Arfaz Law Academy

Adnan Ahmad Pannu adv
03002078067

PLD 2026 SC 302
C.P.L.A.3767/2025
Mst. Naila Javed and another v. Nasir Khan and other
جرح (Cross-examination) کا مقصد گواہ کے بیان کی سچائی کو جانچنا، اس کی گواہی میں موجود تضادات یا اس کے سابقہ بیانات اور موجودہ گواہی کے درمیان اختلافات کو نمایاں کرنا ہوتا ہے۔ تاہم، موجودہ مقدمہ میں مدعا علیہ کے وکیل نے درخواست گزارہ کے بیانِ حلفی کی صداقت یا اعتبار کو جانچنے کے بجائے، اس کے کردار پر حملہ کرنے کی غرض سے غیر متعلقہ، نہایت تعصب پر مبنی اور شرمندہ کرنے والے سوالات کیے۔ انہی سوالات کی بنیاد پر درخواست گزارہ کے دل میں مدعا علیہ کے خلاف شدید نفرت پیدا ہوئی اور اس نے اس کے ساتھ دوبارہ ازدواجی زندگی بسر کرنے سے انکار کر دیا۔

یہ امر قابلِ توجہ ہے کہ خود مدعا علیہ کے بیان میں درخواست گزارہ کے کردار پر کوئی اعتراض موجود نہیں تھا، بلکہ اس نے محض رسمی انداز میں اسے دوبارہ اپنے ساتھ رہنے کی دعوت دی تھی۔

ریکارڈ سے مزید ظاہر ہوتا ہے کہ درخواست گزارہ کے وکیل کے سوالات کے جواب میں مدعا علیہ نے اعتراف کیا کہ اس نے درخواست گزارہ کو نان و نفقہ فراہم نہیں کیا۔ مزید ایک سوال کے جواب میں اس نے یہ بھی تسلیم کیا کہ اس نے سال 2016 میں، جب خاندانی مقدمہ زیرِ سماعت تھا، دوسری شادی کر لی تھی۔ اس نے یہ بھی کہا کہ اسے معلوم نہیں کہ آیا درخواست گزارہ کو اس دوسری شادی کا علم تھا یا نہیں۔

یہ جواب واضح طور پر ثابت کرتا ہے کہ مدعا علیہ نے مسلم عائلی قوانین آرڈیننس، 1961 (MFLO) کی دفعہ 6 کے تقاضے پورے نہیں کیے۔ فیملی کورٹ نے جرح کے دوران مدعا علیہ کے ان واضح اعترافات کو مناسب اہمیت نہیں دی۔

مدعا علیہ کا جان بوجھ کر نان و نفقہ ادا نہ کرنا، درخواست گزارہ کی اجازت بلکہ رضامندی کے بغیر دوسری شادی کرنا، اور جرح کے دوران اس پر کردار کشی کے الزامات لگانا، یہ تمام امور درخواست گزارہ کے مقدمہ کو قانونی ظلم (Legal Cruelty) اور غیر مساوی سلوک (Inequitable Treatment) کے دائرے میں لے آتے ہیں۔

ایسی صورتِ حال میں، جب مدعا علیہ نے درخواست گزارہ کو نان و نفقہ سے محروم رکھا، عدالت میں اس کی بدنامی کی، اور اس کی اجازت کے بغیر دوسری شادی کر لی، تو درخواست گزارہ کا اس کے ساتھ ایک ہی گھر میں رہنے سے انکار کسی بھی طور اس کی ضد یا نافرمانی (Recalcitrance) قرار نہیں دیا جا سکتا۔

