیمر نے جرات مندانہ طور پر اس بات کی نشاندہی کرنے پر حوصلہ افزائی کی کہ جو ظاہر ہے کہ نیٹو (جس کا مطلب ہے امریکہ) نے روسیوں کو یوکرین کے سب سے مشرقی علاقے میں اپنے 'خصوصی فوجی آپریشن' میں شامل کیا جو پہلے ہی مغربی یوکرائن کے حملے کی زد میں ہے۔ خانہ جنگی کے دوران افواج جسے مغربی پریس نظر انداز کرتا ہے۔ میئر شیمر کا بدعتی معاملہ دور سے غلط نہیں ہے، صرف ناراض حکام کے لیے تکلیف دہ ہے۔ ماحول زیادہ مخالف نہیں ہو سکتا تھا۔ مغربی میڈیا کے مطابق کوئی بھی روسی گائیڈڈ میزائل کسی کنڈرگارٹن یا پرہجوم شاپنگ سینٹر کو نشانہ بنانے میں مدد نہیں کر سکتا جب کہ نیٹو کی طرف سے فراہم کردہ یوکرائنی جنگی سازوسامان معجزانہ طور پر شہریوں کے ارد گرد کبھی نہیں پھٹتا۔

نکسن کے دور کے حقیقت پسند ہنری کسنجر نے، جو ہمارا کوئی ہیرو نہیں، اسی طرح انتہائی حساس اشرافیہ کے درمیان انتشار پیدا کیا جب صفوں کو توڑ کر یوکرائن کی جنگ کو ختم کرنے کے لیے مذاکرات پر زور دیا گیا، اس سے پہلے کہ اس نے "اتھل پتھل اور تناؤ پیدا کیا جس پر آسانی سے قابو نہیں پایا جا سکتا"۔ یہاں تک کہ کسنجر بھی اسے کبھی کبھار مارتا ہے۔ خارجہ پالیسی، اگرچہ، اتھلے نظریات کے حامل افراد کے ہاتھ میں ہے جو اب تک کے سب سے بڑے ’اپنے مقاصد‘ کو حاصل کرنے کے راستے پر ہیں، خاص طور پر امریکا اور مغربی یورپ میں دھچکا لگانے کے معاملے میں۔ وہ آخری مردہ یوکرین تک روس سے لڑنے کا یہ خونریزی کب تک جاری رکھ سکتے ہیں؟

امریکی حکومت اس وقت تک اپنی پریس ریلیز کو نگل لے گی جب تک کہ جنگ اس کے اپنے شہریوں کو شدید طریقے سے تکلیف نہ دے، اور یہ نقطہ قریب آ جائے۔ روس کے خلاف سرد جنگ کے اضطراب کا قیمتوں میں اضافے سے بچنے کا امکان نہیں ہے جو پابندیوں کا مکمل طور پر قابل گریز نتیجہ ہے۔ یوکرین کی خودمختاری کا کیا ہوگا؟ کوئی حقیقت پسند آپ کو یہ نہیں بتائے گا کہ کسی ریاست کو خودمختاری کا 'حق' حاصل ہے۔ یوکرین کی حکومت، جو پہلے ہی مقروض اور بدعنوان ہے، کو امریکہ اور نیٹو نے دیوالیہ کر رکھا ہے، جنہوں نے 2014 میں اس کی منتخب حکومت کا تختہ الٹنے میں مدد کی اور خوش کرنے کے لیے ایسا کیا۔ اس کے بعد نیٹو کے مشیروں نے نو نازیوں کو ڈونباس جنگ میں تعینات کرنے کے بارے میں کوئی شکوک و شبہات کے بغیر تربیت دی۔ ہم حقیقت پسندی کے ساتھ تمام تفصیلات میں متفق نہیں ہیں لیکن وقت کے ساتھ ساتھ میئر شیمر اور کسنجر جیسے اعداد و شمار دردناک طور پر درست ثابت ہوں گے۔ عالمی سیاست کی کسی بھی تشخیص میں حقیقت پسندی کو نظر انداز کرنے سے زیادہ بیوقوفی کوئی نہیں ہے