The Write House

22/08/2026

*Is ignorance ever an excuse in law?*

By Chinua Asuzu

Lawyers often quote the maxim “ignorantia juris non excusat” (“ignorance of the law is no excuse”) as if it were an unbreakable rule. Two points should catch the reader's attention. First, the maxim applies to ignorance of law, not to ignorance of fact. Second, like all maxims, it has a specific domain: it belongs to a particular legal field. No maxim freely roams without boundaries.

On the first point, remember the countervailing maxim: “ignorantia facti excusat” (“ignorance of fact excuses”). Despite the apparent absolute translation, its legal meaning is more modest: ignorance of fact CAN serve as an excuse. It does not always provide relief, but, as Black’s Law Dictionary notes, “whatever is done under a mistaken impression of a material fact is excused or provides grounds for relief.” Therefore, the maxim supports the idea that acts and contracts made under a material mistake are voidable.

Regarding the second point, ignorance of the law is no excuse ('ignorantia juris non excusat') clearly falls under criminal law—and even there, only against a defendant who claims ignorance of criminal law. Black’s Law Dictionary states it concisely: “Lack of knowledge about a legal requirement or prohibition is never an excuse to a criminal charge.” Glanville Williams, the notable criminal-law scholar, highlights the limitation: the maxim applies “only to ignorance of criminal law” (Textbook of Criminal Law, 456).

The doctrinal problem occurs when this maxim is taken out of its limited context and treated as a universal rule. It is not. It should not be used when criminal liability is not at stake. Lawyers must resist the urge to apply it beyond its specific scope. They should remember two key points: (a) ignorance of facts can be a defense, and (b) ignorance of law can also serve as a defense outside criminal cases. In fact, even in criminal trials, ignorance of civil law might negate mens rea and thus function as a defense.

Regarding ignorance of fact, the law distinguishes between minor mistakes and those that affect the core issue. If the error involves a material fact, relief may be granted. This principle applies to contract, tort, restitution, and certain criminal defenses. But the mistaken party must act in good faith and without negligence. When those conditions are met, the law may forgive the mistake.

The law, at its most humane, is not mechanical. It is flexible and open to reason, fairness, and the moral aspects of human conduct. It recognizes that ignorance—especially when honest, reasonable, and not negligent—can sometimes excuse what would otherwise be wrongful. Legal practitioners and judges must avoid relying too heavily on maxims as if they were divine truths. Instead, they should remember that ignorance can provide an excuse, and at times, justice truly demands that it does.

04/08/2026

11/07/2026

*Does mere entry in a dictionary qualify a word for use as alleged or at all?*

*By Chinua Asuzu*

The short answer is NO.

Most lexicographers, especially at descriptivist institutions like Merriam-Webster, don’t prescribe how language should be used. They describe how language is used. So when a dubious word or a distorted meaning gains traction in the wild, they usher it into the dictionary on the spurious ground of mere existence in the linguistic ecosystem. Some words are listed just so you’ll understand what semiliterate people mean when they use them, not so you’ll use them yourself.

Here lies the great divide in modern linguistics: prescriptivism versus descriptivism. The prescriptivist defends standards, usage rules, and grammatical integrity. The descriptivist chronicles language in motion, however fractured, misbegotten, vulgarized, or informal. If prescriptivists are the lexical gatekeepers, descriptivists are the lexical gatecrashers. As Merriam-Webster itself admits, inclusion “does not imply approval of a term or its use.”

Lawyers are prescriptivists. We have to be. Legal writing demands standards. As prescriptivists, we reject the idea that frequency of misuse justifies legitimization. We champion clarity, convention, and logic.
Some dictionary entries are cautionary tales. Exhibit A: “severally,” which some dictionaries now define, secondarily, as “several times”—a usage born of ignorance if not illiteracy. The word “severally” has long meant and still means “separately, individually,” as in the legal phrase “jointly and severally liable.” If you mean “several times,” then say “several times.” “Conversate,” “disorientated,” “irregardless,” and “majorly” are all in some dictionaries, but they should never feature in your speech or writing.

Lawyers and other serious writers should familiarize themselves with usage dictionaries and not rely solely on general or lexical dictionaries. ‘Garner’s Modern English Usage,’ now in its 5th edition, is highly recommended.

Slavish deference to general dictionaries undermines that linguistic and semantic maturity that should be part of a lawyer’s professional arsenal. A certain degree of linguistic sophistication is expected of a lawyer. Let us not bow before lexicographical populism. Let us resist the creeping normalization of error by entry in self-disrespecting dictionaries.

Unlike descriptivists, who are in a hurry to inflate their dictionaries with dubious entries, prescriptivists like me and hopefully you strive to uphold Standard Written English, with its grammatical, lexicographical, and linguistic standards. We prescriptivists understand that not all change is progress. Language may evolve, but that evolution should be guided, not left to drift.

So, no. Mere entry in a dictionary does not qualify a word for use as defined or at all.

26/05/2026

*In advocacy, advance both justifying and motivating arguments.*

*By Chinua Asuzu*

A justifying argument appeals to law, logic, and reason. It draws breath from legal rules, sometimes along with policy. “A justifying argument shows that the law requires or at least permits the result you want.” Richard K. Neumann Jr & Kristen Konrad Tiscione, _Legal Reasoning and Legal Writing_, 7th ed. (Wolters Kluwer, 2013), 271 (italics in original).

Justifying arguments are what most of us are used to. Let’s incorporate motivating arguments to augment and boost our advocacy.

A motivating argument appeals to the judge’s shared humanity and sense of justice. It derives potency from the righteousness of the cause. It motivates the judge to think beyond lawyer’s law and resolve the dispute fairly, justly, and pragmatically. “A motivating argument causes a judge to want to decide in your favor. It causes the judge to feel that any other decision would be unwise or unjust. Motivating arguments tend to be centered on facts or a combination of facts and policy.” Neumann & Tiscione 270–271.

Motivating arguments are appeals to the judiciary to do what’s right and wise, while weaning itself off arid legalism. “Motivating arguments … are more often appeals to a human sense of justice or pragmatic policy needs.” Neumann & Tiscione 275.

Justifying arguments are uppermost in most judges’ minds as they embark on the delicate art of judging.

“A motivating argument alone isn’t enough because even a motivated judge isn’t supposed to act without a solid legal justification. Judges understandably want to feel that they’re doing a professional job of judging.” Neumann & Tiscione 271.

Yet without the emotional reinforcement of motivating arguments, justifying arguments will lack rhetorical manure and fail to persuade. “The law can usually be interpreted in more than one reasonable way. When a judge is given a choice between two conflicting justifying arguments, each of which is reasonable, the judge will take the one she or he is motivated to take.” Neumann & Tiscione 272.

Buttress your justifying arguments with motivating arguments. Show (but don’t tell) the judge that deciding as you urge will be not only right but also righteous.