ہم نے یہ بھی مشاہدہ کیا ہے کہ جب کوئی بیوی اپنے شوہر سے نفرت یا بیزاری (Aversion) کا اظہار کرتی ہے تو فیملی کورٹ اکثر نکاح کو خلع کی بنیاد پر ختم کر دیتی ہے، جس کے نتیجے میں بیوی اپنے مہر کے حق سے محروم ہو جاتی ہے۔ حالانکہ یہ دیکھنا ضروری ہے کہ اگر یہ نفرت کسی خاص وجہ کی بنا پر پیدا ہوئی ہو، تو نکاح کی تحلیل انہی مخصوص وجوہات کی بنیاد پر ہونی چاہیے۔

عدالت کو یہ اختیار حاصل نہیں کہ وہ اپنی جانب سے، اور بیوی کے واضح بیان کے بغیر، طلاق یا فسخِ نکاح کے دعوے کو خلع میں تبدیل کر دے۔

یہ اصول اب عدالتِ عظمیٰ کے حالیہ فیصلوں، بشمول Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan (PLD 2024 SC 645) اور Dr. Faryal Maqsood v. Khurram Shehzad Durrani (PLD 2025 SC 262) میں مکمل طور پر طے ہو چکا ہے، جن میں قرار دیا گیا کہ خلع ایک علیحدہ قانونی حق ہے جو صرف بیوی کی واضح، غیر مبہم اور رضاکارانہ رضامندی پر مبنی ہوتا ہے۔

لہٰذا، عدالت کسی بھی صورت میں، اپنی جانب سے، Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (DMMA) کے تحت دائر مقدمے کو خلع کے مقدمے میں تبدیل نہیں کر سکتی، جب تک کہ بیوی خود واضح اور غیر مبہم طور پر خلع کی خواہش کا اظہار نہ کرے۔

اس لیے ماتحت عدالتوں کے وہ متفقہ فیصلے، جن کے ذریعے درخواست گزارہ کی جانب سے خلع کا مطالبہ کیے بغیر ہی خلع کی ڈگری جاری کی گئی، قانوناً برقرار نہیں رہ سکتے۔

مزید برآں، دوسری شادی کے حوالے سے DMMA کی دفعہ 2(iia) واضح طور پر یہ حق دیتی ہے کہ اگر شوہر نے MFLO کی خلاف ورزی کرتے ہوئے دوسری شادی کی ہو تو عورت نکاح کی تحلیل (فسخِ نکاح) کی مستحق ہوگی۔

اگرچہ MFLO کی وہ ترمیمی شق بعد میں منسوخ ہو چکی ہے، تاہم DMMA میں شامل دفعہ 2(iia) پوری طرح نافذ العمل ہے، جیسا کہ Faryal Maqsood مقدمے میں واضح کیا گیا۔

MFLO کی دفعہ 6 کے مطابق، ثالثی کونسل (Arbitration Council) سے تحریری اجازت حاصل کیے بغیر دوسری شادی کرنا قانون کی خلاف ورزی ہے، جس کے نتیجے میں نہ صرف فوجداری سزا بلکہ دیوانی نتائج بھی برآمد ہوتے ہیں، جن میں DMMA کے تحت نکاح کی تحلیل بھی شامل ہے۔

موجودہ مقدمے میں مدعا علیہ نے نہ تو اپنی پہلی بیوی کی اجازت حاصل کی اور نہ ہی ثالثی کونسل سے تحریری اجازت یا اعلامیہ (Declaration) لیا۔

لہٰذا اس امر میں کوئی اختلاف نہیں کہ دوسری شادی ثالثی کونسل کی تحریری اجازت کے بغیر کی گئی، جو دفعہ 2(iia) DMMA کے تحت مقررہ قانونی بنیاد کی صریح خلاف ورزی ہے۔

فیملی کورٹ اور اپیلیٹ کورٹ دونوں اس واضح قانونی بنیاد پر فیصلہ کرنے میں ناکام رہیں، حالانکہ یہ بنیاد ریکارڈ پر پوری طرح موجود تھی۔
Adnan Ahmad Pannu Adv.
03002078067
𝓑𝓐𝓑𝓐 𝓛𝓐𝓦 𝓒𝓞𝓜𝓟𝓐𝓝y………
PLD 2026 SC 302
C.P.L.A.3767/2025
Mst. Naila Javed and another v. Nasir Khan and others
The goal of cross-examination is to dig out the truth by testing the witness's evidence, highlighting contradiction within witness's testimony or between their testimony and prior statement. However, the cross-examination conducted by learned counsel for the respondent rather than testing the veracity or credibility of petitioner's statement-in-chief, improperly sought to impeach the petitioner's character by asking irrelevant highly prejudicial questions solely to embarrass her. On the basis of which the petitioner expressed an aversion towards the respondent and refused to cohabit with him. It is significant to note that the respondent's own statement contained no criticism of the petitioner's character and included what appears to have been a perfunctory invitation for her to resume cohabitation. The record further reveals that while responding questions posed by learned counsel for the petitioner, the respondent admitted that he had not provided maintenance to the petitioner. While responding to another question the respondent admitted that he contracted second marriage during pendency of family case in the year 2016. He also admitted that he had no knowledge whether the petitioner was aware of his second marriage or not. This answer makes it abundantly clear that the respondent had not fulfilled the requirements of section 6 of the MFLO. The Family Court failed to accord due weight to the categorical admission made by the respondent during cross-examination. His admission of wilful neglect in providing maintenance, contracting second marriage without permission of petitioner much less consent and the allegation levelled against the petitioner during cross-examination squarely bring the case of the petitioner within the ambit of legal cruelty and inequitable treatment. In a situation where the respondent deprived the petitioner of maintenance, defamed her in cross-examination and contracted second marriage without her permission, the petitioner's refusal to cohabit with the respondent in the same house does not fall under the category of recalcitrance on her part.

We have noted that where a wife expresses aversion, the Family Court dissolves marriage on the grounds of khula and the wife is deprived of her dower. It is to be seen that if the aversion is the outcome of some reasons, then dissolution should be based on those particular reasons. The Courts should not, on its own motion and without the statement of a wife, convert the demand of divorce into khula. The principle is now well settled through recent judgments of this Court, including Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan (PLD 2024 SC 645) and Dr. Faryal Maqsood v. Khurram Shehzad Durrani (PLD 2025 SC 262), wherein it was held that khula is a distinct remedy grounded in the wife's express and voluntary consent. A Court cannot, on its own motion, convert a suit under the DMMA into one for khula in the absence of a clear and unequivocal statement by the wife. The concurrent judgments of the Courts below granting khula without the petitioner's seeking it, are thus legally unsustainable.
Furthermore, as to the second marriage, section 2(iia) of the DMMA expressly provides that a woman shall be entitled to the dissolution of marriage if the husband has contracted second marriage in contravention of MFLO. The insertion of clause 2(iia) of the DMMA remains fully operative notwithstanding the repeal of the amending provision in the MFLO, as explained in Faryal Maqsood (supra). Under section 6 of the MFLO, contracting a second marriage without written permission of the Arbitration Council constitutes a contravention attracting both penal consequences and civil consequences, including dissolution under the DMMA. In the present case, the respondent neither obtained the permission of existing wife nor sought a declaration from the Arbitration Council. There is thus no dispute that the second marriage was contracted without obtaining the written permission of the Arbitration Council. This conclusively establishes violation of the statutory ground under section 2(iia) of the DMMA. The Family Court and the Appellate Court failed to adjudicate this ground despite its clear availability on the record.

Responsibilities of Public Authorities in contesting court matters.
-------------------------
The Public authorities are obligated to contest the Court cases vigilantly with due diligence. Failure to do so amounts to the breach of their duty. In the case at hand, serious lapses, negligence and reckless conduct is apparent from the record. Despite various opportunities and change of counsel, CDA failed to actively defend the civil suit in question. In spite of availing various opportunities, neither any written statement was filed nor even after declaring ex-parte did the counsel appear to avail the opportunity of cross examination to the plaintiff, heedless demeanour which debilitated their case and endorsed the case of plaintiff. Engaging counsel does not absolve or exonerate a party leaving the case at the mercy of counsel, rather the negligence or laxity of a lawyer is by and large considered the negligence of the client seemingly as the principal and agent. In the scarcities of the sense of responsibility of counsel who disappear from Court despite engagement by his client, the court has no control over but as a consequence of such callous conduct, it is the client who suffers the adverse repercussions and not the opposing party. Every litigant should have a sense of duty to follow up his case with due attentiveness. On passing ex- parte decree, a valuable right accrues in favour of the successful party and ex parte decree cannot be recalled unless the defendant proves sufficient cause which should not be simply based on irresponsible conduct of counsel. If the counsel negligence is treated so sacrosanct, this will become a much loved and most favourable elected device of a litigant to intentionally delay the proceedings and after declaring ex-parte in every case, adopt this strategy and shift the entire burden on the shoulders of counsel, exonerating himself from the responsibility of seriously pursuing the Court case to safeguard his interest. A party cannot relegate whole accountability on his lawyer or the court but it is supposed to make inquiries for regular update in the progress of the lawsuit. However in the interest of justice, the Courts may intervene if the absence of counsel was due to circumstances beyond the control, such as the death or incapacitation of the lawyer or owing to some other force majeure circumstances, which can be distinguished from species of ordinary or gross negligence.

C.P.L.A.2284/2025
Capital Development Authority (CDA), through Chairman, Islamabad and others v. Dr. Sheikh Muhammad Shoaib Shafi and another
2026 SCMR 1033
Adnan Ahmad Pannu adv.
03002078067

نابالغان کی ذات، جائیداد اور وراثتی حقوق اور تقرری گارڈین کے حوالے سے وفاقی آئینی عدالت کی مفصل ہدایات
VVVVVVI. MUST READ JUDGEMENT.
Guidelines for observance by all Civil and Revenue Courts while dealing with proceedings affecting the person, property or inheritance rights of minors. These guidelines are intended to reinforce the statutory safeguards contained in the CPC, the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and the constitutional duty of the Courts, acting as parens patriae, to protect the rights and interests of minors:

(i) The Court shall, at the earliest stage of the proceedings, ascertain whether any party is a minor and ensure strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of Order # # , CPC before taking any substantive step.

(ii) A guardian ad litem shall be appointed strictly in accordance with Order # # , Rule 3, CPC, after satisfying the Court that the proposed guardian has no interest adverse to that of the minor.

(iii) No compromise, admission, concession, relinquishment or consent affecting the rights or property of a minor shall be accepted unless the Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded, that it is lawful and demonstrably in the best interests of the minor, and the requirements of Order # # , Rule 7, CPC have been fully complied with.

(iv) Where the compromise involves the transfer, relinquishment or alienation of a minor's property or inheritance rights, the Court shall also ensure compliance with the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and obtain prior permission from the competent Guardian Court wherever required by law

(v) Where a compromise is entered into by or on behalf of an illiterate, parda nasheen or otherwise vulnerable person representing a minor, the Court shall subject the transaction to heightened judicial scrutiny before according its approval

(vi) The Court shall remain vigilant to ensure that no conflict of interest exists between the guardian and the minor and, if necessary, appoint another suitable guardian in accordance with law.

(vii) Proceedings affecting the proprietary or inheritance rights of minors shall not be disposed of in undue haste, and every order affecting such rights shall reflect the Court's independent application of mind to the welfare and best interests of the minor.

(viii) These safeguards are substantive in nature and shall be strictly observed, keeping in view the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 4, 9, 23, 24, 25(3) and 35 of the Constitution, the doctrine of parens patriae, and the Injunctions of Islam relating to the protection of the property of minors and orphans.

These guidelines are intended to serve as guiding principles for all Civil and Revenue Courts while dealing with proceedings affecting the rights and property of minors. Their faithful observance would not only advance the constitutional mandate of protecting minorsbut would also strengthen public confidence in the administration of justice by ensuring that the rights of those under legal disability receive the highest degree of judicial protection.

C.P.L.A.30-L of 2025
Mst. Bushra Bibi Versus Additional District Judge, Bahawalnagar and others
09-07-2026
*Adnan Ahmad Pannu adv
03002078067

*بیان زیر دفعہ 164 ض ف کوئی بھی مجسٹریٹ قلمبند کر سکتا ھے قانونی طور پر یہ ضروری نہ ھے کہ بیان زیر دفعہ 164 ض ف صرف علاقہ مجسٹریٹ کے روبرو ہی قلمبند ھو -متعلقہ تھانے کے علاقہ مجسٹریٹ کے دوسرے ضلع کے مجسٹریٹ کے روبرو بھی بیان زیر دفعہ 164 ض ف قلمبند کرایا جاسکتا ھے -
*PLD 2022 Lahore 545*
*PLJ 2022 Lahore 302*
*PLJ 2022 Lahore 181*
*PLJ 2021 Lahore 645*
*بیان زیر دفعہ 164 ض ف کوئی بھی مجسٹریٹ قلمبند کر سکتا ھے قانونی طور پر یہ ضروری نہ ھے کہ بیان زیر دفعہ 164 ض ف صرف علاقہ مجسٹریٹ کے روبرو ہی قلمبند ھو -متعلقہ تھانے کے علاقہ مجسٹریٹ کے دوسرے ضلع کے مجسٹریٹ کے روبرو بھی بیان زیر دفعہ 164 ض ف قلمبند کرایا جاسکتا ھے -
Adnan Ahmad Pannu adv
03002078067

2025 SCMR 1633
سپریم کورٹ نے قتل کے مقدمہ میں یہ قرار دیتے ہوئے کہ استغاثہ اپنا کیس ثابت کرنے میں ناکام رہا ہے اپیل منظور کرتے ہوئے نہ صرف اپیلانٹ کو بری کردیا بلکہ اسی مقدمہ کے مفرور اشتہاری ملزم کو بھی بری کر نے کا حکم صادر کیا اور قرار دیا کہ مفرور اشتہاری ملزم کے خلاف کارروائی محض وقت کا ضیاع ہوگا
Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---As per record, one co-accused was a proclaimed offender---According to the prosecution evidence brought on the record, on the day of occurrence, the said co-accused since P.O along with co-accused since acquitted came outside the shop of the complainant along with appellant and co-convict and they both remained present outside the said shop and raised a proverbial lalkara that the complainant party should not be spared alive---Co-accused since acquitted, who was attributed a similar role along with co-accused since P.O, had already been acquitted by the Trial Court, therefore, no useful purpose shall be served by the arrest of co-accused since P.O and putting him to trial by the Trial Court because ultimately he had to be acquitted by the Trial Court in the light of observations made by the trial Court in respect of the case of co-accused since acquitted, as well as in the light of findings recorded by the Supreme Court in the instant judgment---Further Court proceedings in the case of co-accused since P.O shall be a futile exercise and the same shall amount to sheer abuse of process of the Court and the law---Thus, co-accused since P.O was acquitted by extending benefit of doubt.
*Adnan Ahmad Pannu adv.
*03002078067*

VVVVI. MUST READ JUDGEMENT.
PLJ 2026 SC (CrC) 217
سپریم کورٹ نے تمام ماتحت عدالتوں کو حکم صادر کیا ہے گواہ کا کھڑے ہوکر شہادت دینا قانون کا تقاضا نہ ہے۔ اور ساتھ ہی ہدایات جاری کی ہیں کہ بوقت شہادت گواہان کے بیٹھنے کیلئے عدالت میں کرسیوں، سیٹوں یا بنچوں کا مناسب بندوبست کیا جائے۔
We note with concern that during trials, particularly at the stage of examination and cross-examination, witnesses are often required to remain standing in the witness box for prolonged periods, sometimes extending to several hours regardless of age, gender and physical health of the person. There is no legal requirement under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 that a witness must remain standing while giving evidence. The continuation of such a practice serves no legitimate purpose in the administration of justice and is inconsistent with the dignity owed to every individual appearing before a court of law. The administration of criminal justice must be safe, humane, and consistent with constitutional guarantees. Compelling a witness, specially in cases related to sexual offences to remain standing for extended durations while giving testimony places an unnecessary physical and psychological burden upon the individual and may impair the clarity and composure with which evidence is delivered. Allowing a witness to remain seated while deposing does not diminish the sanctity of the oath or the dignity of judicial proceedings. On the contrary, it promotes fairness, composure, and the orderly administration of justice, particularly in cases involving prolonged cross-examination or witnesses who may be vulnerable, elderly, infirm, or otherwise under stress. The State bears a constitutional obligation to ensure that complainants and witnesses are provided a safe and reasonable environment within the courtroom. The protection of witnesses and complainants in Pakistan is firmly grounded in the constitutional framework of fundamental rights, particularly Articles 9 and 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which guarantee the security of person and the right to a fair trial and due process. These guarantees are further strengthened by the principle of human dignity embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. Together, these provisions impose a duty upon the State to ensure that witnesses and victims are protected from intimidation, coercion, humiliation, or undue hardship so that testimony may be rendered freely and judicial proceedings conducted in accordance with law.

The statutory framework further reflects this constitutional commitment. The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, 2017 at the federal level, together with corresponding provincial enactments, namely the Sindh Witness Protection Act, 2013, the Balochistan Witness Protection Act, 2016, the Punjab Witness Protection Act, 2018, and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Witness Protection Act, 2021, provide mechanisms for the protection of witnesses, including anonymity, relocation, security arrangements, and testimony through video-link. These legislative measures reinforce the guarantees of a fair trial and seek to ensure that vulnerable witnesses, including women and minors, may depose without fear or unnecessary hardship.

A court of law is not merely a chamber where disputes are resolved; it is a place where the majesty of the law must walk hand in hand with the dignity of the individual. Every person who enters its precincts, whether as a litigant, an accused, a complainant, or a witness, comes under the protection of the Constitution. A witness who steps into the witness box does so not as a servant of the court, but as a citizen assisting the administration of justice. The law requires such a person to speak the truth; it does not require that truth to be extracted through needless physical strain. Justice does not demand endurance; it demands truth. And truth is best spoken where the witness is afforded composure, security, and respect. A courtroom must therefore remain a place where justice is administered not only with authority but with humanity.

Accordingly all District and Sessions Judges as well as courts subordinate to them, Administrative Judges of Special Courts and Tribunals in Pakistan, are directed to ensure that appropriate seating arrangements are mandatorily provided to the person in witness box, whether in the form of a chair, seat, or bench. Allowing a witness to remain seated while giving evidence remains consistent with the constitutional guarantees of human dignity and the right to a fair trial.

The Registrar of this Court is directed to circulate a copy of this judgment to the Honourable Chief Justices of all High Courts in Pakistan for the purpose of ensuring its circulation, implementation, and compliance in all courts where evidence is recorded, including civil courts, criminal courts, special courts, and tribunals operating under federal or provincial laws. The Honourable Chief Justices shall ensure that appropriate administrative directions are issued so that the requirement of providing seating arrangements for witnesses in the witness box is implemented and observed across all subordinate courts and judicial forums within their respective jurisdictions.
Cr. PLA. 1160/2025
Maham Fatima VERSUS The State and another
*Adnan Ahmad Pannu adv.*
03002078067

Last date of Law G*t is 19 July 2026..